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ABSTRACT
THE LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS (IPOs):VENTURE CAPITALISTS, REPUTATION 
OF INVESTMENT BANKERS, AND CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Halit Gonen?
Old Dominion University 
Director: Dr. John Doukas
The Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) literature has uncovered the underpricing, hot issue 
markets, and long-term underperformance anomalies. The long-term underperformance of 
IPO firms has gained the focus o f recent academic attention. Recent studies document that 
venture capitalists, and the reputation o f  investment bankers are associated with the long-term 
performance o f firms going public. The lack o f venture capitalists has been shown to relate 
with the long-term underperformance of IPO firms. On the other hand, IPO firms 
underwritten by less reputable underwriters have been found to experience more negative 
long-term market adjusted returns. Unlike previous studies, this study examines the 
interactive effects o f  venture capitalists, and the reputation of investment bankers on the 
long-term performance of EPOs using alternative performance measures. Moreover, we 
examine the possible interactive effects of institutional ownership with venture capitalists and 
the reputation o f investment bankers. It is argued that the investigation o f the joint effects 
of venture capitalists, reputation of investment bankers, and institutional investors on the 
long-term performance of IPO firms is more likely to throw additional light on the long-term 
underperformance o f IPO firms than examining the role of these factors independently. In 
addition, this study investigates whether the corporate structure of the firm is associated with 
the long-term performance of EPOs. This investigation relies on 456 IPO transactions over 
the period of 1989-1994. Results based on raw and adjusted buy-and-hold returns show that
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the reputation of investment bankers on the long-term performance o f IPO firms is negligible, 
if  any. These results are inconsistent with the findings o f Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). 
However, venture backed IPOs with considerable institutional ownership experience superior 
long-term performance. Consistent with Bravand Gampers (1997), our evidence shows that 
long-term performance o f IPO firms is not significantly different from counterpart IPO firms. 
Size/book-to-market/industry adjustment not only decreases underperformance o f  non­
venture backed IPO firms, but also eliminates the superior performance o f venture-backed 
IPO firms relative to both, market and non-venture backed IPO firms. Finally, the analysis 
provides little evidence in support of the corporate diversification hypothesis which states that 
diversified IPO firms have lower long-term performance in comparison to focused BPO firms.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Since Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) documented the long-term return 
anomaly for Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), a growing body o f the literature has been trying 
to develop an explanation for the long-term underperformance of IPOs against several 
comparison groups. Previous theoretical and empirical studies identify several factors behind 
the long term performance o f firms going public. Factors such as venture capitalists, and the 
reputation o f  investment bankers have been found to be associated with the long-term 
underperformance o f  IPOs.
In a recent study, Brav and Gampers (1997) examine the differences in the long-term 
performance between venture-backed and nonventure-backed IPOs. They find that venture- 
backed EPOs outperform nonventure-backed IPOs in the five years after the offering. A wide 
difference occurs between two groups in terms o f equally weighted returns and wealth 
relatives against the several comparable benchmarks1. Using Fama-French (1993) three 
factor asset pricing model, Brav and Gampers conclude that venture-backed IPO firms do not 
significantly underperform, while the smallest nonventure-backed IPO firms do. One of their 
possible explanations for the underperformance o f small nonventure-backed IPO firms is 
investor sentiment. Specifically they argue that the equity of small nonventure-backed IPOs 
is held primarily by individuals, and individuals are more likely to be influenced by fads or lack 
complete information. In addition, Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that institutional 
ownership after an IPO is substantially higher for venture-backed IPOs than nonventure- 
backed IPOs. The implication of this explanation is that since venture-backed IPOs
'Brav and Gampers (1997) show that performance differences between venture-backed and nonventure-backed 
IPOs is significantly reduced by using the value weighted returns. Value weighting also reduces underperformance 
for nonventure-backed IPOs.
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2overperform nonventure-backed IPOs, most institutional investors will not significantly lose 
by investing in IPOs because they usually do not buy the small issues that perform the worst. 
Brav and Gampers also argue that asymmetric information could be another reason for the 
underperformance of small nonventure-backed IPOs, referring to the reputation of 
underwriters, since Barry, Musceralla, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) show that small 
nonventure-backed firms go public with lower tier underwriters than similar venture-backed 
firms.
On the other hand, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) examine the effect o f the 
reputation of investment bankers on long-term performance o f IPOs. They argue that high 
reputable underwriters attempt to market IPOs that will experience the least negative long­
term market adjusted returns. Since investors will measure the quality o f the firm with the 
investment bankers’ past performance, by marketing IPOs that have relatively better long­
term performance, investment bankers protect their reputation. Carter, Dark, and Singh show 
that the long-term performance of IPOs is related to the reputation o f  underwriters. IPOs 
underwritten by more prestigious investment bankers experience, on average, a less negative 
performance over the three-year period. Their results imply that $132 would need to be 
invested in the IPOs offered by low reputable underwriters to achieve the same payoffs as 
$100 put in the IPOs underwritten by high reputable investment bankers for a three-year 
holding period.
While these studies provide new insights into the IPO underperformance literature, 
it is unlikely that venture capitalists or investment bankers act independently. It is quite 
possible that high reputable investment bankers select to underwrite the offerings of firms
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3financed by venture capitalists. In light o f  the recent evidence by Ritter and Chen (1998)2 that 
investment bankers do not compete on price in the supposedly highly competitive investment 
banking market, high reputable investment bankers are likely to select IPOs on the basis o f  
venture capitalists3. If there is no price difference between high and low reputable investment 
bankers, firms going public would prefer high reputable investment bankers for their IPOs, 
instead of low reputable underwriters. IPO firms expect that high reputable investment 
bankers can raise funds at more favorable terms. However, high reputable investment bankers 
will be selective in protecting their reputation by underwriting venture-backed IPOs that have 
high growth prospects. Another reason would be reducing asymmetric information between 
investment bankers and issuer firms because the presence o f venture capitalists can also 
reduce the uncertainty o f a firm’s true value. Thus, investment bankers can manage to 
underwrite IPOs without having to sell them at deep discounts.
One could also argue that venture capitalists decide to back IPOs that are in the 
process of being underwritten by reputable underwriters. This is probably because they may 
have concerns about the underwriting procedure especially in the pricing process for stocks 
that they back.
On the other hand, venture-backed IPOs can be underwritten by low reputable 
investment bankers since these IPO firms may not need prestigious underwriters to certify 
firm quality and future cash flow prospects of the venture capitalists. Therefore, if venture 
capitalists act to send a credible signal to investors, there would not be any difference for
2 see also Business Week November 9, 1998
3 Ritter and Chen (1998) show that there is a standard rate of 7% of the per-share offering price for the fees 
charged by investment bankers in most IPOs over the last six years. For instance, only about half of all IPOs had 
7% fees between 1991 and 1994, while investment bankers charged 7% about 75% of the time in the last three 
years.
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4venture-backed IPOs to be underwritten either by more or less reputable investment bankers.
The above discussion suggests that venture-backed IPOs can be underwritten by high 
or low reputable investment bankers. Venture-backed IPOs are not those shown having the 
long-term underperformance in the recent literature, but IPOs underwritten by low reputable 
investment bankers are. In this case, we can ask a question o f whether there is a difference 
in the long-term performance between venture-backed IPOs underwritten by high or low 
reputable investment bankers?
Nonventure-backed IPOs, however, are likely to seek certification through the 
reputation of investment bankers. Therefore nonventure-backed IPOs can also be 
underwritten by high or low reputable investment bankers. In this case, it would be 
interesting to see whether high reputable investment bankers mitigate the wealth hazard from 
underwriting nonventure-backed IPOs.
We argue that it is very important to examine the interactive effects of venture 
capitalists and the reputation of investment bankers on the long-term performance o f IPOs 
using alternative performance measures to understand the long-term underperformance 
phenomenon of EPOs.
Our sample consists o f 456 IPOs issued in 1989-94 period. In this sample, the 
numbers o f IPOs indicating the interactive effects between venture capitalists and the 
reputation o f investment bankers are as follows: There has been a high demand for high 
reputable underwriters; one hundred forty five of 456 (32 percent) venture-backed and one 
hundred seventy one (38 percent) nonventure-backed IPOs are underwritten by high reputable 
investment bankers. Fifty-two (12 percent) venture-backed and eighty (18 percent) non­
venture backed IPOs are underwritten by low reputable investment bankers.
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5Empirical evidence also shows that the long-term underperformance o f IPOs is 
associated with the low institutional ownership o f IPO shares. Fields (1996) argue that long­
term BPO performance is positively related to institutional holdings. She finds that, in the 
long-term, IPOs having larger institutional shareholdings significantly outperform those with 
smaller institutional shareholdings. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1998) test the hypothesis 
that information about the quality o f issues appears to be available at flipping, which is defined 
as percentage o f first day dollar volume ‘sold’ in block trades by institutional investors. They 
find that heavily flipped IPOs significantly underperform EPOs with less flipping over one 
year holding period. This result also implies that institutional investors bid and gain a larger 
allocation of stronger IPOs, leaving a disproportionate share o f weaker IPOs for the smaller 
investors. Therefore, we investigate the joint effect o f institutional ownership along with the 
reputation of investment bankers on the long-term performance o f IPOs. We also look at the 
role of institutional ownership in connection with venture capitalist effect.
Several studies document that there is a relationship between firm value and 
diversification or focus strategies. Serveas (1996) find that diversified firms sell at a 
substantial discount when compared to single segment firms for several years in 1970s and 
1980s. John and Ofek (1995) find that the improvement in performance is positively related 
to the increase in focus. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that diversified firms have values that 
average, during 1986-91, 13% to 15% below the sum o f  the imputed values their segments. 
The loss in value is less for related diversification. Comment and Jarell (1995) find a negative 
relation between abnormal stock returns and several measures o f diversification. Lang and 
Stulz (1994) also show that there is a negative relation between Tobin’s q and several 
diversification measures.
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6Finally, we try to create new approach in understanding o f the long-term anomaly of 
IPOs. We investigate whether the long-term performance o f a sample of IPOs is related to 
corporate structure o f  IPO firms. Since diversification is found as a value decreasing strategy, 
it could also be related to the long-term underperformance o f IPOs. Therefore, we examine 
whether there is a link between the long-term performance o f IPOs and corporate 
diversification. This is accomplished by dividing the sample into multi and single-segment 
firms.
Our empirical evidence shows that, consistent with the results o f Brav and Gampers 
(1997), venture backed IPO firms outperform non-venture backed IPO firms in terms o f raw 
and adjusted returns, based on value-weighted and S&P 500 index in all periods. When BHRs 
are adjusted by CRSP equally-weighted index and size/book-to-market/industry matched 
firms’ returns, performance differences become insignificant between venture and non-venture 
backed IPO firms. Size/book-to-market/industry adjustment not only decreases 
underperformance o f non-venture backed IPO firms, but also eliminates the superior 
performance of venture-backed IPO firms relative to both, market and non-venture backed 
IPO firms.
Results based on raw and adjusted buy-and-hold returns also show that the reputation 
of investment bankers on the long-term performance o f IPO firms is negligible, if any. These 
results are inconsistent with the findings o f Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). Comparison of 
IPO firms with high institutional ownership and IPO firms with low institutional ownership 
indicate that institutional investors have an influence on the long-term performance o f  IPO 
firms over the 1-year and 3-year periods. Finally, our analysis provides little evidence in 
support o f  the corporate diversification hypothesis which states that diversified IPO firms
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7have lower long-term performance in comparison to focused IPO firms.
The simultaneous analysis of venture capitalists versus reputation o f  investment 
bankers generate evidence in support of the view that venture capital exerts more influence 
the long-term performance of IPO firms, while investment bankers’ reputation does not 
appear to affect the long-term performance o f IPO firms. Since venture capitalists play a more 
important role on the determination o f the long-term performance of IPO firms, our 
simultaneous analysis demonstrates that investigating the role o f reputation o f investment 
bankers independently is likely to produce misleading results. Hence, the lower 
underperformance of IPO firms underwritten by high reputable investment bankers reported 
by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) may be driven by venture capital participation in these 
firms and not by investment bankers’ reputation per se. We also find that institutional 
ownership is also an important factor in explaining the long-term performance o f IPO firms.
Cross sectional regression results also reveal the importance o f venture capital and 
institutional ownership on the long-term performance of IPO firms.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Underpricing
Early research related to Initial Public Offerings (IPO) documented evidence that, on 
average, new issues are underpriced. Early work by Ibbotson (1975) showed that IPOs were 
associated with positive abnormal returns (i.e., the difference between the first market price 
and the offer price). In his review o f the empirical evidence on the initial public equity 
offerings, Smith (1986) concluded that the average underpricing appears to exceed 15 
percent. This implies that underwriters consistently offer securities at substantial discounts 
from their values that are set in the after market.
Several theories have been developed to explain the underpricing phenomenon o f new
issues.
2. La Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetiy hypotheses imply that the average underpricing is greater for 
issues with greater ex ante uncertainty about true value o f firms. Rock (1986) argues that a 
winner’s curse occurs because of information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
potential investors. In order to avoid Akerlof s (1970) lemon’s problem, issuers rationally 
underprice new issues because uninformed buyers will withdraw from a market if they do not 
have substantial premium to solve their informational disadvantage.
Ritter (1984) and Beaty and Ritter (1986) further develop and test the implications 
o f Rock’s model, namely suggested positive relationship between the degree o f  underpricing 
and the ex ante uncertainty. Ritter argues that the more uncertain the market is about the true
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9market value o f  the issuing firm, the higher the discount the company must offer to the 
uninformed investors to submit bids. Two variables are used as proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty. The annual sales of the issuing firm prior to the official listing and the volatility 
o f  its stock returns after market period. The results show a significant relationship between 
these two variables and the degree of discount. Beaty and Ritter introduce underwriters into 
Rock’s argument. Investment bankers have an incentive to ensure that new issues are 
underpriced. Otherwise, they lose underwriting commissions in the future. I f  they underprice 
too much, they will lose business from issuers, o r if they underprice too little, they will lose 
business from investors. As an empirical evidence o f this argument, Beaty and Ritter find a 
significant positive relationship between the level o f  underpricing and the amount o f ex ante 
uncertainty.
Baron (1982) argues that offer prices for new issues will be lower due to information 
asymmetry between issuing firms and the investment bankers. He assumes that investment 
bankers have better information than issuers about demand for the issue, and hence the 
ensuing market price. Since issuers delegate the offer price decision to the underwriter and 
cannot perfectly monitor the underwriter, the underwriters have an incentive to underprice 
in order to minimize their risk in selling the entire amount committed to outside investors. 
Musceralla and Vetsuypens (1989) test the Baron’s model by examining self marketed IPOs,
i.e., IPOs of investment bankers who market their own securities. Since we cannot talk about 
information asymmetry in this case, there should not be any underpricing. Their evidence does 
not support Baron’s hypothesis. They find that there is still underpricing even without 
information asymmetry.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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2. Lb Legal Liability
Tinic (1988) develops an insurance hypothesis that underpricing serves as a form of 
insurance against legal liability and the associated damages to the reputations o f investment 
bankers. The securities act o f 1933 specifically identifies the parties that may be subject to 
civil liabilities on account o f false or inadequate information presented in the registration 
statement. To recover damages, a purchaser of an IPO can sue every person who has signed 
the registration statement, including every investment banker that is associated with the 
offering. Tinic argues that underpricing of the offering may provide the issuer and the 
underwriter with protection against potential legal liabilities more efficiently. The insurance 
hypothesis claims that the IPOs issued after 1933 should exhibit substantially larger initial 
excess return than the new issues brought to the market before the enactment o f the Securities 
Act.
Tinic (1988) tests the implication o f  the insurance hypothesis with data on IPOs that 
were issued before and after the Securities Act of 1933. The results indicate that the Act had 
a significant impact on the pricing of IPOs. While the initial excess returns on the pre-SEC 
sample o f IPOs were significantly positive, the magnitude of the underpricing is less than 
excess returns generated by the IPOs issued after 1933.
2.1.c Signaling Theories
Signaling theories argue that the initial market price provides a signal o f the quality 
o f  the IPO. IPOs are characterized by a great deal of uncertainty about their true value 
because o f the scarcity of public information at the time of the initial offering. Underpricing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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o f an IPO reveals significant information that the firm is good to investors, because only 
good firms can be expected to recoup this loss after their performance is realized.
Several studies modeled a signaling game in which underpricing is the key-element. 
These models have in common that the firms’ owner-managers know true value o f the firm 
while the potential investors do not. The underpricing is deliberate and voluntarily to signal 
the true value, and it is justified to achieve a better price for a subsequent equity offering. In 
Welch’ (1989) model, underpricing is a credible signal o f  good firms because it is costlier for 
bad firms due to other direct imitation costs and a probability o f revelation between the two 
issues. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) present a generalization of Leland and Pyle’s (1977) 
model, in which the manager-owners signal both the expected return and variance of future 
earnings using the fraction retained by the owners and underpricing as signals. Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) suggest that underpricing will lead investors to interpret subsequent 
dividend payments more favorably. The firm with higher probability o f high earnings finds it 
thus cheaper to signal.
Clearly, signaling models would have little practical importance if companies do not 
follow a multiple-stage sale policy o f  an initial offering by subsequent equity offerings or 
insider sales. Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993) test the signaling hypotheses empirically 
by assessing the likelihood of a Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) as function of the IPO- 
underpricing. They find a small explanatory power of IPO-underpricing for the likelihood of 
SEOs, which cast doubt on the signaling hypotheses. Garfinkel (1993) tests the signaling 
hypothesis by looking whether the likelihood o f insider selling increases as a function of 
underpricing. He finds no correlation, casting further doubt on underpricing signaling. 
Helwege and Liang (1996) track the 1983 IPO cohort and find that in any of the following
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ten years, fewer than 4 percent o f  firms return the equity market, instead increase in 
investments was financed mainly by retained earnings and private debt in their first decade.
2.1.d Investment bankers ’ reputation
The prevailing belief in the marketplace holds that the choices o f  investment bankers 
affect the price of an IPO. Louge (1973) suggests that the choice o f a prestigious rather than 
a non-prestigious investment bank might influence the price which investors are willing to pay 
for the shares sold. This statement reflects the belief that when a firm sells shares for the first 
time its true value is imperfectly known by investors and that the reputation of investment 
bankers chosen by firm’s owner provides information to the market about the firm’s true 
value. Titman and Trueman (1986) develop a model to demonstrate how the quality of the 
auditor or investment bank chosen can rationally be used by investors in valuing new issues. 
They argue that an entrepreneur with more favorable private information about his firm’s 
value will choose a higher quality auditor or investment bank than will an entrepreneur with 
less favorable private information. Their model predicts that the higher the quality, the more 
favorable will investors infer the information to be and so the higher will be the price at which 
the new issue can be sold.
Carter and Manaster (1990) examine the effects of underwriter reputation on the 
initial performance of IPOs. They find a significant negative relation between the reputation 
o f  underwriters and the magnitude o f the IPO underpricing. This result indicates that low 
dispersion firms are seen to use high prestigious underwriters to signal to the market that they 
are in fact low risk firms. In a recent study, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) find that each of 
reputational proxies used in the prior researches is significantly related to IPO initial returns;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the better the reputation o f the underwriter, the less is the short-run underpricing.
2.1.e Venture Capitalists
The role o f venture capitalists on the IPO underpricing was seen as an empirical 
evidence o f both information asymmetry and signaling theories. In terms o f asymmetry 
information, Megginson and Weiss Hanly (1991) state that venture capitalists can reduce the 
uncertainty o f a firm’s true value. They find that firms certified by venture capitalists 
experience on average lower underpricing at public offerings.
In another empirical work, Barry, Musceralla, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1988) present 
evidence that IPOs of firms initially backed by venture capitalists are just as underpriced as 
those without such backing. Venture capitalists share at least some o f  the private information 
about prospects of the firms they back, and they come to the IPO market repeatedly. 
Therefore, the authors speculate, venture capitalists may have an even greater incentive to 
build a reputation, as the type that back good firms.
2.2 Hot Issue Markets
The past studies on the offering price argument of IPOs document that IPOs of firms’ 
stocks are underpriced. What is even more puzzling is the fact that, in some time periods and 
some industries, underpricing appears to be systematically larger than in other periods. 
Empirical evidence suggests the existence of hot issue market for IPOs: in certain periods and 
in certain industries, new issues are underpriced. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) find that the 
underpricing phenomenon occurs only during particular periods. At the beginning and end of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the 1960s new issue markets are hot in the sense that there is significant underpricing. In the 
interim, however there is no evidence o f  underpricing. Ritter (1984) identifies a  hot issue 
market in 1980. Ritter, for example, reports that the average return from the offer price to the 
first after market price is more than forty-eight percent for IPOs in 1980 and 1981. He 
presents evidence that underpricing is focused in particular industries, such as new issues by 
oil and gas firms (natural resource issues).
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) argue that as the costs of going public are lower and the 
benefits greater in certain periods and industries, a flotation could become so attractive that 
a firm would be willing to accept higher than usual underpricing. Thus, this kind of firm takes 
advantage of a good IPO climate.
2.3 Long-Term Underperformance
The initial market pricing o f an IPO is an important informational event because it 
indicates the extent to which the assessment by the market deviates from the offer price set 
by firm and its underwriters. The evidence of studies mentioned above prove that all price 
adjustment takes place in the first trading day. This suggest that the IPOs market in the short- 
run is quite efficient. On the other hand, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) tiy to explain that the 
abnormal returns accruing to IPO investors may only be interpreted as evidence o f 
underpricing by underwriters if it is shown or assumed that the aftermarket for IPOs is 
efficient. Thus, they indicate the importance of the long term price behavior of IPOs.
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2.3. a Empirical Studies
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) find negative aftermarket performance o f -13.73% in the 
first year following the initial offering for 1,435 IPOs over the period 1979-1984. This result 
suggest that IPOs are subject to overvaluation in early aftermarket trading.
The aftermarket performance of initial public offerings has received increased 
attention since Ritter’s (1991) exposure of the potential wealth hazard o f a buy-and-hold 
strategy toward investing in IPOs. He document that, in the long-term, IPOs appear to be 
overpriced. Using sample o f  1,526 EPOs that went public in the U.S. in the 1975-84 period, 
he finds that in the 3 years after going public these firms significantly underperformed a 
comparison group of matching American Stock exchange (Amex) and New York Stock 
exchange (NYSE) firms by size and industry. While the average holding period return for the 
sample of IPOs is 34.47%, a control sample of 1,526 listed stocks, matched by industry and 
market value produces an average total return o f 61.86% over the same 3 year holding 
period. He shows that there is tendency for firms with high adjusted initial returns to have the 
worst aftermarket performance. This tendency is stronger for smaller issues than larger issues. 
In addition to this, younger companies did even worse than average. His empirical evidence 
also give that there is substantial variation in the underperformance year to year (for example, 
mean three year after market returns are positive for 1975-1980 IPOs and negative for 1981- 
1984 IPOs) and across industries. He interprets these results as (1) investors are periodically 
overoptimistic about the earnings potential o f young growth companies, and (2) firms take 
advantage of these “windows of opportunity”.
Loughran (1993) finds that, on average, IPOs underperform during the six calendar 
years after going public. His sample includes 1,656 initial public offerings conducted during
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the period from 1967 to 1987. The sample IPOs generate substantially lower returns than the 
Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) NASDAQ equally-weighted index. 
Additionally, Loughran stacks the BPO returns by calender month to investigate the existence 
of seasonal patterns in raw returns. He finds no apparent pattern after the returns adjusted for 
market movements. This findings suggest that monthly seasonal regularities in IPOs are 
similar to those discovered in more traditional equity studies. However, Other seasonal 
patterns are not explored. Therefore, short term differences in IPO and seasoned security 
returns may still exist.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) examine long-term trends in stock returns o f security 
issuance. They show that companies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an IPO or 
a seasoned equity offering (SEO), significantly underperform relative to nonissuing firms for 
five years after the offering date. They find that the average annual return during the five years 
after issuing is only 5% for firms conducting IPOs, and only 7% for firms conducting SEOs. 
Investing an equal amount at the same time in a nonissuing firm with approximately the same 
market capitalization, and holding it for an identical period, would have produced an average 
compound return o f 12% per year for EPOs and 15% for SEOs. The magnitude o f the 
underperformance is large: it implies that 44% more money would need to be invested in the 
issuers than in nonissuers to be left with the same wealth five years later. As in Ritter (1991) 
study, they also document that the degree to which issuing firms underperform varies over 
time. They entertain a number of possible explanations for the poor subsequent performance 
of issuing firms. They focus on following statement: It is found by previous studies that most 
issuing firms with low book-to-market ratios, and firms with low book-to-market ratios have 
had low returns in recent decades (for instance, Fama and French (1992)). So that, while the
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average raw return on new issues is very low and firms selling equity underperform 
nonissuing firms o f  the same market capitalization, it is valuable to examine whether the 
appropriate benchmark for measuring abnormal performance is size-matched firms. They 
address this by presenting both cross-sectional and time-series multiple regression results, 
using monthly returns controlling for both size and book-to-market effects. Cross-sectional 
regressions show that there are economically and statistically significant book-to-market and 
new issue effects. They perform time-series regressions o f monthly portfolio returns on three 
factors (market return, SMB: the return on small firms minus the return on large firms, and 
HML: the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market 
stocks) as used in Fama et al. (1993). They state that if the poor performance of issuing firms 
depend on confounding effects (i.e.., differences in beat, differences in size, and differences 
in book-to-market ratios) then the intercepts in the regression should be statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Comparing the regressions that cover return difference between 
issuers and nonissuers, they find that issuing firms have lower subsequent returns than non­
issuers, holding both size and book-to-market ratio constant. They interpret these results as 
the consistency with a market where firms take advantage of transitory windows of 
opportunity by issuing equity when, on average, they are substantially overvalued. Thus, they 
left this topic out as, with their definition, “the new issues puzzle”.
Loughran and Ritter also report that for both groups o f issuers, there is no 
underperformance during the six months after the offering. They only state that because the 
underperformance is delayed, the connection with issuing firms is less obvious to the market. 
Graves, Hegde and Miller (1996) try to show that the direction of this early aftermarket trend 
can be conditional on the initial signal. Their results indicate that adjusted returns in the first
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three months following the offering are, on average, in the same direction as the initial 
mispricing - positive for the underpriced group and negative for the overpriced IPOs. This 
evidence show that market prices adjust rather slowly to the information revealed by the initial 
mispricing o f IPOs. However, following the first three months o f  trading, they find that there 
are no significant differences in the abnormal returns o f underpriced and overpriced IPOs and 
both groups exhibit significant underperformance from months 6 to 24, consistent with Ritter 
and Loughran and Ritter’s result.
In contrast to Loughran and Ritter’s (1995) investor perspective, Jain and Kini (1994) 
attempt to measure the operating performance of IPO firms. They find that IPO firms exhibit 
decline in post-issue operating performance, as measured by the operating return on assets 
and operating cash flows deflated by assets for years 0, +1, +2, and +3 relative to their pre- 
IPO levels, year -1, both before and after industry adjustment.
2.3.b The Role o f Ownership Structure
Jain and Kini (1994) show that IPO firms exhibit high growth in sales and capital 
expenditures relative to firms in the same industry in the post-IPO period. Thus, declining 
operating performance of IPO firms cannot be attributed to lack o f sales growth opportunities 
or cutbacks in post-IPO capital expenditures. They test two possible explanation for the 
decline in the post-issue operating performance of IPO firms. 1- They find positive relation 
between managerial ownership retention and post issue operating performance. Here 
managerial ownership is entrepreneurial ownership for IPO firms. They interpret this resulf 
as being consistent Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency hypothesis and the Lelan and Pyle 
(1977) signaling hypothesis. According to agency hypothesis, higher ownership retention by
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managers reduces their incentives to undertake nonvalue maximizing projects. Leland and 
Pyle suggest that, by retaining a significant ownership stake in the firm, entrepreneurs can 
signal project quality since false representation can be costly. Both hypotheses, therefore, 
predict relatively superior operating performance o f IPO firms with higher entrepreneurial 
ownership. However, they were not able to separate the individual effects o f these two 
hypotheses. 2- On the other hand, they find no relation between post-issue changes in 
operating performance and initial returns at the IPO. Signaling models o f underpricing predict 
that IPO firms that underprice should exhibit superior operating performance in comparison 
to those that do not. Thus the interpret the absence o f a positive relation between the change 
in operating performance and underpricing as being inconsistent with the signaling explanation 
for underpricing.
Hensler, Rutherford, and Springer (1997), in contrast to above studies, focus on 
issuers and their ability to survive in the aftermarket. They examine the survivability o f IPO 
stocks in the aftermarket and the relation between IPO characteristics and time-to-failure. 
Their results indicate that the survival time for IPO activity increases with size, age o f the firm 
at the offering, the initial return, IPO activity level in the market, and the percentage o f  insider 
ownership. Even if we accept the survival time as long term over or underperformance 
determined by above studies, which is not possible, the results about size, age and initial 
return are inconsistent with the previous evidence. Therefore, the positive relationship 
between survival time and percentage o f insider ownership is very week to explain long term 
underperformance o f IPO firms.
Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997) examine the relation between ownership 
characteristics and operating performance up to ten years after going public for a sample of
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283 IPOs in 1980-1983 period. They find that operating income scaled by assets or by sales 
exceeds the performance of matched publicly traded firms before going public and then after 
two years going public declines to a level that is below the performance of matched firms. 
However, performance does not decline appreciably further during the second through tenth 
years o f public trading. Investigation of whether the operating performance o f IPO firms is 
explained by changes in stock ownership characteristics, they find that neither the level of 
performance after going public nor the change in performance from before to after going 
public is related systematically to various measures of ownership by officers and directors and 
other blockholders, such as venture capitalists or parent companies. They conclude that the 
changes in equity ownership that result from going public do not lead to changes in incentives 
that affect operating performance.
In terms o f the evidence that the presence o f venture capital backing influences 
investors’ valuation o f companies, they report that offerings with venture capital backing 
experience a smaller decline in performance from year -1 to year 1, but the longer intervals 
provide no evidence o f superior operating performance of firms that go public with the 
backing of a venture capitalist. Their evidence shows that variation in operating performance 
after going public is explained mostly by the size and age of the companies and by the 
presence of secondary sales. The median performance o f small (measured by the size of total 
assets) startup companies is significantly below the performance industry-matched firms after 
going public, while larger and more established companies’ median performance is not 
different from the performance o f industry-matched firms after going public.
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2.3.c Security Analysts ’ Overoptimism
Rajan and Servaes [R&S (1997)] examine whether the behavior o f analysts is related 
to the IPO anomalies, which are underpricing, hot issue markets, and long-term 
underperformance. In terms o f long run underperformance of IPO firms, they hypothesize that 
the best way to answer the question o f whether the underperformance is because of 
institutional constraints -such as short sale restrictions- in the IPO market or whether it is 
because o f systematic over-optimism on the part o f investors is to look at investor 
expectations. Since brokerage house analysts reflect or drive investor expectations, R&S use 
data on analyst following and forecast accuracy to explore this issue.
First, R&S find that more underpriced issues attract larger analyst following. Analysts 
then systematically overestimate the earnings o f these companies, with forecast errors 
averaging 5 percent o f the firm’s stock price. As the forecast window increases, so does the 
forecast error. Thus, analysts are more overoptimistic about a firm’s long term prospects than 
a firm’s short term prospects. These forecast errors are lower, but they still remain significant 
after size and market adjustments. This indicates that the overoptimism o f analysts for IPOs 
is only partly a reflection of their overoptimisim in general. Then, R&S study long-term (five 
years) earnings growth forecasts and find that analysts are also overoptimistic about the long 
term growth opportunities o f IPOs.
Second, R&S find a positive relation between the number of EPOs coming to market 
in a given industry in a given quarter and several measures of analyst long-term earnings 
growth projections for recent EPOs in these industries. Since these growth projections are 
overly optimistic, they interpret this result as consistent with window of opportunity 
arguments and the investor sentiment.
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Finally, R&S look at the relationship between analyst long term growth projections 
and the aftermarket stock price performance of EPOs. They find that firms with the highest 
projected growth substantially underperform three benchmarks (1. the NYSE/AMEX value 
weighted index; 2. the smallest decile of the NYSE/AMEX firms; 3. size and industry 
matched firms.) However, firms with the lowest growth projections outperform these 
benchmarks. These results indicate that investors appear to believe the inflated long-term 
growth.
2.3.d The Role o f Venture Capitalists
Brav and Gampers [B&G (1997)] examine the differences in the long-term 
underperformance between venture-backed EPOs and nonventure-backed IPOs. Their 
hypothesis is whether venture capitalists, who specialize in financing promising startup 
companies and bringing them public, affect the long-term performance of newly public firms. 
Venture capitalists have important roles for a company going to the public. Going public is 
simply a stage in the growth o f a company. Venture capital firms specialize in collecting and 
evaluating information on startup and growth companies. For a newly public firm with high 
growth opportunities, there are two difficulties that venture capilatists can take care of; 1) 
potential capital constraints, and 2) asymmetric information. Venture capitalists take care of 
the difficulty of potential capital constraint by providing access to top-tier national investment 
and commercial bankers. Since this is so, the investment behavior o f venture-backed firms 
would be less dependent upon internally generated cash flows. This also partly takes care o f 
informational asymmetries that are associated with startup companies. These abilities that 
venture capitalist have create different expectations in the price o f the offering between
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venture-backed and nonventure-backed firms.
Long-term stock price performance is expected to be different for two groups because 
venture capitalists stay on the board o f directors long after the IPO and may continue to 
provide access to capital that nonventure-backed firms lack. In addition to this, venture 
capitalists may affect who holds the firm’s shares after an IPO. Venture capitalists continue 
to have contacts with top-tier, national investment bankers and may be able to provide more 
and higher quality analysts to follow their firms, thus lowering potential asymmetric 
information between the firm and investors. Similarly, because institutional investors are the 
primary source o f capital for venture funds, institutions may be more willing to hold equity 
in firms that have been taken public by venture capitalists with whom they have invested. 
Another possible explanation for the superior long-term performance o f venture-backed IPOs, 
is venture capitalists’ reputational concerns. Because venture capitalists repeatedly bring firms 
public, if they become associated with failures in the public market, they may ruin their 
reputation and ability to bring firms public in the future. Venture capitalists may consequently 
be less willing to overprice it or follow a stock.
In data analysis, B&G calculate five year equally and value weighted buy-and-hold 
performance for each IPO and their benchmarks. Several benchmarks are utilized. These are 
four broad market indexes (the S&P 500, Nasdaq value weighted composite index, 
NYSE/AMEX value weighted index, and NYSE/AMEX equal weighted index), Fama-French 
(1994) industry portfolios and size and book-to-market matched portfolios that have been 
excluded recent IPO and seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms. Then, they calculate wealth 
relatives by taking the ratio o f one plus the IPO portfolio return over one plus the return on 
the chosen benchmark. Wealth relatives less than one mean that the IPO portfolio has
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underperformed relative to its benchmark.
B&G find that venture-backed EPOs outperform nonventure-backed IPOs. There is 
wide difference between two groups in terms o f equally weighted returns and wealth relatives 
against the alternative benchmarks. Nonventure-backed IPOs perform worse than Loughran 
and Ritter’s (1995) results. However, value weighted performance looks similar for the two 
groups with little overall underperformance. Results from controlling for industry returns 
show performance differences as well. On the other hand, wealth relatives versus size and 
book-to-market portfolios demonstrate that underperformance is not an IPO effect. When 
EPOs and SEOs are excluded from size and book-to market portfolios, they find that venture- 
backed IPOs significantly outperform their relative portfolio returns while nonventure-backed 
IPOs perform as well as the benchmark portfolios.
Fama-French (1993) three factor time series regressions is used to see whether 
underperformance of IPO firms is captured by three factors [RMRF: the value weighted 
market return on all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq (RM) minus the risk free rate (RF), SMB (small 
minus big): the difference each month between the return on small firms and big firms, HML 
(high minus low): the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book- 
to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks] since a three 
factor model may explain the cross section of stock returns. On the other hand, if EPOs 
underperform on a risk adjusted basis, portfolios of IPOs should consistently underperform 
relative to this three factor asset pricing model. Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
B&G also use the regression intercept as an indicator of risk-adjusted performance. The 
intercepts from the regressions of the equal and value weighted venture-backed IPO 
portfolios are insignificant showing that the three factor model is not rejected. When the
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nonventure-backed returns are weighted equally, the intercept is significantly negative 
indicating severe underperformance. Value weighting non-venture capital returns produces 
a smaller negative intercept. Partitioning the nonventure-backed sample on the basis o f size 
demonstrates that underperformance primarily resides in small non-venture-backed issuers. 
Fama-French’s three factor model cannot explain the underperformance of these small, non­
venture-backed firms.
Finally, B&G show that underperformance documented by Loughran and Ritter is not 
unique to firms issuing equity. When issuing firms are matched to size and book-to-market 
portfolios that exclude all recent firms that have issued equity, EPOs do not underperform. 
Underperformance is a characteristic of small, low book-to-market firms regardless o f 
whether they are IPO firms or not.
B&G also provide various explanations on the sources of the underperformance of 
small, low book-to-market firms. First, unexpected shocks may have hit small growth 
companies in the early and middle 1980s. They find that returns of IPO firms are highly 
correlated in calender time even if the firms go public in different years. Underperformance 
for the venture capital sample is primarily concentrated from 1983 through 1986 and is 
concentrated from 1981 through 1987 for the nonventure capital portfolio.
A second explanation for the underperformance o f small, low book-to-market firms 
«
is investor sentiment. Small nonventure-backed IPOs are more likely to be held by individuals. 
Individuals are more likely to be influenced by fads or lack complete information. Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) show that institutional holdings o f  equity after an IPO are substantially 
higher for venture-backed IPOs than they are for nonventure-backed IPOs. The relatively 
higher institutional holdings may occur because institutions have greater information on small,
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venture-backed firms through their investment in venture capital funds. Fields (1996) has 
shown that long-term IPO performance is positively related to institutional holdings. She finds 
that, in the long-term, IPOs having larger institutional shareholdings significantly outperform 
those with smaller institutional shareholdings.
Asymmetric information is also likely to be more prevalent for small firms because 
individuals spend considerably less time tracking returns than institutional investors do. Barry, 
Musceralla, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) show that small nonventure-backed firms go 
public with lower tier underwriters than similar venture-backed firms. These firms may also 
have fewer and lower quality analysts following the company after the offering. More 
importantly Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) show that the reputation o f the underwriter is 
related to long-term performance of IPOs, consistent with greater asymmetric information 
being associated with lower returns.
Finally, individuals might derive utility from buying the shares o f  small, low book-to- 
market firms because they value them like a lottery ticket. Returns on small nonventure- 
backed EPOs are more highly skewed than returns on either large IPO firms or similar sized 
venture-backed IPO firms.
With all o f these results and explanations, they stated that most institutional investors 
will not be significantly hurt by investing in IPOs. They usually do not buy the small issues 
that perform the worst. However, underperformance of small growth companies may be 
important for capital allocation. If the cost of capital for small growth companies is 
periodically distorted, their investment behavior may be adversely affected.
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2.3.e The Role o f Investment bankers' reputation
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) examine the initial returns and three-year returns 
following the IPOs and the relationship o f  those returns with investment bankers’ reputation. 
In this context, they use three existing measures o f underwriter prestige and provide a 
comparative evaluation o f those measures.
First of all they find that each of the reputation proxies is significantly related to IPO 
initial returns as widely documented, in fact, in previous IPO literature; the better the 
reputation of the underwriter, the less is the short-run underpricing. They show that among 
three alternative reputation proxies, the Carter-Manaster (CM) measure explains more o f  the 
variation in the initial returns compared to the Johnson-Miller or the Megginson-Weiss 
measures.
In terms of long-term performance, they hypothesize that high reputable underwriters 
attempt to market EPOs that will experience the least negative long-term market adjusted 
returns. Investors use the investment bankers’ past performance, as measured by the quality 
o f firms in which they have previously sold equity, to assess their credibility. By marketing 
IPOs that have relatively better long-term performance, investment bankers protect their 
reputation. Therefore, in a OLS (Ordinary Least Square) regression, the coefficients for 
underwriter prestige measures are expected to be positive when the long-term market 
adjusted return is used as the independent variable.
They find that EPOs underwritten by more prestigious investment bankers have, on 
average, a less negative performance over the three year period. The results indicate that 
when the reputation proxies are evaluated simultaneously, only the CM measure is 
significantly related to the EPO stocks’ three-year returns. Additionally, their results imply
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that $132 would need to be invested in the IPOs offered by low reputation underwriters to 
achieve the same payoffs as $100 put in the IPOs underwritten by high reputation investment 
bankers for a three-year holding period.
2.3.f  The Role o f Institutional Ownership
Recently, two studies examine the role o f institutional investors in ownership structure 
on initial and future performance o f IPOs. In a theoretical paper, Stoughton and Zechner 
[S&Z (1998)] analyze the effect of different IPO mechanisms on the structure o f  share 
ownership. They address the question o f how the IPO process determines the equilibrium 
structure of shareholdings. There has been enough empirical evidence showing that ownership 
structure affects the efficiency of corporate governance and thus the intrinsic value o f the 
firm. In addition to this, there is a growing empirical literature on the relation between the 
fraction o f shares owned by large investors and firm performance. In their model, 
underpricing and rationing may be rational phenomena from the standpoint o f  the issuer. S&Z 
state that strategic rationing and underpricing are positively correlated. If  the issuer is not 
allowed to ration strategically, their model predicts zero underpricing but implies a lower 
intrinsic value due to lack of monitoring. Underpricing and rationing in favor o f  large 
shareholders lead to a higher intrinsic value o f the firm which more than offsets the amount 
of underpricing. Another feature o f their model is that institutional shareholders do not sell 
out in the secondary market (flipping) in order to capture the gains from underpricing. Thus, 
their major conclusion is that the value o f a firm’s EPO is determined by the ownership 
structure resulting from the offering mechanism.
Their model features an entrepreneur who plans to sell all his shares to a collection
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o f outside investors. Alternatively, one can view this problem from the perspective of the 
venture capitalist who gives up control and sells his stake at the time o f the IPO. The outside 
investors are grouped in two classes: large investors and small investors. The major 
distinguishing feature between the two classes is that large investors have the ability to 
monitor the activities o f management in the firm while small investors do not. The view that 
the investment banker as a broker with an active and continuing relationship with the 
institutional investment community. The nature of this relationship provides two benefits to 
the entrepreneur. First, the investment banker is able to identify those investors capable of 
monitoring and provide favored treatment, either in price terms, or if that is disallowed, in 
terms of priority. Second, the nature of the repeated relationship allows the investment banker 
to negotiate directly with the large investor, providing for greater extraction of surplus to the 
benefit o f the entrepreneur. Thus, S&Z demonstrate that the form o f institutional ownership 
is an important factor for IPO-mechanism.
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack [KSW (1998)] examine underwriters’ pricing errors and 
the first day trading activities in EPOs to see whether there is a relationship between those and 
one-year future performance o f IPO firms. First they show that initial returns predict 
subsequent long term (one-year) excess returns. Hot IPOs, which had a first day return 
greater than or equal to 10 percent and less than 60 percent, and Cool IPOs, defined as having 
a first day return above zero and less than 10 percent, have positive excess returns at one- 
month, six month and one-year time frames. On the other hand, Cold IPOs, labeled with a 
first day return zero or negative, and Extra-Hot IPOs, classified as having a first day return 
above 60 percent, have negative excess returns for the same time frames. Since extra-hot 
IPOs do not outperform hot ones, the results were interpreted as being not monotonic.
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For seeking the relationship between first day trading activities and future 
performance, KSW focus on what information is contained in the first day trading. They 
hypothesize that information about the quality of issues appears to be available at flipping, 
which is defined as percentage of first day dollar volume ‘sold’ in block trades by large 
(institutional) investors. Flipping accounts for 45 percent o f  trading volume on the first day 
in cold issues compared to 22 percent and 14 percent for hot and extra-hot IPOs respectively. 
The evidence show that heavily flipped IPOs significantly underperform EPOs with less 
flipping over future holding periods. This means that large investors sell issues on the first 
day that have the worst future performance. In addition to this, the results for flipping do not 
disappear in a five factor model including market, size, book-to-market, general market 
momentum, and IPO market momentum. Thus, flipping provides valuable information 
(superior to the initial return) about the direction o f  the subsequent price adjustment to 
equilibrium fair value, flipping is not the cause of the prior performance. Therefore, KSW 
conclude that flipping is a rational response to underwriters’ mispricing.
KSW also show that flipping provides a link between the empirical findings on 
institutional investment in IPOs [For example Field (1996)] and the theoretical underpricing 
literature, that is, institutional investors bid for and gain a larger allocation of stronger IPOs, 
leaving a disproportionate share of weaker IPOs for the smaller investors. The implication o f 
this finding is that we should find a positive relationship between institutional holdings and 
future performance.
2.3.g  Corporate Diversification
Several papers demonstrate that there is a relationship between the firm value and
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diversification. There are two dimensions o f  the theoretical arguments for the effect o f 
diversification on the firm value; benefits and costs. The potential benefits o f  diversification 
include greater operating efficiency, less incentive to forego positive net present value 
projects, greater debt capacity, and lower taxes. Through diversification managers create a 
larger internal capital market, which allocates resources more efficiently and also reduces 
asymmetric information between managers and outside investors. Thus, diversification 
reduces the underinvestment problem described Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Conglomerates can sustain higher levels o f  debt because corporate diversification reduces 
earnings variability. Increased debt capacity creates value by increasing interest tax shield.
The potential cost o f diversification arises from the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. According to this argument, managers diversify to protect the 
value of their human capital, and as Jensen (1986) explained, companies diversify to increase 
the private benefits o f managers. Jensen states that managers of firms with unused borrowing 
power and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake value-decreasing investments. 
Stulz (1990) also argues that diversified firms will invest too much in lines o f business with 
poor investment opportunities.
Empirical studies examine whether the benefits o f diversification outweigh the costs. 
Lang and Stulz [L&S (1994)] investigate whether the market’s valuation o f a firm is 
correlated with its degree o f diversification. They hypothesize that diversified firms are valued 
more than comparable portfolios of specialized firms if diversified firms differ form specialized 
firms only because diversification improves performance. Comparing the Tobin’s q o f 
diversified firms to the Tobin’s q of specialized firms, they find that through the late 1970s 
and the 1980s single-industry firms are valued more highly by the capital markets than
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diversified firms. Further, highly diversified firms (defined as those firms that report sales for 
five segments or more) have a both mean and median Tobin’s q below the sample average for 
each year. Hence, conglomerates are not even average firms in terms o f q.
L&S show that the negative relation between q and the degree o f diversification 
cannot be explained by industry effects. In addition to this, their result do not change with the 
control variables that explain Tobin’s q; size, access to capital markets, and intensity o f 
research and development. They conclude the analysis that there is a diversification discount 
by eliminating firms with large q’s, using only firms that did not change their number of 
segments, and using the ratio o f firm market to book value.
L&S interpret the evidence as supporting the view that diversification is not a 
successful path to higher performance, but it less definitive on the question of the extent to 
which diversification hurts performance. The reason given is that the firms that become more 
diversified appear to perform poorly before becoming more diversified, indicating that firms 
that diversify do not become poor performers only or mainly because they diversify.
Berger and Ofek [B&O (1995)] use segment-level data to estimate valuation effect 
of diversification and to examine the potential sources o f value gains or losses. In doing so, 
they estimate the value o f diversified firm’s segments as if they were operated as separate 
firms. So that, they compare the sum o f the imputed stand-alone values of the segments of 
diversified companies to the actual values o f those companies. The results show that 
diversified firms have values that average , during 1986-91, 13% to 15 % below the sum of 
the imputed values o f their segments. The loss in value is less for related diversifications.
B&O find additional support for the conclusion that diversification reduces value by 
documenting that the segments of diversified firms have lower operating profitability than
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
single-line business. They find that overinvestment is associated with lower value for 
diversified firms, and that segments o f diversified firms overinvest more than single-line 
businesses do. These results are consistent with one source o f the value loss being greater 
propensity of multi-segment firms to overinvest. In addition, they find that the subsidization 
o f poorly performing segments contributes to the value loss from diversification. Two 
potential benefits of diversification, tax shields and the ability o f multi-segment firms to 
immediately realize tax savings are found too small to offset the documented value loss.
Comment and Jarrell (1995) find a negative relation during 1978-89 between 
abnormal stock returns and several measures o f diversification, including the number of 
segments reported by management and revenue and asset based Herfindahl indexes. They also 
show that diversified firms do not have some of the benefits o f diversification: debt does not 
increase systematically with diversification; access to external capital market transactions by 
diversified firms is not less than the single-segment firms. They find some evidence showing 
that diversification does make firms more likely to be takeover targets.
John and Ofek [J&0(1995)] focus as an important motive for divestitures. It is 
important because selling the unrelated asset leads to an increase in focus and more efficient 
operation of the core business. Value gains come from better management o f the assets 
remaining after divestiture. J&O conduct a series o f tests to determine whether focus is an 
important explanation for seller gains. They find that the seller’s operations become more 
focused in the year o f the divestiture; there is an increase in the Herfindahl index and a 
decrease in the number o f  reported lines of business; and in 75 % o f the cases, the divested 
division is unrelated to the seller’s main operations.
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J&O find that the firm’s remaining assets are more profitable after the divestiture by 
examining several accounting measures o f performance, such as operating margin and return 
on assets. This evidence support the focus hypothesis that eliminating negative synergies 
between divested asset and the remaining assets should lead better performance for the 
remaining assets after the divestiture. They also find that the average cumulative excess return 
to the seller on the two days preceding and the day o f the divestiture announcement is 
positive, and positively related to different measures o f increase in focus. They conclude that 
the positive relationship between the change in firm value around the divestiture 
announcement and cash flow changes for the seller’s remaining assets for the three years 
following the sale implies that the positive excess return is at least partly generated by the 
anticipated increase in cash flows of the remaining assets.
Serveas (1996) states that diversification was perceived poorly by capital markets 
during the 1980s, the current trend toward corporate focus is consistent with this notion. He 
examines whether this is also case during the 1960s and 1970s when firms moved toward 
diversification. If  diversification was perceived positively when it started, then it may be 
argued that the current wave of de-diversification (more focus) is due to technological or 
other changes with reduce the benefits of diversification.
He finds no evidence that diversified firms are valued more than single segment firms 
in the 1960s and early 1970s, on the contrary, for several years diversified firms sell at a 
substantial discount when compared to single segment firms. This discount is large and 
significant over the 1961-70, but it becomes small and insignificant in 1973-76. These results 
hold after controlling for industry effects and for differences between diversified and 
undiversified firms in profitability, leverage and investment policy. He conclude that the
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pattern of insider ownership over the sample period provides some clues that can explain the 
behavior of corporations. When diversified firms were selling at a discount to single segment 
firms, they also had lower insider ownership than single segment firms, but when discount was 
eliminated, there was little difference in insider ownership between two groups. These results 
suggest that insider ownership was an effective deterrent to diversification.
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3. VENTURE CAPITALISTS, REPUTATION OF INVESTMENT 
BANKERS, AND INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS
Since Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) documented the long-term return 
anomaly for IPOs, several recent researchers have directed their attention on the long-term 
underperformance puzzle of IPOs. It is documented that factors, such as venture capitalists, 
reputation o f investment bankers, and institutional ownership are associated with the long­
term performance o f firms going public. In this study, we also analyze the long-term 
performance of IPOs using alternative performance measures. However, we examine the 
interactive effects of venture capitalists, reputation of investment bankers, and institutional 
ownership on the long-term performance of IPOs, in addition to examining the role o f these 
factors independently.
3.1 Venture Capitalists and Investment bankers’ reputation Effects
Recent studies associated with the ongoing long-term underperformance puzzle have 
shown that the long-term underperformance of EPO firms is related to investment and 
institutional characteristics of the IPO activities. Specifically, the role o f venture capitalists 
and investment bankers’ reputation have gained considerable empirical support in explaining 
the different performance of IPO firms. Brav and Gampers (1997) show that venture-backed 
EPOs have superior performance over nonventure-backed IPOs. Carter, Dark, and Singh 
(1998), however, attribute the long-term underperformance to the low reputation of 
underwriters. They find that the long-term underperformance is smaller for IPO firms
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associated with high reputable investment bankers.
In this study, we argue that a joint analysis o f  venture capitalists and investment 
bankers’ reputation is warranted. The reason is that venture capitalists and underwriters are 
unlikely to act independently and, therefore, it is not clear whether these two elements o f the 
underwriting process have independent or join effects on the long-term performance of EPO 
firms. Since venture capitalists and the reputation o f investment bankers may reflect the 
information about quality o f IPO firms, indicating relatively better long-term performance, it 
is possible that they have a joint influence on the superior performance. The simultaneous 
analysis of the interactive effects o f these factors would allow us to determine which one of 
the two factors is more influential o f the long-term performance of IPO firms. For example, 
the comparison of the long-term performance of venture-backed IPOs underwritten by high 
reputable investment bankers with nonventure-backed EPOs underwritten by high reputable 
investment bankers will shed more light on the debate o f  long-term underperformance of 
IPOs.
There are several reasons that explain the superior long-term performance o f  venture- 
backed IPO firms. Venture capital is an important source o f  financing for start-up companies. 
Newborn firms with high growth opportunities are likely to be subject to potential capital 
constraints and information asymmetries. Venture capitalists who specialize in financing firms 
with high growth opportunities and bringing them public have the abilities to take care of 
these difficulties. Furthermore, venture capitalists provide access to top tier national 
investment and commercial banks. So that, the investment behavior of venture-backed firms 
would be less dependent upon internally generated cash flows. Venture capitalists’ presence 
on the board of directors o f firms that they back after firms issued EPOs reduces agency cost
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problems by monitoring managers’ activities. Moreover, venture capitalists have contacts 
with top tier investment bankers and may be able to attract more and high quality analysts to 
follow their firms. Therefore, venture capitalists help to reduce informational asymmetries 
between the firm and investors as well as between the firms and underwriters.
Venture capitalists take an investment risk by financing firms with high growth 
opportunities because they have responsibilities to several sources that provide funds, such 
as wealthy individual investors, investment bankers, subsidiaries o f  banks and other 
corporations. In return for taking such an investment risk, venture capitalists should be 
rewarded with above average future returns. Therefore, venture capitalists certify the quality 
o f the firms and its future growth opportunities. Finally, venture capitalists are likely to be 
concerned with the preservation of their reputation in bringing firms public. I f  venture-backed 
firms do not perform well, venture capitalists may ruin their reputation and ability to bring 
firms public in the future.
The joint analysis o f venture capitalists and investment bankers’ reputation is 
warranted by the fact that venture capitalists and investment bankers may not act 
independently. It is quite possible that high reputable investment bankers, concerned with the 
preservation of their reputation and the fee structure associated with IPOs, are likely to prefer 
underwriting firms financed by venture capitalists. Ritter and Chen (1998) have recently 
shown that most o f  the investment bankers charge a standard fee as the rate o f 7% o f the per- 
share offering price in EPOs. If all underwriters charge the same fee, firms going public would 
logically prefer high reputable investment bankers with the expectation that high reputable 
investment bankers would help them raise capital at more favorable terms (i.e., less 
underpricing). However, high reputable investment bankers will be selective in protecting
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their reputation by underwriting IPOs with high growth prospects. Venture-backed IPOs 
signal such high growth prospects that would unlikely be ignored by investment bankers. In 
addition, the asymmetric information gap between investment bankers and issuer firms can 
be reduced because venture capitalists can also resolve the uncertainty o f a firm’s true value. 
Thus, investment bankers can sell IPOs without having deep discounts.
One could also argue that venture capitalists decide to back IPOs that are in the 
process o f being underwritten by high reputable underwriters. Firms whose issues are 
expected to be underwritten by high reputable investment bankers may be seen as firms that 
can provide adequate investment returns at a far lower risk by venture capitalists. Since, 
venture capitalists may have concerns about the underwriting procedure especially in the 
pricing process for stocks that they back, they may favor firms that are likely to be 
underwritten by reputable underwriters.
On the other hand, venture capitalists may be indifferent to the reputation of 
investment bankers. Venture-backed IPO firms may not need prestigious underwriters to 
certify firm quality and future cash flow prospects o f the venture capitalists. Therefore, if the 
reputation of investment bankers is irrelevant to the long-term performance of IPO firms, 
venture-backed IPOs to be underwritten either by more or less reputable investment bankers 
would have similar performance.
The above discussion suggests that venture-backed IPOs are more likely to be 
underwritten by high rather than low reputable investment bankers. Venture-backed EPOs 
underwritten by high reputable underwriters are expected to suffer from mild 
underperformance, if any. These EPO firms’ overperformance is very possible. This would 
imply that the interactive effects o f  two factors are responsible for the superior performance.
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However, our analysis is designed to identify whether venture capitalists or high reputable 
investment bankers derive this result. This is accomplished by examining the long-term 
performance of IPO firms associated with combinations such as venture-backed (nonventure- 
backed) and high (low) reputable investment bankers as well as their cross combinations (i.e., 
venture-backed (nonventure-backed) and low (high) reputable investment bankers).
Nonventure-backed EPOs, however, are likely to seek certification through the 
reputation o f investment bankers. Therefore, nonventure-backed EPOs can be underwritten 
by high or low reputable investment bankers. If  the reputation of investment bankers signals 
the long-term performance, nonventure-backed IPOs underwritten by low reputable 
investment bankers are expected to have the worst performance. However, for nonventure- 
backed IPOs underwritten by high reputable investment bankers, it would be interesting to 
see whether high reputable investment bankers mitigate the wealth hazard from underwriting 
nonventure-backed EPOs. If the reputation of investment bankers is unrelated to the long-term 
performance o f EPO firms, the performance o f two groups (nonventure-backed IPOs 
underwritten by low reputable investment bankers and nonventure-backed EPOs underwritten 
by high reputable investment bankers) should be similar.
3.2 Institutional Ownership Effects
Outside investors as potential buyers o f IPO issues are institutional (large) investors 
and small investors. The major distinguishing feature between these two classes o f investors 
is that institutional investors have the ability to monitor the activities o f management in the 
firm while small investors do not. Substantial equity ownership by institutions encourages 
them to monitor managers more carefully. This can motivate managers to improve
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performance of their firms. Empirical studies show that institutional ownership affects firm 
value4.
In feet, institutional ownership has been shown in the literature as another factor that 
affects the long-term performance o f IPO firms. The empirical evidence indicates that the 
long-term underperformance o f IPOs is associated with the low institutional ownership of 
EPO shares. Fields (1996), for instance finds that IPOs having larger institutional 
shareholdings significantly outperform those with smaller institutional shareholdings. 
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1998) also find that heavily flipped IPOs (sold in block trades 
by institutional investors on the first day) significantly underperform IPOs with less flipping 
over one year holding period. This result implies that institutional investors bid and gain a 
larger allocation of stronger EPOs, leaving a disproportionate share o f  weaker IPOs for the 
smaller investors.
Megginson and Weiss (1991), however, show that institutional ownership after an 
EPO is substantially higher for venture-backed IPOs than they are for nonventure-backed 
IPOs. The implication of this research is that institutional investors’ IPO commitments seem 
be associated with venture capitalists. One would also think that the weaker 
underperformance o f IPOs underwritten by high reputable underwriters is because of high 
institutional ownership stakes in these EPO firms.
In this study, we also examine the effects o f institutional ownership on the long-term 
performance of IPOs by taking into account the role of venture capitalists and reputable
4 McConnel and Serveas (1990) examine whether monitoring by institutional investors affects the value of the firm. 
They find a positive relationship between firm value and the percentage of shares held by institutions. See also the 
work by Agrawal and Mandelker (1990).
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nature of underwriters. A simultaneous analysis is conducted between institutional ownership 
and venture capitalists, and the reputation of investment bankers. First we examine the 
interactive effects of institutional ownership with the reputation o f  investment bankers on the 
long-term performance o f  IPOs. Since IPO firms with high institutional ownership and 
underwritten by high reputable investment bankers are associated with better performance, 
one should expect that IPOs, underwritten by high reputable investment bankers and high 
institutional investors would perform well. When IPO firms are underwritten by low 
reputable investment bankers and institutional ownership is low, it is expected that they have 
the worst performance. Examining the performance differences between IPO firms, 
underwritten by high reputable investment bankers, with high (or low) institutional ownership 
and IPO firms, underwritten by low reputable investment bankers, with high (or low) 
institutional ownership would explain the factors behind the long-term underperformance of 
IPOs.
Finally, we investigate the interactive effects o f institutional ownership and venture 
capitalists on the long-term performance of IPOs. This kind o f simultaneous analysis is 
expected to make additional contribution to the long-term underperformance literature.
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4. CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND LONG-TERM 
PERFORMANCE OF IPO FIRMS
There are two dimensions of the theoretical arguments for the effects o f  corporate 
diversification on firm value. The potential benefits of diversification include greater operating 
efficiency, less incentive to forego positive net present value projects, greater debt capacity, 
and lower taxes. Furthermore through diversification, managers create a larger internal capital 
market, which allocates resources more efficiently and also reduces asymmetric information 
between managers and outside investors. Thus, diversification reduces the underinvestment 
problem described by Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Conglomerates can sustain 
higher levels of debt because corporate diversification reduces earnings variability. Increased 
debt capacity creates value by increasing interest tax shield.
The potential cost o f diversification arises from the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. According to this argument, managers diversify to protect the 
value of their human capital, and as Jensen (1986) explained, companies diversify to increase 
the private benefits of managers. Jensen states that managers o f firms with unused borrowing 
power and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake value-decreasing investments. 
Stulz (1990) also argues that diversified firms will invest too much in lines o f business with 
poor investment opportunities.
Empirical studies by Serveas (1996), John and Ofek (1995), Berger and Ofek (1995), 
Comment and Jarell (1995), and Lung and Stulz (1994) document an inverse relation 
between firm value and corporate diversification. All these studies conclude that the costs of 
diversification outweigh its benefits.
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In this paper, we also address this issue in the context o f IPOs by taking into 
consideration the industrial (business) diversify o f  the firm. Since diversification is found as 
a value decreasing strategy, it could also be related to the long-term underperformance of 
IPOs. Therefore, we examine whether there is a link between the long-term performance of 
IPOs and corporate diversification. This is accomplished by dividing the sample into multi and 
single-segment firms. I f  there is an effect o f  corporate structure consistent with previous 
evidence o f the diversification discount literature, we expect focused (single-segment IPO) 
firms to overperform diversified (multi-segment IPO) firms.
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
5.1 Data Selection and Sources
In this study, we use a sample o f IPOs issued from January 1, 1989 through December 
31, 1994. Firms conducting IPOs are collected from various issues o f Corporate Finance: the 
IDD Review ofInvestment Banking published by Investment Dealers ’ Digest, Inc. IPOs with 
at least one dollar offer price have included in the sample. Since our focus is to examine both 
operating and stock performances o f IPOs, we also require that the COMPUSTAT annual 
and research tapes have data for each firm for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. We do not 
require that these firms have post-EPO financial data on the COMPUSTAT tapes. In terms 
of calculating stock performance of IPO firms, some o f the IPOs can be delisted before their 
three-year anniversary, but all other data are required to be complete. We exclude financial 
companies whose two-digit SIC codes are between 60-67 including banks, savings and loans, 
closed-end funds and real estate investment trusts, partnership, and unit offerings. Our final 
sample covers 456 IPOs. Two hundred two out o f456 began trading on the NYSE, forty-two 
on the AMEX and two hundred twelve on Nasdaq.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A o f  table 1 shows the 
number o f IPOs per year in the sample period. Even though the number o f IPOs issued in 
1989 and 1990 is less than that in the other years, there is no specific year having the number 
o f IPOs with a large difference. Panel B covers characteristics of IPOs. Information about the 
number o f shares offered by the firm, the number o f shares offered by current shareholders, 
and the offering prices are obtained from the same source, Investment Dealers ’ Digest o f  
Corporate Finance. Using this information, total value of issue, percentage o f shares offered 
by current holders are calculated. The mean total value from all 456 offerings is $61.5 million.
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19.6 percent of this total average value was provided by current shareholders. The mean of 
offer price is $13.29. Average initial return is 11.1 percent. Initial return is defined as the 
difference the first day market price and the offering price as a proportion o f the offering 
price. Initial market prices are determined by using the 1997 CRSP NYSE/AMEX and 
Nasdaq files. Variables prior to offering are calculated using related data items from 
COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes. Panel C and D of table 1 show industry groups 
o f IPOs according to two-digit and four-digit SIC codes, respectively. Fifty five percent of 
IPOs is manufacturing firms, coming from especially chemicals, computer and computer 
related industries. Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services, Retail Trade, and 
Services (especially business related) are the other dominant industry groups. The 
classification of IPOs according to four-digit SIC codes indicates that IPO firms in the sample 
come from 200 different industries.
The names of venture capitalist IPOs are obtained from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) Database. If  an IPO firm is not listed for being a venture financed, this 
firm is classified as non-venture capitalist IPO firm.
We get the names o f Investment bankers involved IPOs from two different sources: 
A large proportion of the investment bankers come from the Corporate Finance: the TDD 
Review of Investment Banking published by Investment Dealers ’ Digest, Inc. Underwriters 
for the year 1991 and first half o f the year 1992 are missing in this source. The names of 
investment bankers for these periods are obtained from the SDC database.
To measure the reputation o f investment bankers, we use two classifications. One 
classification is Carter-Manaster (CM) investment bankers’ reputation measure based on
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tombstone advertisements5. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) give an alphabetical list of 
investment bankers with updated Carter-Manaster ranks. The CM measure is a discrete 
underwriter reputation variable from zero to nine where a nine is the most prestigious 
underwriter and zero is the least prestigious underwriter. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) 
classified EPOs as low, medium and high reputation groups, if they are underwritten by 
investment bankers with CM measure between zero and five, five and eight, and higher than 
eight, respectively. Since the number o f IPOs underwritten by investment bankers with CM 
measure below than five in our sample are very few, we create two reputation groups, high 
and low (we can also say not high). The low reputation group (LR) consists o f EPOs 
underwritten by investment bankers with CM ranks lower than eight. The high reputation 
group (HR) consists o f CM ranks eight and above. So that, the medium group of Carter, 
Dark, and Singh (1998) is accepted as a low reputation group in our classification.
An alternative measure for the reputation of investment bankers is used relying on the 
SDC’s underwriters ranking for 1996 as another classification to measure the reputation of 
investment bankers. The SDC ranks investment bankers according to their market share. If 
an investment bank involved, EPOs are ranked in top ten in the SDC’s ranking, these IPOs 
are included in the high reputation group. Otherwise, they are included in the low reputation 
group. The list of SDC’s Investment bankers ranking is given at the appendix.
COMPUSTAT Business Segment Description Report is used to extract information 
for segments that represent 10% or more of consolidated sales. In this data set, secondary 
SIC codes are also provided for the related industries o f a firm’s base industry determined by
5 Carter-Manaster ranking procedure for 1979-1984 period is explained in Carter and Manaster (1990). Carter, 
Dark, and Singh (1998) reestimate Carter-Manaster ranking and update for 1985-1991 period using the same 
procedure.
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a primary SIC code. Using this information, we set two classification measures to separate 
IPO firms as diversified (multi-segment) and focused (single-segment). Classification o f firms 
is made each year from year -1 to year +3.
First, we classified firms according to two-digit SIC codes by comparing primary SIC 
code with secondary SIC codes. IPO firms with two or more different two-digit SIC codes 
are classified as multi-segment. Firms are defined as single segment firms if they are given 
only one two-digit SIC code. With this classification, we find 201 EPOs issued by multi­
segment firms and 251 by single segment firms.
The second classification is made by segment information. Firms with only one 
segment information are classified as single-segment, and firms with two or more segments 
are classified as multi-segment IPO firms. We find only forty IPOs issued by multi-segment 
firms. Twenty-five companies have two segments, ten companies have three, and only five 
out o f  40 multi-segment IPO firms have four segments. In addition to this, two companies 
diversified at zero year (the offering year), one company at +1, two companies at +2, and 
three companies diversified at the +3 year. In this sample, there are also very few companies 
that they become single segment finns after the offering. Only two companies increased their 
segment after the offering year.
The information for ownership structure o f IPO firms, regarding shares held by 
institutional investors, large blockholders, and insiders, at the end of the offering year is 
obtained from the Compact Disclosure Database. If institutional investors have stakes in an 
IPO firm greater than the median value of institutional ownership o f the IPO sample at the 
end o f the offering year (year 0), the IPO firm is classified as the firm with high institutional 
ownership (HIGH-INST). An EPO with low institutional ownership (LOW-INST) is the one
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that institutional investors’ participation in this IPO firm is less than the median value o f the 
sample.
5.2 Methodology
5.2. a. Unadjusted Measures o f Operating Performance
We use several measures o f operating performance. The first measure is operating return on 
assets, which is operating income before depreciation divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT 
data item 13 divided by data item 6). The second operating performance measure is operating 
cash flows scaled by total assets. This measure is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation minus capital expenditures divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 13 
minus data item 128 divided by data item 6). The third measure is the operating margin which 
consist of operating income before depreciation divided by total sales (COMPUSTAT data 
item 13 divided by data item 12). We also use three other accounting measures to capture the 
growth opportunities of EPOs. These are sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12), capital 
expenditures (COMPUSTAT data item 128), and research and development expenses 
(COMPUSTAT data item 46). The last two measures are scaled also by total assets. We also 
use an approximation of Tobin’s q, which is computed as market value of outstanding shares 
plus liquidation value o f preferred stocks plus net current assets plus long term debt divided 
by total assets [COMPUSTAT (data item 24 multiplied by data item 25) + data item 10 + 
(data item 5 - data item 4) + data item 9 divided by data item 6], An alternative performance 
measure that is used in the analysis is the book-to-market ratio. Book value is defined as 
common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes (COMPUSTAT data item 60 plus data item 
35) and market value is the product o f common shares outstanding and share price at the end
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o f the year (COMPUSTAT data item 24 multiplied by data item 25). The last operating 
performance measure used is excess market value. Excess market value is defined as the 
difference between market value o f outstanding shares and book value o f equity divided by 
total sales[COMPUSTAT ((data item 24 x data item 25) - data item 60)/data item 12].
The change in operating performance in offering year (year 0) and three-years after 
the offering is measured as a percentage change relative to year -1 (the fiscal year prior to the 
IPO)6. We measure the percentage changes in operating performance as follows:
the median value of {operating performance variable, (t) - operating performance 
variablef (-1) divided by operating performance variable, (-1)},
where i represents the firm, -1 represents the fiscal year prior to the IPO, and t represents the 
post-IPO fiscal year end (i.e., t equals to 0, 1, 2, 3 .)
Furthermore, the long-term performance of IPOs is evaluated using buy-and-hold 
returns (BHRs). The BHR is defined as the geometrically compounded return on the stock 
in time t. We calculate BHRs for several long-term periods as follows:
Min [T. Delist]
R j . T ' t n  ( l+rJI - l
t = 3
where rft is return for firm i on day t; R3toT is the raw buy-and-hold return for firm i beginning 
on the third trading day for the IPO, extending to T days after the IPO issue. We use four 
buy-and-holding periods. The first period spans from 3 day to 1 month (25 days), second is 
from 3 day to 1 year (253 days), third is from 3 day to 2-year (506 days), and fourth is from 
3 day to three-year (760 days) after. If a firm is delisted during the period, buy-and-hold
6 Since there is no market data available at year -1 to calculate Tobin’s q and book-to-market ratio as alternative 
performance measures, the percentage changes in these variables is calculated starting from the end of the offering 
year, year 0.
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period ends at the delisted day.
5.2.b. Adjusted Measures o f Operating Performance
We also estimate adjusted BHRs for the EPO sample against several alternative 
benchmarks. We use the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/ Nasdaq value-weighted index, CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equally-weighted index and S&P 500 index as market indicator 
benchmarks. BHRs o f IPO firms are adjusted by subtracting the contemporaneous CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted, equally-weighted market returns, and S&P 500 index 
returns:
Min [T, Delist] Min [T. Delist]
Adjusted R3toT = [ j j  ( l+ rit) - f t  O+rbendmu t^) ]
t= 3  t= 3
Fama (1998) states that much of the apparent over and underperformance in the long­
term disappears when common factors such as size and book-to-market effects are controlled 
for. To address this issue Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1998) recommend that “researchers 
compare sample firms to the general population on the basis of these factors.”
To control for size, book-to-market, and industry effects, we match each IPO firm 
with a publicly traded firm using these factors. Our method matches firms according to size 
and book-to-market ratio along with two-digit industry classification. Firms in the same two- 
digit SIC classification with IPO firms are matched based on size measured by market value 
o f outstanding shares, and book to market ratio. We require that the matching firm’s size and 
book-to-market ratio be within 25 % of the size and book to market ratio o f the firm going 
public. We do not match firms if they went to public prior to 1986 which is three years before
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our IPO sample period. If we find more than one matching firm for an IPO firm, we take the 
one that went public earlier than others. This matching procedure reduces our sample from 
456 to 367.
BHRs based on size/book-to-Market/Industry are used as another alternative 
benchmark to calculate adjusted BHRs. We also calculate adjusted percentage change for the 
other operating performance measures by using these matching firms. In this case, the 
percentage size/book-to-market/industry adjusted performance of an IPO firm is the 
difference between its percentage change in operating performance and the percentage change 
in operating performance of the matching firm.
Finally, a cross sectional regression analysis is performed to examine the relation 
between alternative measures of performance, Yi, and a set of influential factors. The cross- 
sectional regression analysis is conducted using the following regression model:
Y; = b0 + b! VBDUMMY + b2 REPDUM + b3 DIVDUM 4- b4 ISSUE 
b5 SECOND + b6 INST + b7 LARGE + b„ INSD + e;
The independent variables o f this model consists of three alternative indicator 
variables. VBDUMMY is the first dummy variable indicating whether an IPO firm is venture- 
backed or not. It takes the value o f 1 if  the IPO firm is backed by a venture capitalist, and 
zero otherwise. REPDUM is the dummy variable that measures the effect o f investment 
bankers’ reputation on the dependent variable. It takes the value o f 1 if  an IPO firm is 
underwritten by a high reputable investment banker, and zero otherwise. The third dummy 
variable (DIVDUM) measures for corporate diversification of the IPO firm. It takes the value 
of 1 when a firm is defined a single segment IPO firm which consists o f only one 2-digit SIC
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code. For an IPO firm with two or more differently two-digit SIC codes labeled as Multi- 
Segment IPO firm, it takes the value o f 0. The analysis includes a  set o f  control variables as 
well. Issue size (ISSUE) is defined as the total value of the offering divided by total assets of 
the firm at the year prior to the offering (year -1). The SECOND variable refers to the 
percentage o f the total issue offered by current shareholders. These two variables are 
documented as having an effect on both the short- and long-term performance of IPO firms. 
For instance, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997) show 
the effect o f these variables in their analysis. We also account for ownership effects into the 
regression analysis. These are represented by the percentage of shares held by institutional 
(INST), blockholders (LARGE), and Insiders (INSD).
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1 Long-Term Operating Performance o f IPO Firms
Table 2 presents median annual operating performance measures o f EPO firms for 
multiple periods and changes in them for post-issue years, year 0 (offering year), +1. +2, and 
+3 relative to year -1 (the fiscal year prior to the IPO). Operating performance changes are 
also adjusted by subtracting the performance changes o f firms matched with IPO firms by 
size and book to market ratio along with corresponding two-digit industry classification.
The operating return on assets measure indicates that there is no statistically important 
change for IPO firms from year -1 to zero (the year o f the IPO). However, this performance 
measure significantly declines for years +1, +2 , and +3 relative to year -I. The median 
changes in operating return on assets decline significantly by 13 percent, 18 percent and 19 
percent for these post-issue years. The median size/book-to-market/industry adjusted 
operating return on assets shows a similar trend of declining performance. For this adjusted 
performance measure, although declines in the median adjusted operating return on assets are 
less pronounced, the wilcoxon test statistic is significant for years +2 and +3 relative to year 
-1. This result shows that, in the long term, declining performance of IPO firms cannot be 
attributed to firms that are similar and in the same industry with them.
Operating cash flows scaled by total assets seem to follow the same direction with 
operating return on assets. Cash flows decline 16 percent from year -1 to 0 (not statistically 
significant change) and 31 percent, 40 percent, and 42 percent (all significant at 1 percent 
level) for years +1, +2, and +3. Significant negative median size/book-to-market/industry 
adjusted changes in cash flows again indicate that IPO firms suffer more than similar firms in
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the same industry.
The above results show that the median levels o f operating return on assets and cash 
flows o f  IPO firms decline overtim e relative to their pre-issue levels, while corresponding 
levels for their matched firms decline by a lesser amount. However, this doesn’t mean that 
IPO firms have worse operating performance than similar firms. In Table 2, we also present 
both median operating performance and adjusted operating performance levels for year -1 and 
year 0. (For market value related operating performance measures, we report the performance 
levels for all years in Table 2.) It is shown that the median adjusted operating performance 
levels for both measures are close to zero. We can easily infer from this result that IPO firms 
and their industry peers have similar operating performance.
The results for the other performance measure, operating margin, suggest a significant 
increase over all time windows. However, adjusted operating margin figures show that there 
is no difference between IPO firms and their counterparts. This shows that IPO firms increase 
their profitability as much as their industry peers do. Consequently, declines in operating 
performance cannot be related the lack of profitability.
There could be several reasons for the decline in operating performance of IPO firms. 
First o f all, declines in post-issue operating performance o f IPO firms can be expected if these 
firms do not generate enough sales or managers fail to maintain the required levels of capital 
expenditures relative to pre-issue levels. To examine this issue, we also look at the raw and 
adjusted sales and capital expenditures growth for IPO firms. In Table 2, the median change 
in sales growth and the ratio o f capital expenditures to total assets before and after adjustment 
are reported. It is shown that IPO firms experience increasing trends in terms o f these 
measures. The median increases in sales measured relative to year -1 are 24 percent, 56
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percent, 90 percent and 127 percent (all significant at the 1 percent level) for years 0, +1, +2, 
and +3, respectively. Adjusted figures show that IPO firms have sales greater than similar 
firms in the same industry in years +1, +2, and +3 relative to year -1. Over the year -1 to +1 
period, IPO and matching firms have similar sales growth. Capital expenditures scaled by 
assets figures also show significant growth for years +1, +2, and +3 relative to year -1. The 
adjusted numbers provide the information that IPO firms increase their capital expenditures 
24 percent and 20 percent (both numbers are significant) in years +1 and +2, and 12 percent 
(not significant) in year +3 more than similar firms. The trend o f median changes in sales and 
capital expenditures imply that declines in operating performance cannot be associated with 
lack sales growth, and investments of IPO firms.
We also study value-based operating performance measures o f IPO firms. These 
measures are Tobin’s q, book-to-market ratio and excess market value. Since there is no 
available information for the firms’s market value prior to its offering, we present the median 
change of these measures for years +1, +2, and +3 relative to year 0, the offering year. 
Tobin’s q figures show that the value of the firm declines in the post-EPO period. For 
instance, the median change in Tobin’s q measure is 27 percent before adjustment and 0.3 
percent after adjustment for year +3 relative to year 0. The median book-to-market ratio for 
EPO firms increases 37 percent and 8 percent relative to similar firms over three years, 
indicating also declines in market value. Excess market value o f IPO firms also declines 
significantly at the post-EPO period. For instance, the excess market value of IPO firms 
declines 8 percent more than similar firms over three year post-issue period.
[Insert Table 2 About Here]
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6.2 Long-Term Operating Performance and the Role o f Venture Capitalists, the Reputation 
of Investment Bankers, Institutional Ownership, and Corporate Structure
The results from the previous section suggest that IPO firms’ performance over the 
three year period after going public are consistent with the findings of Jain and Kini (1994) 
and Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997)7. Recent studies associated with the ongoing long­
term underperformance puzzle have shown that some o f the IPO firms have different long­
term performance than others when performance is measured by buy-and-hold stock returns. 
Brav and Gampers (1997) show that venture-backed IPOs have superior performance over 
nonventure-backed IPOs. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), however, attribute the long-term 
underperformance to the low reputation of underwriters. Fields (1996) finds that IPOs having 
larger institutional shareholdings significantly outperform those associated with smaller 
institutional shareholdings. We also use buy-and-hold stock returns to compare IPO firms. 
Unlike previous studies, we examine median changes in the operating performance measures 
for different types o f  IPO firms to determine whether operating performance of EPO firms is 
influenced by venture capitalists, reputation of investment bankers, institutional ownership, 
and firm’s corporate structure.
6.2.a Long-Term Operating Performance and The Role of Venture Capitalists
Table 3 presents the median operating performance changes for venture and non­
venture backed IPO firms and compares these two groups. The operating return on assets 
results show that operating performance declines for both venture and non-venture backed
7 Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997) find significant declines in operating performance for unadjusted results 5 
years after offering, but adjusted results do not become significant
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IPO firms. Declines in post-issue operating performance are not statistically different between 
the two groups. Similar results are obtained based on adjusted return on assets performance 
measure. The adjustment does not yield any difference between the two groups, either.
We find some evidence that declines in operating cash flows for venture backed IPO 
firms are less than non-venture backed IPO firms for the years +1, +2, and +3 relative to year 
-1. However, when operating cash flows is adjusted by size/book-to-market-industry, they 
do not yield any significant difference between the two groups.
The median operating margin increase over three years relative to year -1 for both 
venture and non-venture backed EPO firms, but there is no significant difference between the 
two groups.
Although the results for the median operating return on assets and operating cash 
flow changes indicate that operating performance of both venture and non-venture backed 
IPO firms declines relative to their pre-IPO levels, it is not clear whether operating 
performance levels o f the two groups differ substantially. For instance, with the light of 
evidence that operating cash flows of venture backed IPO firms decline less than non-venture 
backed IPO firms, it is hard to argue that venture backed EPO firms have better cash flows. 
We plan to revisit this issue at the cross sectional level of analysis later.
We also find that the median sales, and capital expenditures increase over three years 
relative to year -1 for both venture and non-venture backed IPO firms. However, the results 
show that only the median sales growth is statistically different between the two groups. 
Venture backed IPO firms increase their sales more than non-venture backed IPO firms. This 
result is confirmed when we adjust it for size/book-to-market/industry. The results for growth 
in capital expenditures show that venture backed IPO firms have superior capital expenditures
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growth in the third year relative to year -1 against both non-venture backed IPO firms and 
similar firms in the same industry.
In terms of performance measures related to the market value of IPO firms, Tobin’s 
q and excess market value decline again for both venture and non-venture backed IPO firms. 
The median raw and adjusted changes for these measures, however, are not statistically 
different between the two groups (except in year +3 for Tobin’s q). In terms o f book-to- 
market ratio, the median increase in this measure for venture backed IPO firms is significantly 
less than non-venture backed IPO firms. However, adjusted results fail to yield significant 
differences.
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
6.2.b Long- Term Operating Performance and Investment Bankers ’ Reputation
The median operating performance changes for IPOs underwritten by high reputable 
(HR IPOs) and low reputable investment bankers (LR EPOs) and the comparison of these the 
two groups are presented in Table 4. Table 4 is split into two panels based on two different 
investment bankers’ reputation classifications. While Panel A o f Table 4 reports the results 
based on Carter-Manaster Investment bankers’ reputation ranking, Panel B reports results 
based on Securities Data Corporations’ investment bankers’ reputation ranking.
As both panels indicate, the results are similar to those reported for all IPO firms in 
Table 2. The median value o f operating return on assets, operating cash flows, Tobin’s q, 
excess market value decline, and operating margin, book-to-market ratio increase for EPOs 
underwritten either by high or low reputable investment bankers in post-issue periods relative
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to year -1. The median sales, and capital expenditures increase over time as well. Even though 
size, book-to-market along with industry adjusted median changes have less value, the trend 
remains basically the same.
As shown in Panel A, there are only a few statistical differences in the median 
operating performance changes between HR IPOs and LR IPOs, but slightly more being 
reported in Panel B. While statistical differences between both groups are in favor o f  IPO 
firms underwritten by low reputable investment bankers in Panel A, EPOs underwritten by 
high reputable investment bankers produce favorable results in Panel B. For instance, the 
median operating return on assets of IPO firms whose issues are underwritten by high 
reputable investment bankers decline 11 percent, and 15 percent for years +2 and +3 relative 
to year -1. EPO firms whose issues are underwritten by low reputable investment bankers 
declined by 29 percent and 32 percent changes for the same years. The differences between 
the two groups in two periods are statistically significant. Similarly, the median declines in 
operating cash flows deflated by total assets for high reputable IPOs are significantly less than 
those for low reputable EPOs. However, the adjusted median changes do not show the 
significant difference between the two groups for both operating performance measures.
[Insert Table 4 About Here]
With the results in Table 4, although there is evidence that the HR IPOs have superior 
operating performance relative to the LR IPOs group. However, it is not clear that the HR 
IPOs group has better performance levels than the LR IPOs. The cross-sectional regression 
analysis is designed to address this point further.
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6.2.c Long-Term Operating Performance and Institutional Ownership
Empirical studies show that institutional ownership affects firm value. The argument 
behind this finding is that substantial institutional equity ownership encourages greater 
monitoring o f  managers. This can motivate managers to improve firms’ performance. 
Therefore, it is expected that the IPO firms with higher institutional ownership in comparison 
to firms with lower institutional ownership to have superior operating performance. To test 
this conjecture, we examine the relation between our operating performance measures and 
the fraction o f  the shares held by institutional investors. We split the sample into the two 
groups based on the median value of institutional ownership of our sample at the end o f the 
offering year (year 0). Hence, IPO firms with institutional ownership above the sample median 
will be referred to as IPO firms with high institutional ownership (HIGH-INST) and IPO firms 
with low institutional ownership below the sample median as low institutional ownership firms 
(LOW-INST).
The median performance results for the two groups are reported in Table 5. The 
operating return on assets results show that the median performance o f firms with both high 
and low institutional ownership decline. Firms with high ownership show better performance 
relative to firms with the low ownership for years 0, +2, and +3 relative to year -1, with the 
difference being significant both before and after adjustment. (This is true except in the year 
+3. Adjusted return on assets change between the two groups is not significant.) For instance, 
the HIGH-INST group shows a median raw (size/book-to-market/industry adjusted) change 
o f-13(1) percent in operating return on assets in comparison to a median raw (size/book-to- 
market/industry adjusted) change of -25(-20) percent for the LOW-INST group from year 
-1 to year +2. We also find that the HIGH-INST group has higher capital expenditure growth
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for years 0 and +1 than the LOW-INST group, with the difference being significant at the 
0.10 level. The results after adjustment do not yield significant differences between the two 
groups. There is no other evidence based on other operating performance measures showing 
that the HIGH-INST group is associated with superior performance relative to the LOW- 
INST group.
In general, we find just a little evidence that institutional investors with a higher 
percentage shares in equity of IPO firms improve the performance o f  these firms against firms 
that have lower institutional participation. However, this advantage o f firms with high 
institutional ownership disappears against their industry peers.
[Insert Table 5 About Here]
6.2.dLong-Term Operating Performance and Corporate Structure
In this section, we study whether there is a link between the long-term performance 
o f EPOs and corporate structure. Table 6 reports the median raw and adjusted operating 
performance changes based on the corporate diversification characteristics o f IPO firms. The 
Z statistics are also presented to show whether there are performance differences between 
single- and multi-segment firms. Table 6 consists of two panels based on two corporate 
diversification classifications o f  IPO firms. Panel A reports EPO performance for single- and 
multi-segment firms based on two-digit SIC codes, while Panel B reports similar evidence 
based on the number o f segments that IPO firms have operations.
Since diversification is found as a value decreasing strategy by Serveas (1996), John 
and Ofek (1995), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarell (1995), and Lung and Stulz
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(1994), it is hypothesized that decline in the long-term performance of single-segment IPO 
firms is likely to be less than multi-segment IPO firms. The results reported in Table 6 do not 
exhibit a clear significant difference between single- and multi-segment IPO firms either 
before or after adjustment. Except for the median changes in operating cash flows for years 
0, +1, and +2 relative to year -1 shown in panel B, that demonstrate that the median value of 
cash flows of multi-segment IP O firms declines less than that of single-segment firms, the two 
groups are associated with the same median operating performance changes at the post-issue 
period. Thus, we conclude that the performance differences between single- and multi­
segment IPO firms are indistinguishable.
[Insert Table 6 About Here]
6.3 Long-Term Operating Performance and Interactive Effects o f Venture Capitalists, 
Reputation o f Investment Bankers, and Institutional Ownership
In the previous section, we did study the relationship between the long-term 
performance o f IPO firms and several factors that have been documented in IPOs literature 
as being related to the long-term performance of IPO firms. In this section, we examine the 
interactive effects o f venture capitalists, investment bankers’ reputation, and institutional 
ownership to determine the joint influence of these factors on the long-term performance of 
EPO firms.
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6.3.a Venture Capitalists, Investment Bankers’ Reputation and 
Operating Performance o f IPO Firms
Our evidence, this far, shows that the presence o f venture capitalists and high 
reputable investment bankers in the IPO process yields relatively better long-term 
performance. However, it is quite possible that these two factors have a joint influence on the 
long-term performance of EPO firms. To determine which one o f  the two factors is more 
influential on the long-term operating performance of IPO firms, we split the EPO sample into 
four subsamples based on venture capital and investment bankers’ reputation characteristics. 
The first two subsamples consist o f (1) venture backed IPOs underwritten by high reputable 
(HR/VC) and (2) low reputable investment bankers (LR/VC), while (3) non-venture backed 
IPOs underwritten by high reputable (HR/Non-VC) and (4) low reputable investment bankers 
(LR/Non-VC) represent other two.
Table 7 presents raw and adjusted median percentage operating performance change 
differences for the four subsamples. In this table, we also report the Z and Chi-square 
statistics to test differences between groups. The table is designed to see which factor has 
more influence on the performance o f IPO firms. For instance, if  we detect a significant 
difference between HR/VC and LR/VC firms, since the common factor is venture capitalists 
in the two groups, we can argue that investment bankers’ reputation derives the results. The 
comparison o f HR/Non-VC and LR/Non-VC firms is expected to shed light in the same 
direction. If  venture capital have greater influence on the long-term operating performance 
o f EPO firms, we should expect to observe superior performance for the LR/VC firms over 
HR/Non-VC IPO firms. Similarly, we can arrive at the same conclusion if HR/VC firms show 
better performance than the LR/Non-VC firms. In addition to these results, if there is no
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difference between HR/VC and LR/VC firms, as well as between HR/Non-VC and LR/Non- 
VC firms, this would supply that venture capital play a more crucial role in explaining the 
long-term performance o f IPO firms. There is also a high probability that the two factors may 
have a joint influence on the performance of IPO firms. Evidence in favor of the joint effect 
should show that HR/VC firms have the best while LR/Non-VC firms have the worst 
performance.
Panel A o f Table 7 reports post offering performance across different firms based on 
the Carter-Manaster reputation ranking of investment bankers’ reputation. The results appear 
to be mixed. There is no clear evidence supporting that the effect o f either investment 
bankers’ reputation or venture capital is dominant. For instance, the median change in return 
on assets over 1 and 2 year periods shows that LR/VC firms (-6 percent and -13 percent) 
show significantly better performance than HR/VC (-16 percent and -18 percent) firms. This 
may be because, as we show in Panel A of Table 4, investment bankers’ reputation measure 
based on Carter-Manaster ranking gives more credit to the low reputation group in our IPO 
sample. The same pattern is also observed between the HR/Non-VC firms and the LR/Non- 
VC firms for the years +1, and +2 relative to year - I. In this comparison HR/Non-VC firms 
(-7 percent and -14 percent) have superior performance relative to LR/Non-VC firms (-22 
percent and -31 percent). Moreover, there is no substantial difference in return asset changes 
between HR/VC and LR/Non-VC firms, as well as between HR/Non-VC and LR/VC firms 
for the years +1 and +2, indicating that venture capital do not seem to create any substantial 
performance differences among EPO firms. The return on assets results are similar even after 
we adjust for size/book-to-market/industry. These results indicate that investment bankers’ 
reputation plays a critical role in terms of affecting IPO firms’ return on assets.
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On the other hand, the evidence based on the median change in operating cash flows 
deflated by total assets and operating margin show that LR/VC firms show superior 
performance over HR/VC and HR/Non-VC firms for the years +1, and +2 relative to year -1. 
Moreover, HR/VC and HR/Non-VC firms have significantly less decline in cash flows than 
LR/Non-VC firms over the 1 and 2 year periods. While, the adjusted median changes in cash 
flows yield the difference between HR/VC and LR/VC groups, and between HR/Non-VC and 
LR/VC groups only at year +2, the same results are observed at year +1 for operating margin. 
These results imply that venture capital exert an influence on the changes in the operating 
performance o f IPO firms.
The evidence based on sales growth clearly support a dominant venture capital effect. 
The median sales growth figures are 78 percent, 138 percent, and 205 percent for HR/VC 
firms for the years +1, +2, and +3. LR.Non-VC firms have 61, 82, and 97 percent sales 
growth at the same year periods. The differences between two types of firms are significant 
in every time windows. In addition to these results, LR/VC firms (93, 162, and 252 percent) 
have significantly greater sales growth than HR/Non-VC firms (43, 74, 100 percent) over 1, 
2, and 3 year periods. Moreover, there is no significant difference in sales growth between 
HR/VC and LR/VC firms and between HR/Non-VC and LR/Non-VC firms. However, 
size/book-to-market/industry adjustments eliminate the differences. These results imply that 
venture capital play a dominant role on the median sales growth. The results for capital 
expenditures do not yield any significant differences among the four type of firms.
Based on Tobin’s q, book-to-market ratio, and excess market value performance 
measuring, the results show that the LR/VC group has superior performance relative to the 
HR/Non-VC group for almost every time period. This result may imply that venture capital
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eliminate the disadvantage o f the low reputation factor. However, we find no evidence that 
the HR/VC group has better performance than the LR/Non-VC group. This is because, as we 
repeat, investment bankers’ reputation measure based on Carter-Manaster ranking gives 
more credit to the low reputation group in our EPO sample. Consequently, low reputable 
investment bankers also play a role on the long-term operating performance o f IPO firms.
In general, the evidence shows that the two factors have joint influence on the long­
term operating performance o f IPO firms. The Carter-Manaster investment bankers’ 
reputation ranking produces the results in the favor o f  the LR/VC group. Moreover, the 
combination of low reputation and non-venture capitalists generate the worst operating 
performance for these EPO firms.
Panel B o f Table 7 presents the results based on Securities Data Corporation’s 
investment bankers’ reputation ranking. In this panel, as in Panel A, the evidence suggests 
that both venture capital and investment bankers’ reputation have an influence on the long­
term operating performance of IPO firms. Based on operating return on assets, operating cash 
flows, and operating margins most of the time both HR/VC and HR/Non-VC firms appear 
to have superior performance over the LR/Non-VC group, indicating that both high 
reputation and venture capitalists factors affect the results. In this panel, size/book-to- 
market/industry adjusted median changes in operating performance measures eliminate the 
differences across the different type of firms.
[Insert Table 7 About Here]
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6.3. b Investment Bankers ’ Reputation, Institutional Ownership and 
Operating Performance o f  IPO Firms
In this section, we examine the interactive effect o f investment bankers’ reputation and 
institutional ownership on raw and adjusted median changes in operating performance 
measures for post-issue periods relative to year -1. The effect o f investment bankers’ 
reputation on the long term performance o f  EPO firms is demonstrated by Carter, Dark, and 
Singh (1998). Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1998) and Fields (1996) find that IPOs having 
larger institutional shareholdings significantly outperform those associated with smaller 
institutional shareholdings. Since these two factors are shown as affecting the long-term 
performance o f IPO firms, we examine if  there is a joint influence of investment bankers’ 
reputation along with institutional ownership the long-term performance o f  our EPO sample. 
We create four subsamples to test this conjecture. One subsample is called the HR/HINST 
group if IPO firms were underwritten by high reputable investment bankers and have 
institutional equity ownership grater than the median of the IPO sample. I f  IPO firms were 
underwritten by high reputable investment bankers and have institutional equity ownership 
less than the median of the IPO sample, they are classified as HR/LINST firms. The other two 
subsamples are LR/HINST firms with the combination o f low reputable investment bankers 
and institutional equity ownership grater than the median of the IPO sample and LR/LINST 
firms I f  IPO firms were underwritten by low reputable investment bankers and have 
institutional equity ownership less than the median o f the IPO sample.
Table 8 reports median changes in operating performance measures for the four 
subsamples. Table 8 is separated into two panels. Reputation classification o f IPO firms is 
accomplished by using Carter-Manaster investment bankers’ reputation rankings in Panel A,
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and Securities Data Corporation’s rankings in Panel B. As shown in Panel A, there is no 
supporting evidence in favor o f the two factors having a joint influence on IPO firms’ long­
term performance. However, in Panel B, we are able to distinguish subsamples in terms of 
operating return on assets. The HR/HINST group shows superior performance over the 
LR/HINST group for years +1, and +3, and over the LR/LINST group for all time windows 
relative to year -1. On the other hand, we find that the LR/HINST group has similar 
performance with the HR/LINST group in all long-term time windows. Consequently, high 
institutional ownership in IPO firms underwritten by low reputable investment bankers is 
associated with firms that have superior long-term performance. We interpret these results 
as evidence consistent with the view that institutional ownership stakes in IPO firms 
underwritten by reputable investment bankers to have an influence on the long-term 
performance o f these firms.
In addition to the above results, we show that the HR/HINST group has the least 
declines in operating return assets, while the LR/LINST group shows the worst performance. 
For instance, while the median in operating return on assets declines 2 percent, 10 percent, 
and 14 percent for years +1, +2, and +3 relative to year -1 for the HR/HENST group, declines 
are 15 percent, 23 percent, and 39 percent for the LR/LINST group in the same periods, 
respectively. When we adjust the performance measures by size/book-to-market/industry the 
results remain essentially similar for all four type o f firms , indicating that the median changes 
in operating return on assets for the four subsamples are not different than their counterparts. 
Unfortunately, the results for the other performance measures do not yield any significant 
results.
[Insert Table 8 About Here]
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6.3.c Venture Capitalists, Institutional Ownership and 
Operating Performance o f IPO Firms
We also investigate the interactive effects o f institutional ownership and venture 
capitalists on the long-term performance o f  IPO firms. It is shown by Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) that institutional ownership after an IPO is substantially higher for venture backed IPO 
firms than non-venture backed IPO firms. Thus, with a simultaneous analysis o f venture 
capitalists and institutional ownership, we will be able to test whether the better long-term 
performance o f venture backed IPO firms is because o f high institutional ownership stakes 
in these IPO firms. For this kind of simultaneous analysis we split our sample into four groups 
based on venture capital and institutional ownership characteristics of IPO firms. Hence, the 
VC/HINST (Non-VC/HINST) group represents venture backed (non-venture backed) IPO 
firms with institutional equity ownership in exess of sample median. The VC/LINST (Non- 
VC/LINST) group is venture backed (non-venture backed) IPO firms with institutional equity 
ownership less than the median o f the IPO sample.
Table 9 reports the median change differences in operating performance measures 
among those four groups for different post-isuue periods relative to year 1. If  venture capital 
and institutinal investors have a joint influence on the long-term performance of IPO firms, 
we should expect the VC/HINST group to have the best performance (or the least decline in 
operating performance) among the four groups. Moreover, if institutional investors have more 
influence on the long-term performance o f IPO firms than venture capital do, we should 
expect the Non-VC/HINST group to show similar performance over the VC/HINST group 
and similar or superior performance relative to the VC/LINST group. The results from Table 
9 do show a pattern to support above two statements. First of all, the VC/HINST group is
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not the one that shows the least declines in all operating performance measures for the all 
long-term time windows. The VC/LINST group also shows superior performance over the 
Non-VC/HINST and Non-VC/LINST groups, especially in the median change based on 
tobin’s q and book-to-market ratio. However, with the exception o f the median change in 
operating cash flows for years +1, and +2 relative to -1, the Non-VC/HINST group shows 
similar performance against either the VC/HINST group or the VC/LINST group based on 
all other performance measures. These results imply that neither venture capital nor 
institutional investors have more influence on the long-term changes in operating performance 
o f IPO firms. They have a joint infleunce on the results. Hence, the presence of higher or 
lower institutional ownership with venture capitalists or without them affect the long-term 
operating performance of IPO firms.
[Insert Table 9 About Here]
6.4. Long-Term Buy-and-Hold Periods Stock Returns o f IPO Firms
6.4.a Initial Returns
Even though the main goal o f this study is to examine the long-term performance of 
IPO firms, we also look at the initial returns of IPO. Table 10 reports the initial return results. 
The mean (median) initial return is 11 (5.2) percent for all IPOs in the sample. We also 
observe that venture back IPO returns are larger than non-venture back IPO returns. The 
mean (median) initial return for venture-backed IPOs is 14.1 (8.9), and for nonventure-backed 
IPOs is 8.9 (4.4). The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05, or better. This is 
consistent with the long-term results of Brav and Gampers (1997). It is interesting to note the
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short- and long-term performance of IPO firms is also consistent with the results o f  Krigman, 
Shaw, and Womack (1998). They show that initial returns predict subsequent long-term (one- 
year) excess returns. They find that IPOs with a first day return above zero and less than 60 
percent have positive excess returns over 1 year.
Investment bankers’ reputation does make a difference in the mean initial returns with 
the reputation measure based on CM ranking in our sample. The mean initial return for IPOs 
underwritten by high reputable investment bankers is 12 %, and 9.3 % for IPOs underwritten 
by low reputable investment bankers. The difference is significant at 0.10 level. Based on the 
median initial results, whichever classification is used to measure the reputation o f  investment 
bankers, the initial returns for high and low reputation groups of IPOs are not statistically 
different from each other.
There is little evidence is associated corporate diversification on the any initial return 
differences. IPOs issued by single-segment firms have higher initial returns than IPOs issued 
by multi-segment firms when they are classified according to segment information. There is 
no statistical difference between the two groups classified according to 2-Digit SIC codes.
In the analysis o f measuring joint effect, venture capitalist IPOs underwritten by high 
reputable underwriters and with high institutional ownership appear to have the highest initial 
returns. We interpret these results to signify that initial returns indicate the quality o f  the firms 
as consistent with signaling theories.
[Insert Table 10 About Here]
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6.4.b Long-Term Buy-and-Hold Periods Stock Returns and Role o f Venture 
Capitalists, Reputation o f Investment Bankers, Institutional Ownership,
and Corporate Structure
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) document underperformance of IPO 
firms using several benchmarks. Brav and Gampers (1997) replicate their work and extend 
it to the comparison o f venture and non-venture backed EPO firms using also several 
benchmarks, such as the Fama and French (1994) industry portfolios and size and book-to- 
market matched portfolios. Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) compare stock returns of IPO 
firms underwritten by high and low reputable investment bankers. They use value weighted 
market-adjusted long run return. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1998) examine one-year 
long-term returns o f IPO firms to measure institutional investors effect using CRSP size 
index.
Our approach, in this section, addresses these issues for our IPO sample utilizing 
several benchmarks. First, the performance o f IPO firms is matched to three market indexes: 
the CRSP (NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq) value and equally weighted, and the S&P 500 composite 
indexes. The performance of IPO firms is also compared to size/book-to-market/industry 
matched firms that have excluded recent EPO firms. Since it is documented that size and 
book-to-market are important determinants o f the cross section o f  stock returns and 
eliminate most of the anomalies, it seems very important to compare performance to size and 
book-to-market matched firms. We also control industry effects. Thus, we use industry as 
the third dimension in our selection of matching firms. In this section, we also present the 
performance of single- and multi-segment firms.
Table 11 reports raw and adjusted stock returns computed using a buy-and-hold
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strategy in terms of all sample and different classifications o f  IPO firms. Buy-and-hold stock 
returns (BHRs) are computed for 1-month, 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year periods starting from 
the third day of trading o f new issues. In this table, we report both mean and median values 
o f  stock performance for the same periods. The mean returns are relevant-statistic from a 
portfolio strategy perspective. However, the median returns provide information about the 
performance of the sample in general. Therefore, we rely on the median returns to interpret 
the results.
Median raw stock returns for EPO firms are 2.4 percent, 15.9 percent, 18.9 percent, 
and 19.4 percent for 1-month, 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year buy-and-hold periods, respectively. 
The long-term CRSP value-weighted, S&P 500 index, and size/book-to-market/industry 
adjusted returns o f IPO firms in our sample become positive for the periods of 1-month and 
1-year. IPO firms underperform 11.5 percent, and 28.6 percent against the value-weighted 
index in 2-year and 3-year buy-and-hold periods. Underperformance of IPO firms against 
S&P 500 index are 4.2 percent and 18.3 percent for the same periods. CRSP equally weighted 
adjusted returns become more negative in the long-term. Size/book-to-market/industry 
adjustment decreases the underperformance of IPO firms consistent with the extant empirical 
literature. IPO firms overperform similar firms by 1.2 percent and 0.7 percent over the year 
+ i and +2, respectively, while they appear to underperform by 4.7 percent their peers over 
the 3-year period.
Comparison o f venture backed IPO firms with non-venture backed IPO firms suggests 
that, as consistent with the results o f  Brav and Gampers (1997), venture backed IPO firms 
overperfom non-venture backed EPO firms in terms o f raw and adjusted returns, based on 
value-weighted and S&P 500 index in all periods. The median adjusted BHRs are significantly
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different for the two groups in all periods. Moreover, venture backed IPO firms overperform 
CRSP value weighted and S&P 500 market index over the 1-month and 1-year periods, but 
non-venture backed IPO firms show similar performance relative to the same benchmarks in 
these periods. Even though, the median performance difference between venture and non­
venture backed IPO firms is around 10 percent for CRSP value-weighted market adjusted and 
14 percent for S&P 500 index adjusted BHRs over 1 year, the median adjusted BHRs 
differences between the two groups are only significant at 0.10 level. However, the median 
performance differences between venture and non-venture backed IPO firms are statistically 
stronger over two years. Over the same period, a median venture backed EPO firm 
underperforms the CRSP value-weighted market benchmark by 5 percent and overperforms
5.4 percent relative to S&P 500 index benchmark. However, non-venture backed IPO firms 
underperform the two benchmarks by 16.7 percent and 10 percent over the 1 and 2 year 
periods, respectively. The differences between the two groups are significant at 0.01 level. 
Over three year period the median BHRs for venture backed EPO firms is 3 5.1 percent, while 
the median BHRs for non-venture backed IPO firms is only 9.8 percent. The median CRSP 
value weighted and S&P500 index adjusted BHRs for the three year period are -16 percent 
and -2.5 percent for venture backed EPO firms, respectively. The corresponding performance 
results for non-venture backed IPO firms are more negative, -37.4 percent and -27.8 percent. 
The median difference between the two groups are significant at 0.05 level.
When BHRs are adjusted by CRSP NYSE/AMEX, Nasdaq equally index, the median 
adjusted BHRs with this market index are more negative for the two groups. However, 
performance differences disappear between venture and non-venture backed IPO firms with 
this adjustment in all periods, except the 1-month period. The larger underperformance of
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IPO firms by the adjustment with the equally weighted index relative to value-weighted index 
is because o f lower CRSP value weighted index returns relative to equally-weighted index 
returns. This indicates that, over 1989-94 sample period, stock returns o f small issues 
increased more than big issues. Since our evidence suggests that there is no performance 
difference between venture and non-venture backed IPO firms, it may be that the value o f 
bigger issues in CRSP index are grater (lower) than that in our IPO sample, and the value 
of smaller issues in CRSP index are lower (greater) than that in our IPO sample. However, 
we cannot compare the value o f IPO issues in our sample against all issues over the post IPO 
periods. Consequently, we can only say that value of firms in our sample is uneven. This may 
be the reason why we are unable to find any difference between venture backed IPO firms 
and non-venture backed IPO firms in terms of adjusted CRSP equally-weighted index returns.
We also fail to detect any significant performance differences between venture and 
non-venture backed IPO firms based on size/book-to-market/industry adjusted returns over 
all long-term time windows. This result shows, as demonstrated Brav and Gampers (1997), 
that underperformance is not an EPO effect. When recent IPO firms are excluded from 
size/book-to-market/industry matching firms both, venture and non-venture backed EPO firms 
show similar performance with their relative counterparts. This result indicates that size/book- 
to-market/industry adjustment not only decreases underperformance o f non-venture backed 
IPO firms, but also eliminates the superior performance o f venture-backed EPO firms relative 
to both, market and non-venture backed EPO firms.
Results based on raw and adjusted buy-and-hold returns also show that reputation of 
investment bankers on the long-term performance of IPO firms is negligible, if any. The 
results are inconsistent with the findings of Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). Using by Carter-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
Manaster and Securities Data Corporation alternative, we could not find any significant 
difference between the two groups relative to the all alternative benchmarks for all buy-and- 
hold periods. EPO firms underwritten either high or low reputable investment bankers have 
an inferior performance relative to the market over two and three years. Carter, Dark, and 
Singh (1998) argue that book-to-market adjustments might eliminate the underperformance 
entirely for IPOs associated with investment bankers o f high reputation. We find little 
evidence to support this argument based on adjusted BHRs for the size/book-to- 
market/industry. For instance, the median adjusted return with SDC’s reputation ranking for 
the high reputation group is 10.9 percent and -8.4 percent for low reputation group over two 
year period. And the difference between the two groups is significant at 0.05 level. Based on 
the CM ranking, the results are -1.7 percent and -8.3 percent, respectively, but the difference 
test statistic is not significant. Even though the results for other buy-and-hold periods are in 
favor of IPOs associated with the high reputation group, we cannot detect any significant 
differences.
From the comparison of IPO firms with high institutional ownership and EPO firms 
with low institutional ownership, we find that institutional investors have an influence on the 
long-term performance of IPO firms over the 1-year and 3-year periods. Using CRSP value- 
weighted and S&P 500 index adjusted BHRs, EPO firms with high institutional ownership 
overperform EPO firms with low institutional ownership. The median CRSP value weighted 
and S&P500 index adjusted BHRs over the one year period are 9 percent and 14 percent for 
IPO firms with high institutional ownership, respectively. The corresponding results for IPO 
firms with low institutional ownership are -1.4 percent and 1.5 percent. The difference 
between the median values for the two groups are different at 0.10 and 0.05 significance
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levels. For the 3-year period, the adjusted BHRs are significant and less negative for the high 
institutional investors group. These results imply that high institutional investors’ stake in the 
equity o f  IPO firms reduces the long-term underperformance. On the other hand, the 
performance differences between the two groups disappear when BHRs are adjusted using 
the CRSP equally weighted index and size/book-to-market/industry matching firms’ returns.
Finally, we demonstrate that there is little evidence to support the corporate 
diversification hypothesis which states that diversified EPO firms have lower long-term 
performance in comparison to focused IPO firms. When we classified the sample into single- 
and multi-segment IPO firms based the number o f existing on segments that they operate in, 
we could not find any performance difference between the two groups. However, corporate 
diversification based on two-digit SIC codes reveals that single-segment IPO firms 
significantly overperform multi-segment IPO firms over 1 year period. For the other periods, 
there are no statistically performance differences between the two types of EPO firms. A 
median single-segment firm earns 8.7 percent over market measured by the value weighted 
index and 14.9 percent over S&P500 index over the 1-year buy-and-hold period. The BHRs 
for multi-segment firms are -1.8 percent and 0.1 percent for the same period. When returns 
are the CRSP equally-weighted index adjusted, single-segment firms show less 
underperformance relative to multi-segment firms again one year after the issue. Size/book- 
to-market/industry adjustment eliminates the difference between diversified and non­
diversified firms.
[Insert Table 11 About Here]
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6.5 Long-Term Buy-and-Hold Periods Stock Returns and Interactive Effects o f Venture 
Capitalists, Reputation o f Investment Bankers, Institutional Ownership
The evidence, this far, suggests that the long-term underperformance of IPO firms is 
not uniquely associated with the role of venture capitalists, reputation o f investment bankers, 
and institutional ownership. Therefore we turn our attention to the possible joint effects o f 
venture capitalists, reputation o f  investment bankers, and institutional investors on the long­
term performance of IPO firms. This kind of simultaneous analysis is more likely to throw 
additional light in explaining o f the long-term underperformance o f IPO firms than examining 
the individual effects of these factors independently.
6.5. a Venture Capitalists, Investment Bankers’ Reputation and 
Buy-and-Hold Periods Stock Returns
Brav and Gampers (1997) show that venture-backed IPOs have superior performance 
over nonventure-backed EPOs over five years long-term period. Carter, Dark, and Singh 
(1998), however, demonstrate that the wealth hazard of IPOs is less for IPOs underwritten 
by the high reputable investment bankers relative to IPOs underwritten by low reputable 
investment bankers over three years. Earlier, we stated that venture capitalists and investment 
bankers are unlikely to act independently. Therefore, it is not clear whether these two factors 
have independent or joint effects on the long-term performance of IPO firms. In this section, 
we conduct a simultaneous analysis of the interactive effects o f  the two factors. Hence, we 
hope to determine which o f  the two factors has a greater bearing on the long-term 
performance of EPO firms. This issue investigated by analyzing the long-term performance of
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EPO firms across different post-issue intervals for the following sets o f group combinations 
based on venture capital and investment bankers’ reputation. The first two groups consist o f 
(1) venture backed EPOs underwritten by high reputable (HR/VC) and (2) low reputable 
investment bankers (LR/VC), while (3) non-venture backed IPOs underwritten by high 
reputable (HR/Non-VC) and (4) low reputable investment bankers (LR/Non-VC) represent 
other two.
If the interactive effects o f venture capital and high reputable investment bankers are 
responsible for the long-term performance, we would expect the HR/VC group to have the 
best performance among the four groups. The LR/Non-VC group should show the worst 
performance. However, our analysis is designed to identify whether venture capital o r  high 
reputable investment bankers is more influence on the long-term performance of EPO firms. 
Therefore, we test the median return differences among the four groups, if we detect a 
significant superior performance of the HR/VC group over the LR/VC group, since the 
common factor is venture capital in the two groups, we can argue that investment bankers’ 
reputation has a greater effect on the long-term performance. If  this is so, the comparison of 
HR/Non-VC and LR/Non-VC firms is expected to shed light in the same direction. 
Consequently the HR/Non-VC group should show better performance than the LR/Non-VC 
group. If venture capital have greater influence on the long-term operating performance of 
IPO firms, we should expect to observe superior performance for the LR/VC firms over 
HR/Non-VC IPO firms. Similarly, we can arrive at the same conclusion if HR/VC firms show 
better performance than the LR/Non-VC firms. In addition to these results, if there is no 
difference between HR/VC and LR/VC firms, as well as between HR/Non-VC and LR/Non- 
VC firms, this would supply that venture capital play a more crucial role in explaining the
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long-term performance o f IPO firms. Table 12 presents the results o f  this kind of 
simultaneous analysis of venture capitalists versus reputation o f investment bankers. Returns 
for the interactive effects of the two factors are calculated using both, Carter-Manaster and 
Securities Data Corporation’s Investment bankers’ reputation rankings.
In Panel A, we report the median raw BHRs differences for the four groups. The 
results show that the HR/VC group never shows superior performance relative to the LR/VC 
group, nor the HR/Non-VC group relative to the LR/Non-VC group for the favor of the 
reputation factor. Moreover, in the part 1 of this panel, while the LR/VC group have superior 
performance over the HR/Non-VC group, these two groups have similar performance based 
on the results at the part 2 of Panel A over the 2 and 3 year periods. For instance, in Panel A1 
(A2), the HR/VC group earns 26.2 (34.1) percent, the LR/VC group earns 52.9 (18.3) 
percent, the HR/Non-VC group earns 12.2 (18.6) percent, and the LR/Non-VC group earns 
16.3 (11.4) percent over 2 year period. The difference between the HR/Non-VC and the 
LR/VC groups is significant at 0.05 level in Panel Al, but insignificant in Panel A2. These 
results imply that venture capital play important role in explaining the long-term performance 
o f IPO firms.
Adjusted BHRs with value-weighted index in Panel B and S&P 500 market index in 
Panel D show the same trend as we have in panel A. Hence, there is clear evidence with the 
value-weighted and S&P 500 index adjusted returns for the 2 and 3 year periods that venture 
capital have more influence on these results. For instance, in part 2 o f  Panel B, the median 
CRSP value-weighted adjusted BHRs are 5.5 percent for the HR/VC group, -1.7 percent for 
the LR/VC group, -17.2 percent for the HR/Non-VC group, and -15.1 percent for the 
LR/Non-VC group. Based on these median returns, there is no significant difference between
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the HR/VC and the LR/VC groups, as well as between the HR/Non-VC and the LR/Non-VC 
groups. However, the median return for the HR/VC group is significantly higher than that for 
the LR/Non-VC group. Moreover, the LR/VC group has significantly less negative return 
relative to the HR/Non-VC group. For the 3-year period adjusted returns show that the 
HR/VC group has superior performance over the LR/Non-VC group, the LR/VC group 
shows similar performance with the HR/Non-VC group. In the near future, I-year period, 
even though returns show the same trends (for instance, the LR/Non-VC group has the 
lowest median return) , the numbers cannot yield any significant difference between the 
groups. We conclude from these results that venture capital is the dominant factor in 
explaining the long-term performance of IPO firms.
[Insert Table 12 About Here]
6.5.b Investment Bankers ’ Reputation, Institutional Ownership and 
Buy-and-Hold Periods Stock Returns
Since the reputation o f investment bankers does not seem to exert an important 
influence on the long-term performance of IPOs in comparison to venture capital, we 
investigate the role o f investment bankers’ reputation in conjunction with institutional 
ownership.
We report the median raw and adjusted return differences for the simultaneous 
analysis o f investment bankers’ reputation versus institutional ownership in Table 13. In this 
table, returns for the interactive effects o f the two factors are also calculated using both, 
Carter-Manaster and Securities Data Corporation’s Investment bankers’ reputation rankings.
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If the reputation of investment bankers and ownership by institutional investors have 
a joint effect on the long-term performance o f IPO firms, the HR/HINST group should show 
superior performance over the other groups. However, Table 13 is designed to determine 
which of the two factors is dominant on the results. If  institutional investors have greater 
influence on the long-term performance of IPO firms, we should expect the LR/HINST group 
to have higher median returns than the HR/LINST group, or at least these two groups should 
have similar performance. Moreover, if we find no performance difference between the 
HR/HENST and the LR/HINST groups, as well as between the HR/LINST and the 
LR/LINST groups, this will support the argument of the influence of institutional ownership 
on the long-term performance of IPO firms. The superior performance of the HR/HINST and 
the HR/LINST groups relative to the LR/HINST and the LR/LINST groups will support the 
influence of investment bankers’ reputation on the long-term performance o f IPO firms.
The median raw and CRSP value-weighted and S&P 500 index adjusted returns in 
Table 13 shows that, only over the 1 year period, the HR/HINST group has significantly 
higher returns than the LR/LINST group. This is true when we use SDC’ reputation ranking. 
There is no significant difference in the median returns between the other pair groups. For 
instance, in the part 2 o f Panel B, the median CRSP value-weighted adjusted returns in 1-year 
based on SDC’ ranking for the HR/HINST group is 8.6 percent and -4.4 percent for the 
LR/LINST group, the difference is significant at 0.10 level. Although the LR/HINST group 
has 12.8 percent median return which is higher than the median return o f 2.8 percent for the 
HR/LINST group, the difference is not statistically significant. These results show that 
institutional investors have more influence only on the near-future performance o f IPO firms 
than the reputation o f investment bankers. Equally-weighted and size/book-to-market/industry
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
adjusted returns do not yield any significant differences among the four groups.
[Insert Table 13 About Here]
6.5.c Venture Capitalists, Institutional Ownership and 
Buy-and-Hold Periods Stock Returns
In the past two sections, the evidence suggests that institutional investors have more 
influence on the performance o f IPO firms over one year after the issue, and venture capital 
over two and three years on the long-term performance of IPO firms relative to investment 
bankers’ reputation. In this section, we concentrate on the role o f venture capital in 
connection with institutional ownership of IPO firms. Hence, we will be able to test whether 
the long-term performance of IPO firms is more influenced by venture capital or by high 
institutional ownership stakes in these IPO firms. If venture capital and institutional investors 
have a joint influence on the long-term performance o f IPO firms, we should expect the 
VC/HINST group to have the best performance among the four groups. To conclude that the 
long-term better performance of a group of IPO firms relative to others is because of the role 
of venture capital support, not higher institutional ownership for these IPO firms, VC/HINST 
and VC/LINST firms should have greater raw or adjusted returns than Non-VC/HINST and 
Non-VC/LINST firms. On the other hand, if institutional investors have more influence on 
the long-term performance of IPO firms than venture capital do, we should expect the Non- 
VC/HINST group to show similar performance over the VC/HINST group and similar or 
superior performance relative to the VC/LINST group.
The results related to connection of venture capital with institutional investors are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
presented at Table 14. Panel A reports the raw BHRs results. Based on these results, the 
VC/HINST group has the best performance in all periods. This group has also significantly 
higher median return than the Non-VC/HINST and the NonVC-LINST groups. In the 
comparison o f the VC/HINST group with the Non-VC/ HINST group, since higher 
institutional ownership is the common factor, the results imply that venture capital has more 
influence on the performance o f IPO firms. However, in every period, the Non-VC/HINST 
group has the similar median returns with the VC/LINST group. This implies that high 
institutional ownership in non-venture backed IPO firms eliminates the disadvantage of being 
without support o f venture capital in these firms. Low institutional ownership in IPO firms 
backed by venture capitalists eliminates the advantage o f  venture capital in these firms. The 
evidence shows that the VC/LINST group show also similar long-term performance with the 
Non-VC/LINST group. The median return differences become significant between the 
VC/LINST and the Non-VC/LINST groups in only 2-year period.
The median adjusted returns with CRSP value-weighted index in Panel B and S&P 
500 index in Panel D show the exactly the same trend with the raw returns in all long-term 
time windows. Like in every comparison, equally-weighted in panel C and size/book-to- 
market/industry adjusted results in Panel E do not show any significant difference among the 
four groups.
[Insert Table 14 About Here]
6.6 Cross Sectional Regression Results
We run several Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multivariate regressions to determine
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the sources of influence behind the long-term performance o f EPO firms cross sectionally. In 
these regressions, raw and adjusted BHRs, percentage changes in operating performance 
measures and operating performance levels are regressed against a set of independent 
variables defined earlier.
6.6. a Cross Sectional Regressions Explaining Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns
The results of the regressions on the raw, market (based on CRSP value and equally 
weighted indexes) and size/book-to-market/industry adjusted returns are presented in Panels 
A and B of Table 15. The difference between the two panels is the measure of identifying the 
investment bankers’ reputation. Investment bankers’ reputation in Panel A is presented by a 
dummy variable (REPDUM1) based on the Carter-Manaster ranking. The results based on 
the dummy variable (REPDUM2) using the Securities Data Corporation’s reputation ranking 
are presented in Panel B.
In Panel A, when the dependent variable is the raw BHRs, the coefficients of the 
venture capitalists dummy variable are positive and significant over 1-month and 3-year 
periods, indicating that the presence o f venture capital in EPO firms increase the long-term 
returns. The same results for VBDUMMY variable are observed in Panel B. The estimated 
coefficients o f REPDUM1 variable become significantly negative based on raw returns for 
2 and 3 year periods in panel A  Consequently, based on Carter-Manaster investment bankers’ 
reputation measure, EPOs firms underwritten by high reputable investment bankers have lower 
long-term returns. However, the reputation effect is still negative but insignificant when the 
Securities Data Corporation’s investment banking reputation ranking is used, as reported in 
Panel B. The corporate diversification variable, DIVDUM, and the institutional ownership
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variable, INST, have significant positive coefficients in year 1. These results show that single­
segment and higher institutional firms earn more over I year. The estimated coefficients of 
the blockholders variable, LARGE, are significant and negative for the 1,2, and 3 year 
periods, indicating that EPO firms with large ownership have lower long-term returns.
In Panel A, the coefficients of the venture capitalists dummy variable are positive and 
significant in the regressions using the value-weighted adjusted BHRs8 in every period, 
except 1-year. Venture backed EPO firms outperform non-venture backed IPO firms by 31% 
(the value of the coefficient plus intercept) over 3 years period. In all regressions for all time 
windows with the exception of the short-term window (i.e., one-month), investment bankers’ 
reputation has negative effect on the market adjusted results in panel A. However, in Panel 
B, the reputation effect is still negative but insignificant when the Securities Data 
Corporation’s investment banking reputation ranking is used. The variation o f the value- 
weighted adjusted returns over one year is explained by corporate diversification and 
institutional investors. For this period, positive and significant coefficient o f the DIVDUM 
variable indicates that single-segment firms earn 11 % more than multi-segment firms. The 
institutional ownership coefficient suggests that 1% increase in the participation of 
institutional investors in the equity of IPO firms creates 1% more excess returns over one 
year. Identical results are presented in Panel B.
Agency theory suggests that substantial equity ownership by blockholders tends to 
monitor managers and therefore, reduce agency costs. We find that the estimated coefficients
8 Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) use a transformed market adjusted returns as the dependent variable due to 
positively skewed and nonnormal value of the returns. They transform market return to the natural logarithm of 
1000 percent plus each buy-and-hold return. We also run our regressions with this transformed form o f the 
dependent variables. The results for the coefficient estimates of the independent variables remain the same. The 
only effect is on the intercept Insignificant intercept coefficients become significant.
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o f the blockholder variable, LARGE, are significantly negative for the 1, 2, and 3-year 
periods. This result holds for the same periods in every regressions. These results show that 
long-term performance is adversely affected when blockholders increase their equity IPO 
firms. This result appears to be inconsistent with the monitoring activities o f  blockholders.
There is a  little evidence that insiders ownership has an influence on the long-term 
performance o f IPO firms. The regression results do not yield any significant effect of the 
ISSUE and SECOND control variables.
Adjustment of the raw returns with the equally-weighted market index eliminates the 
effects of venture capitalists, corporate diversification and institutional ownership effects on 
the performance o f  IPO firms consistent with our previous results. The regression results 
based on the size/book-to-market/industry matched firms, reveal a weak relation between the 
independent variables and the long-term performance o f IPO firms.
[Insert Table 15 About Here]
6.6.b Cross Sectional Regressions Explaining The Long-Term Operating 
Performance of IPO Firms
Table 16 reports results on the relation between the changes in operating performance 
measures, such as Tobin’s q, operating return on assets, and operating cash flows for the 
years +1, +2, and +3 relative to year -1 (relative to year 0 for Tobin’s q )9 . We also present 
regression results on the levels using the same operating performance measures at year +1.
9 We report only the results of the regressions in which Carter-Manaster investment bankers’ reputation ranking 
is used for reputation measure in this table because the results for two classifications are indifferent.
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With the regression on the raw Tobin’s q levels at year +1, we find an evidence that 
operating performance levels between venture and non-venture backed IPO firm are 
different10. The estimated coefficient o f VBDUMMY is significant and positive for Tobin’s 
q level at year 1 and other post issue years. This implies that venture backed IPO firms have 
higher market value, as measured by Tobin’s q, than non-venture backed EPO firms. 
However, the results based on raw changes in Tobin’s q show that the estimated coefficients 
of the dummy variable, VBDDUMY are insignificant for all long-term windows, indicating 
that venture capitalists do not play an important role in explaining the long-term performance 
of the IPO firms. Hence, operating performance declines for both venture and non-venture 
backed IPO firms. The coefficient of REPDUM variable has negative and significant impact 
on Tobin’s q in year 1, indicating that IPO firms whose issues underwritten by the high 
reputable investment bankers have less market value than the low reputable group of EPO 
firms. This negative relationship continues between the reputation measure and changes in 
Tobin’s q over the two year period. These results show that the market value o f EPOs 
underwritten by high reputable investment bankers declines more than that o f  IPOs 
underwritten by low reputable investment bankers. The other two variables affecting the 
Tobin’s q level at year 1 are LARGE and INSD. This result suggests that when blockholders 
participation (insiders ownership) in equity increases , Tobin’s q o f firms decreases 
(increases). We are unable to find a significant relationship between the explanatory variables 
and the changes in Tobin’s q rather than the REPDUM variable.
In table 16, we also report regression results using adjusted Tobin’s q performance 
measure for size/book-to-market/industry. The negative effect of investment bankers’
10 We also run the same regressions on the operating performance levels at the other post-issue years. The results 
remain the same for the operating performance levels in 2 and 3-year periods.
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reputation on the Tobin’s q and on the changes in Tobin’s q remain the same with the raw 
results. We cannot detect any other significant effect o f explanatory variables on this adjusted 
performance levels and changes. Similar results are found, but not reported, for all other 
performance measures. Moreover, for regressions on all other performance measures 
adjusted for size/book-to-market/industry, the effect o f REPDUM disappear.
Based on the regression results on the operating return on assets, estimated 
coefficients the VBDUMMY variable are insignificant, showing that venture and non-venture 
backed IPO firms are indifferent in terms of both performance level at the year 1 and 
performance changes over post-issue period. The results of the regressions on operating cash 
flows deflated by total assets reveal the same information with one exception. Venture backed 
IPO firms increase their cash flows relative to non-venture backed EPO firms over only 2-year 
period. The coefficient of the REPDUM variable is significant and positive for the operating 
return on assets at year 1. This implies that the high reputable group o f IPO firms have a 
higher operating return on assets relative to low reputable group. This result remains the same 
for operating cash flows. While there is no significant effect of reputation on the changes 
operating return on assets, the estimated coefficients of REPDUM turn, negative and 
significant when it is regressed against the changes operating cash flows over 2 and 3 year 
periods.
The issue size which is defined as total value of offering divided by total assets one 
year prior to the offering has significantly negative effect on the performance levels o f return 
on assets and cash flows11. This result indicates that IPO firms offered new issues more
" We also use logarithm of the total value of the offering to control issue size as suggested in the literature. We 
did not report the results here. As consistent the literature, the estimated coefficient of LNSIZE is significant and 
positive.
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relative to the their total assets have lower performance. The last control variable SECOND, 
representing the percentage of the total issue offered by current shareholders, has a significant 
and positive estimated coefficient for the operating performance levels. These two variables 
have no effect on the changes in operating performance measures.
The estimated coefficients o f  institutional ownership variable are significant and 
positive for both return on assets and cash flows levels in year 1, but it has no effect on the 
operating performance changes. The other ownership variables, LARGE and INSD appear 
to have significant relation with performance in levels, but not in changes.
[Insert Table 16 About Here]
We also do not find any effect o f those factors on operating performance changes 
using some other dependent variables, such as operating margin, capital expenditures over 
total assets, book-to-market ratio, and excess market value. Therefore, we only report the 
results of the regressions on the raw and adjusted levels o f these variables at year 1 in Table 
17. Even though the results are inconsistent across the performance measures, there is some 
evidence that the presence of venture capitalists increase the performance o f IPO firms. For 
instance, regression results using raw and adjusted book-to-market performance measures, 
the estimated coefficients of the VBDUMMY variable are negative and significant, indicating 
that venture backed IPO firms have lower book-to-market ratio than non-venture backed 
IPO firms at year 1. Similarly, VBDUMMY has a significant positive effect on the raw excess 
market value in the year 1, but not on the adjusted level.
[Insert Table 17 About Here]
Overall, the cross sectional regression results show that there is a significant
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relationship between venture capital, reputation of investment bankers, corporate 
diversification, institutional ownership and operating performance levels, but not in terms o f  
operating performance changes during the post issue years.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
This study investigates the degree that the long-term performance of IPO firms is 
explained by venture capitalists, investment bankers’ reputation or institutional ownership. 
This investigation relies on 456 firms that go public between 1989-1994. In this study, unlike 
previous research, we examine the interactive effects o f  venture capitalists, reputation of 
investment bankers and institutional ownership on the long-term performance o f IPO firms, 
instead o f examining the role o f these factors independently. We also investigate whether 
there is a link between the long-term performance of IPOs and corporate diversification.
We begin this study by analyzing the long-term performance of EPO firms using 
alternative accounting and value-based performance measures. We find that, over three years 
after the offering, the performance of IPO firms declines significantly relative to their pre-IPO 
levels based on several performance measures even though IPO firms display high post-issue 
growth in sales and capital expenditures. The evidence shows that performance changes are 
weakly related to venture capital, investment bankers’ reputation and institutional ownership 
characteristics of IPO firms. IPOs backed by venture capitalists, underwritten by high 
reputable investment bankers, and having a higher institutional ownership exhibit somewhat 
superior long-term performance in comparison to other IPO firms. However, the change in 
adjusted performance measures based on size/book-to-market/industry show that the 
performance advantage of these IPO firms disappears against their industry peers. We also 
find that performance differences between single- and multi-segment IPO firms are 
indistinguishable.
Based on BHRs, IPO firms underperform the value-weighted index by 11.5 percent 
and 28.6 percent in the 2-year and 3-year periods, respectively. CRSP equally-weighted
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adjusted returns are more negative in the long-term. Size/book-to-market-industry adjustment 
significantly decreases the underperformance o f IPO firms consistent with the extant empirical 
literature. Consistent with the results o f  Brav and Gampers (1997), our evidence shows that 
venture backed IPO firms outperform non-venture backed IPO firms in terms o f raw and 
adjusted returns, based on value-weighted and S&P 500 index in all periods. When BHRs are 
adjusted by CRSP equally-weighted index and size/book-to-market/industry matched firms’ 
returns, performance differences become insignificant between venture and non-venture 
backed IPO firms. Results based on raw and adjusted buy-and-hold returns also show that the 
reputation of investment bankers on the long-term performance of IPO firms is negligible, if 
any. These results are inconsistent with the findings o f Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). 
Comparison o f IPO firms with high institutional ownership and IPO firms with low 
institutional ownership indicate that institutional investors have an influence on the long-term 
performance o f IPO firms over the 1-year and 3-year periods. Finally, our analysis provides 
little evidence in support o f the corporate diversification hypothesis which states that 
diversified IPO firms have lower long-term performance in comparison to focused IPO firms.
In this study, we also examine the interaction effects across sets of factors: (1) venture 
capitalists versus reputation of investment bankers, (2) reputation of investment bankers 
versus institutional ownership, (3) venture capitalists versus institutional ownership.
The evidence based on the joint influence o f the three set of factors shows that non­
venture backed IPOs underwritten by low reputable investment bankers, and with lower 
institutional ownership generate the worst operating performance. Similar results are obtained 
for IPO firms that are underwritten by low reputable investment bankers and have lower 
institutional ownership.
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The results based on BHRs for the simultaneous analysis o f  venture capitalists versus 
reputation of investment bankers generate a clear evidence that venture capital exerts more 
influence the long-term performance of IPO firms. We show that there is no significant 
difference between HR/VC and the LR/VC firms, as well as no significant difference between 
HR/Non-VC and LR/Non-VC firms. Since venture and non-venture capital are common 
factors in these comparisons, this result implies that reputation o f investment bankers does 
not affect the long-term performance of IPO firms. Moreover, LR/VC firms have significantly 
less negative or sometimes similar return relative to HR/Non-VC firms, indicating that venture 
capital has more influence on the long-term performance of IPO firms. Since venture 
capitalists play a more important role on the determination of the long-term performance of 
IPO firms, our simultaneous analysis demonstrates that investigating the role o f reputation 
of investment bankers independently is likely to produce misleading results. Hence, the lower 
underperformance o f EPO firms underwritten by high reputable investment bankers reported 
by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) may be driven by venture capital participation in these 
firms and not by investment bankers’ reputation per se.
We find that institutional ownership is also an important factor in explaining the long­
term performance o f IPO firms. Based on BHRs comparison of venture capitalists versus 
institutional ownership, venture capitalists IPO firms with higher institutional ownership have 
the highest returns in all long-term time windows. We also show that high institutional 
ownership in non-venture backed IPO firms eliminates the disadvantage o f  being without 
support of venture capital in these firms.
Cross sectional regression results also reveal the importance o f venture capital and 
institutional ownership on the long-term performance o f IPO firms. The regression results
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show that there is a significant relationship between venture capital, reputation o f investment 
bankers, corporate diversification, institutional ownership and operating performance levels, 
but not in terms o f  operating performance changes during the post-issue years.
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APPENDIX
SECURITIES DATA CORPORATION’S 
INVESTMENT BANKERS’ REPUTATION RANKING
Investment Bankers M kt Share # of Issues Rank
Morgan Stanley 14.1 42 1
Goldman, sachs & Co 11.8 49 2
Merill Lynch & Co 11.1 58 3
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 7.9 39 4
Smith Barney Inc 7.4 50 5
Salomon Brothers 5.8 30 6
CS First Boston 5.0 20 7
Alex. Brown & Sons 4.5 50 8
Montgomery Securities 4.0 44 9
Lehman Brothers 2.5 25 10
Robertson Stephens 2.1 28 11
Hambrecht & Quist 2.1 29 12
Bear, Steams 1.9 16 13
PaineWebber 1.8 23 14
Prudential Securities 1.3 14 15
NatWest Markets/Gleacher NW 1.1 10 16
William Blair 0.9 10 17
Cowen 0.9 13 18
Dillon, Read 0.8 12 19
Oppenheimer 0.8 16 20
Robert W. Baird 0.8 5 21
J.C. Bradford 0.7 8 22
Volpe, Welty & Company 0.5 9 23
Lazard Houses 0.5 3 24
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell 0.5 3 25
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Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics
Frequency distribution, characteristics, and industry classifications of a sample o f 456 IPO firms. IPOs with at least one 
dollar offer price and firm commitment offerings have included in the sample. Data for these IPOs is obtained from 
COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes. Total value of issue is the product of shares offered and offer price. The initial 
return is the difference between the first CRSP-listed after-market price and the offering price as a proportion of the offering 
price. Finance, insurance, and real estate division of industry classes (2 Digit SIC codes from 60 to 67) has been excluded 
from IPO sample.
Panel A: Number of Issues Per Year
Year Number of Issues
1989 38
1990 46
1991 76
1992 98
1993 117
1994 81
Total 456
Panel B: Characteristics of IPO Sample
Descriptive Measure Mean Min 25* percentile Median 75* percentile Max
Total value of issue($ million) 61.5 2.4 22.950 39 70.680 770
Percentage o f shares offered
by current holders (%) 19.6 0 0 1.4 33 1
Offer price 13.29 2 10 13 16 28
Initial Return (%) 11.1 -6.6 0 5.2 17 143
Variables prior to offering
Total assets ($ million) 214.03 0.058 15.291 55.34 213.46 5100.8
Sales ($ million) 268.29 0 23.22 68.42 262.79 14324.6
Leverage (%) 38 0 10 35 61 213
Capital expenditures/
Total assets(%) 8.2 0 2.4 5 10 55.2
R&D expenses/total assets (%) 15.2 0 0 3.6 18.7 198
Panel C: Industry Classifications o f IPO Sample
(According to 2 Digit SIC Code)
2 Digit SIC Title and Description of Industries I # of Companies Total
Division A: Agriculture, forestry, and Fishing 1
1 Agriculture production - crops 1
Division B: Mining 24
10 Metal Mining 1
12 Coal Mining 1
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 21
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmtl Minerals, Except Fuels 1
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Panel C: Industry Classifications o f IPO Sample (Continued) 
(According to 2 Digit SIC Code)
2 Digit SIC Title and Description of Industries #  of Companies Total
Division C: Construction 6
15 Building Construction - Gen Contractors and Oprt Builders 3
16 Heavy Construction other than Building Const- Contractors 1
17 Construction - Special Trade Contractors 2
Division D: Manufacturing 232
20 Food and Kindred Products 4
21 Tobacco Products 0
22 Textile Mill Products 5
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 10
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 2
25 Furniture and Fixtures 3
26 Paper and Allied Products 4
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 9
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 36
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 1
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 3
31 Leather and Leather Products 3
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 4
33 Primary Metal Products 15
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and
Transportation Equipment 9
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and
Computer Equipment 37
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and
Components, Except Computer Equipment 37
37 Transportation Equipment 15
38 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments: Photo­
graphic; Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks 28
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 7
Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 39
40 Railroad Transportation 1
41 Transit and Passenger transportation 1
42 Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 4
44 Water Transportation 2
45 Air Transportation 0
46 Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas 2
47 Transportation Services 0
48 Communications 15
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 14
Division F: Wholesale Trade 13
50 Wholesale Tarde - Durable Goods 8
51 Wholesale Tarde - Nondurable Goods 5
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Panel C: Industry Classifications o f IPO Sample (Continued) 
(According to 2 Digit SIC Code)
2 Digit SIC Title and Description of Industries # o f Companies Total
Division G: Retail Trade 60
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, and
Mobile Home Dealers 4
53 General Merchandise Stores 7
54 Food Stores 5
55 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 2
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 10
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings, and Equipment Stores 4
58 - Eating and Drinking Places 12
59 Miscellaneous Retail 16
Division H: Services 81
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 2
72 Personnel Services 0
73 Business Services 35
75 Automotive Repair, Services, and Parking 0
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 0
78 Motion Pictures 1
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 6
80 Health Services 24
82 Educational Services 2
83 Social Services I
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management,
and Related Services 10
Total# of 2-Digit Total # of
Industries = 52 IPO Firms = 456
Panel D: Industry Classifications o f IPO Sample
(According to 4 Digit SIC Code)
4 Digit SIC Industry Group Frequency
7310 Advertising 2
2870 Agriculture Chemicals 2
100 Agriculture Production Crops 1
3585 Air Condition, Heating, Refrigarator Equipment 1
2300 Apparel & Other Finished Products 3
5600 Apparel and Accessory Stores 1
5531 Auto and Home Supply Stores 2
2050 Bakery Products 1
2836 Biological Products, Ex Diagnostics 11
1220 Bituminous Coal, Lignite Management 1
2780 BlankBooks, binders, Bookbind 2
3310 Blast Furnaces & Steel Works 1
5200 Building Material, Hardware, Garden-Retail 2
2731 Books: Publishing, Publishing & Printing 1
2211 Brdwoven Fabric Mill, Cotton 3
2086 Btld & Can Soft Drinks, Water 1
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Panel D: Industry Classifications of IPO Sample (Continued)
(According to 4 Digit SIC Code)
4 Digit SIC Industry Group Frequency
7389 Business Services 1
4841 Cable and Other Pay TV Services 1
3578 Calculate, Acct Machines, Ex Comp 1
2273 Carpets and Rugs 1
5961 Catalog, Mail - Order Houses 3
3241 Cement, Hydraulic 1
2800 Chemicals & Allied Products I
7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design 3
7374 Computer Processing, Data Prep Services 4
7370 Computer Programming, Data Process 4
4991 Cogeneration-Sm Power Producer 4
8731 Coml Physical, Biological Research 2
2750 Commercial Printing 3
3669 Communications Equipment 1
4899 Communication Services 2
3576 Computer Communication Equipment 11
3577 Computer Peripheral Equipment, Nec 4
7371 Computer Programming Service 1
3572 Computer Storage Devices 1
5045 Computers & Software-Whsl 1
1700 Construction-Special Trade 2
2670 Convrt Papr, Papberboard, Ex Boxes 2
1311 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 15
3420 Cutlery, Hand Tools, General Hardware 2
2020 Dairy Products 1
5311 Department Stores 2
7381 Detect, Guard, Armor Car Services 1
7331 Direct Mail Advertsing Services 1
3357 Drowning, Insulating Nonfer Wire 1
1381 Drilling Oil and Gas Wells 4
5912 Drug & Proprietary Stores 2
5812 Eating Places 1
8200 Educational Services 2
3825 Elec Meas & Test Instruments 3
3677 Electr Coil, Transfrm, Indicator 1
3634 Electric Housewares and fans 2
3640 Electric Lighting, Wiring Equipments 1
3620 Electrical Industrial Apparatus 1
3845 Electromedical Apparatus 8
3670 Electronic Comp, Accessories 1
3679 Electronic Components, Nec 1
3571 Electronic Computers 2
5065 Electronic parts, Eq-Whsl, Nec 1
8711 Engineering Services 4
3510 Engines and Turbines 1
8700 Engr, Acc, resh, Mgmt, Rel Services 1
3443 Fabricated Plate Work 2
3060 Fabricated Rubber Pds, Nec 1
8744 Facilities Support Mgmt Services 2
5651 Family Clothing Stores 3
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Panel D: Industry Classifications o f IPO Sample (Continued) 
(According to 4  Digit SIC Code)
4 Digit SIC Industry Group Frequency
3523 Farm Machinery and Equipment 2
5400 Food Stores 1
3140 Footwear, Except Rubber 3
5712 Furniture Stores 2
3944 Games, Toys, Chid Veh, Ex Dolls 2
8062 General Medical & Surgical Hospitals 1
3560 General Industrial Machines & Equipments 2
3221 Glass Containers 1
3220 . Glass. glasswr-Pressed, Blown 1
5140 Groceries & Related Products - Whsl 2
5141 Groceries, General Line-Whsl 1
5411 Grocery Stores 5
3760 Guided Missiles & space Vech 2
5072 Hardware-Wholesale 1
4955 Hazardous Waste Management 3
8000 Health Services 1
1600 Heavy Construction - Not BIdg Constr 1
7363 Help Supply Services 5
5700 Home Furniture & Equipment Store 1
8082 Home Health Care Services 2
8060 Hospitals 5
7011 Hotels, Motels, Tourist Courts 2
3630 Household Appliances 1
3651 Household Audio & Video Equipment I
2510 Household Furniture 1
2024 Ice Cream & Frozen Desserts 1
2835 In Vitro, In Vivo Diagnostics 2
3564 Industrial Coml Fans, Blowrs, Oth Eq 2
2810 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 2
3823 Industrial Measurement 1
2860 Industrial Organic Chemicals 2
5944 Jewelry Stores 1
3910 Jewelry, Silverwr, Plated Ware 1
2253 Knit Outwear Mills 1
3826 Lab Analytical Instruments 2
3821 Lab Apparatus and Furniture 1
5211 Lumber & Oth Bldg Matl - Retl 2
2400 Lumber and Wood Pds, Ex Furniture 1
5080 Machinery and Equipment - Whsl 2
8742 Management Consulting Services 1
3829 Meas & Controlling Devices, Nec 2
5047 Medical, Dental, Hospital Equipment - Whsl 1
8071 Medical Laboratories 2
3411 Metal Cans 1
3460 Metal Forgings and Stamping 2
5051 Metals Service Centers - Whsl 1
3540 Metalworking Machinery & Eq 1
7990 Misc Amusement & Rec Service 6
2890 Misc Chemical Products I
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Panel D: Industry Classifications of IPO Sample (Continued) 
(According to 4 Digit SIC Code)
4 Digit SIC Industry Group Frequency
3690 Misc Elec Machinery, Eq, Supplies 3
3490 Misc fabricated Metal Products 1
2390 Misc Fabricated Textile Products 1
8090 Misc Health & Allied Services, Nec 3
3590 Misc Industrial, Commercial, Machy & Eq 1
3990 Misc Manufacturing Industries 2
5190 Misc Nondurable Goods - Whsl 1
5940 Misc Shopping Goods Stores 4
3790 Misc Transportation Equipment 1
1090 Miscellaneous Metal Ores 1
2741 Miscellaneous Publishing 1
5900 Miscellaneous Retail 1
3532 Manufacturing Machy, Eq, Ex Oil Field 1
1400 Manufacturing, Quarry Nonmtl Minerals 1
7812 Motion Pictures, Videotape Prodtn 1
3716 Motor Homes 2
5010 Motor Veh Parts, Supply-Whsl 1
3714 Motor Veh part, Accessory 4
3711 Motor Vehicles & Car Bodies 1
3751 Motorcycles, Bicycles & Parts 1
4922 Natural Gas Transmission 2
2711 Newspaper: Publishing, Pubg & Print 2
3360 Nonfer Foundries (Castings) 1
5960 Nonstore Retailers 1
8050 Nursing & Personal Care fac 1
3579 Office Machines, Nec 2
8011 Offices of Medical Doctors 1
1389 Oil, Gas Field Services, Nec 2
1531 Operative Builders 3
3827 Optical Instruments & Lenses 1
3842 Ortho, Prosth, Surg Appl, Supply 5
5110 Paper & Paper Products, Whsl 1
2650 Paperboard Containers, Boxes 1
2631 Paperboard Mills 1
2844 Perfume, Cosmetic, Toilet Prep 1
2911 Petroleum Refining 1
2834 Pharmaceuticals Preparations 1
4813 Phone Comm Ex Radiotelephone 2
4610 Pipe Lines, Ex Natural Gas 3
2821 Plastics, Resins, Elastomers 1
3260 Pottery and Related Products 2
7372 Prepackaged Software 1
3334 Prim Production of Aluminum 1
3672 Printed Circuit Boards 3
2531 Public Bldg & Rel Furniture 1
3561 Pumps and Pumping Equipment 2
4832 Radio Broadcasting Stations 1
3663 Radio, Tv Broadcast, Comm Eq 4
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Panel D: Industry Classifications o f IPO Sample (Continued)
(According to 4 Digit SIC Code)
4 Digit SIC Industry Group Frequency
4812 Radiotelephone Communication 3
3743 Railroad Equipment 2
4011 Railroads, Line-Haul Operating 1
5735 Record and Tape Stores 1
4953 Refuse Systems 3
5990 Retail Stores 4
3350 Rolling & Draw Nonfer Metal 4
4950 Sanitary Services I
2241 Sawmills, Planing Mills, Gen 1
3674 Semiconductor, Related Device 1
3444 Sheet Metal Work 1
5661 Shoe Stores 2
8051 Skilled Nursing Care 7
8300 Social Services 1
8093 Spec Outpatient Facility, Nec 1
3559 Special Industry Machy, Nec 4
3949 Sporting & Athletic Gds, Nec 2
4961 Steam, Air-Conditioning Supp 1
3317 Steel Pipe and Tubes 1
3312 Steel Works & Blast Furnaces 7
3841 Surgical, Medical Instr, Apparatus 4
3661 Tele & Telegraph Apparatus 7
4822 Telegraph & Oth Message 2
7385 Telephone Interconnect Systems 1
4833 Television Broadcast Station 4
3824 Totalizing Fluid Meters 1
4100 Transit & Passenger Trans 1
3713 Truck and Bus Bodies 1
3715 Truck Trailers 1
4213 Trucking, Except Local 4
3081 Unsapp Plastics Film & Sheet 2
5331 Variety Stores 5
4400 Water Transportation 2
2340 Wmns, Miss, Chid, Infht Undgrmt 1
5621 Women’s Clothing Stores 4
2330 Womens, Misses, Jrs Outwears 5
2511 Wood Hshld Fum, Ex Upholsrd I
Total # o f 4-Digit Total # of
Industries = 200 IPO Firms = 456
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Table 2: Measures of Operating Performance of 456 Initial Public Offering Firms
Operating performance changes of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. Table values are for the median change after three years 
offering relative to year -1. Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common stock. 
Median annual performance is reported for multiple-year periods, Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes, Operating 
Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income 
before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128). Operating margin is operating income before depreciation divided by total 
sales (data item 13/data item 12). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current 
assets plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined 
as common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of 
outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12], The significance tests are based on 
Wilcoxon non-perametric rank test which assumes that the observations are independent. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Operating Performance Before and After the Initial Public Offering
Operating Performance
Median (Observations)
Changes in Operating Performance
Median(Observations)
Performance Measure Year-1 YearO Year-1 to 0 Year-1 to+1 Year-1 to+2 Year-1 to+3
Operating Return on Assets (EBITD / Assets)
IPO Firms 0.16(444) 0.16(457) -0.08(441) -0.13(439)**
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted 0.01(306) 0.01(317) -0.10(303) -0,07(301)
Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets
IPO Firms 0.11(438) 0.10(453) -0.16(434) -0.31(430)***
Size-B/M-Industiy Adjusted 0.02(298) 0.01(308) -0.08(293) -0,11(289)**
-0.18(412)*** -0.19(320)***
-0.07(277)* -0.11(211)**
-0.40(403)***
-0.07(264)***
-0.42(313)***
-0.09(200)***
Operating Margin (EBITD / Sales)
IPO Firms 0.07(421) 0.08(431)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted -0.01(289) -0.01(291)
0.10(411)***
0,10(285)
0.09(400)***
0.08(276)
0,08(372)***
0.12(255)
0.07(282)**
0.04(191)
Sales
IPO Firms 68.4(446) 96.2(458) 0.24(436)***
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted -10.7(308) -7.6(319) 0.08(300)
0.56(434)***
0.20(298)***
0.90(408)***
0.38(276)***
1,27(316)***
0.37(210)***
Capital Expenditures/Total assets
IPO Firms 0.05(439) 0.05(454) -0.02(432) 0.27(428)***
Size-B/M-Industiy Adjusted -0.01(299) -0.0(310) 0.08(293) 0.24(289)**
0.17(402)***
0.20(265)***
0.10(312)*
0 .12(200)
R&D/Total Assets
IPO Firms 0.04(252) 0,03(262) -0.33(183)* 0.10(192)* -0.15(172)* -0.22(135)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted 0.00(138) 0.00(140) -0.28(100)** -0.27(99) -0.27(92) -0.42(68)
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 2-Continued
Operating Performance
Median (Observations)
Changes in Operating Performance
Median(Observations)
Performance Measure YearO Year+1 Year+2 Year+3 YearO to+1 Year 0 to +2 Year 0 to +3
Tobin’s Q
IPO Finns
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
1.52(449)
0.07(308)
1.30(447) 1.18(424) 
0.05(307) 0.04(287)
1.13(322)
0.03(216)
-0.11(446)** 
0.000(306)
-0.19(422)***
0.004(285)**
-0.27(321)***
-0.003(214)***
Book to Market Ratio
IPO Firms
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
0.32(463)
-0.01(319)
0.39(456) 0.44(430) 
-0.0(317) 0.01(294)
0.46(328)
0.04(221)
0.19(455)***
0.01(317)**
0.26(429)***
0.08(294)***
0.37(327)***.
0.08(221)***
Excess Market Value
IPO Firms
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
0.93(450)
0.03(314)
0.81(450) 0.69(426) 
0.02(313) -0.01(290
0.65(325)
-0.04(219)
-0.21(446)*
-0.08(311)
-0,41(421)***
-0.12(288)**
-0.49(320)***
-0.08(218)***
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Table 3: Comparison of Operating Performances Between Venture and Non-Venture Backed 456 IPO Firms
Operating performance changes of U.S. fimis announced public offering between 1989-1994. Venture Capitalist IPOs are backed by a venture capitalist, the others arc classified as Non-Venture 
IPOs. Table values are for the median change after three years offering relative to year -1, Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering 
(IPO) of common stock. Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes, Operating Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total 
assets (data item 13/data item 6), Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128). Operating margin is operating income 
before depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12), Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current 
assets plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity plus balance 
sheet deferred taxes (data item 6 0 + data item 35), Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item 
(24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12]. The Z statistics reported in the table are based on Wilcoxon two-sample non-perametric rank test which assumes that the observations are independent. 
*. **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level._____________________________________________________________________________________________ _
Changes in operating performance of Intiai Public Offering Firms
VC Non-VC Z-stat VC Non-VC Z-stat VC Non-VC Z-stat VC Non-VC Z-stat
IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to+2 Year -1 to+3
Operating Return on Assets (EBITD/A sets)
IPO Finns
Median -0,12 -0.04 -2.44*** -0.13 -0.12 -0.64 -0.16 -0.19 0.87 -0.15 -0.26 1.38
Observations 193 247 (0 .01) 192 246 (0.52) 183 228 (0.39) 153 166 (0.17)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.10 -0.10 0.40 -0.04 -0,08 0.46 -0.02 -0.11 1.37 -0.12 -0.10 -0.65
Observations 137 166 (0.69) 136 165 (0.64) 129 148 (0.17) 106 105 (0.51)
Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.19 -0.14 -0.20 -0.26 -0,38 2.01** -0.31 -0.50 2,98*** -0,29 -0.45 2.25**
Observations 190 243 (0.84) 189 240 (0.04) 180 222 (0 .00) 152 160 (0 .02)
Size-B/M-lndustry A djusted
Median 0,01 -0.16 2.17** -0,03 -0.21 1.12 -0.02 -0.15 1,02 -0.32 -0.09 1.18
Observations 130 163 (0.03) 129 160 (0.26) 122 142 (0.31) 101 99 (0.24)
Operating Margin (EBITD / Sales)
IPO Finns
Median 0.07 0.11 - 1.12 0.14 0.06 0.76 0.11 0.01 1.11 0.07 0.07 0.43
Observations 170 240 (0.26) 167 232 (0.45) 157 214 (0.27) 124 157 (0.67)
Size-B/M-Industty Adjusted
Median 0,13 0.07 0.55 0.09 0.08 0.57 0.16 0.08 0.46 -0.05 0.06 -0.26
Observations 123 162 (0.58) 119 157 (0.57) 113 142 (0.65) 91 100 (0.79)
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 3-Continued
VC
IPOs
Non-VC
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
VC
IPOs
Non-VC
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
VC
IPOs
Non-VC
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
VC
IPOs
Non-VC
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year -1 to +1 Year-1 to+2 Year -1 to+3
Sales
IPO Firms
Median 0.40 0.20 4 46*** 0.81 0.49 4.77*** 1.44 0.76 5.31*** 2.11 0,98 4,43***
Observations 188 247 (0 .00) 187 246 (0 .00) 179 228 (0 .00) 149 166 (0 .00)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0,10 0.07 1.41 0.36 0.16 2.01 ** 0.57 0.24 2.82*** 0.70 0.22 2.20**
Observations 134 
Capital Expenditures/Total
166
Assets
(0.16) 133 165 (0.04) 128 148 (0.0) 104 106 (0.03)
IPO Finns
Median -0.04 -0,01 -0.51 0.27 0.29 -0.32 0.29 0.09 0.79 0.19 0.06 1.68*
Observations 191 240 (0.61) 190 237 (0.75) 181 220 (0.43) 152 159 (0.09)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.02 0.10 0,08 0.12 0.28 -0.28 0.27 0.16 -0.09 0,26 -0,15 -2.22**
Observations 132 161 (0.93) 131 158 (0.78) 124 141 (0.93) 101 99 (0.03)
R&D/Total Assets
IPO Firms
Median -0.41 -0.20 3.03*** 0.17 0.06 -1.48 -0.19 -0.07 1.00 -0.26 -0.17 0.48
Observations 108 75 (0,00) 113 79 (0.14) 104 68 (0.32) 86 49 (0.63)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.38 -0.17 1.46 -0.38 -0.07 1.94** -0.32 -0.04 1.49 -0.46 -0.15 0.37
Observations 63 37 (0.14) 61 38 (0.05) 59 33 (0.14) 46 22 (0.71)
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Table 3-Continued
VC Non-VC Z-stat VC Non-VC Z-stat VC Non-VC Z-stat
IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 to 0 YearO to+1 Year 0 to +2 Year 0 to +3
Tobin’s Q
IPO Firms
Median -0.14 -0.11 0.38 -0.18 -0.19 1.29 -0.23 -0.30 1.79*
Observations 196 249 (0.70) 187 234 (0 .20) 153 167 (0.07)
Size-B/M-Industty Adjusted
Median 0.05
oo1 1.49 0.02 -0.04 0.65 -0.00 0.00 0.14
Observations 139 167 (0.14) 133 152 (0.52) 107 107 (0.89)
Book to Market Ratio
IPO Firms
Median 0.13 0.23 -2.10** 0.14 0.40 -2.71*** 0.21 0.44 -2.12**
Observations 199 255 (0.04) 189 239 (0.01) 155 171 (0.03)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.07 0.06 -1.63* 0,01 0.12 -1,60 0.11 0.04 0.00
Observations 145 172 (0.10) 137 157 (0 .11) 110 111 (0.99)
Excess Market value
IPO Finns
Median -0.20 -0,22 0.39 -0.36 -0.44 0.33 -0.39 -0.56 1.50
Observations 193 252 (0,70) 186 234 (0.74) 150 169 (0.13) .
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.02 -0.09 0.04 -0.10 -0.14 0.41 -0.17 -0.07 -0.41
Observations 140 171 (0.96) 134 154 (0.68) 107 111 (0.68)
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Table 4: Investment Bankers’ Reputation and Operating Performance of 456 IPO Firms 
Panel A: Measures of Operating Performance of 456 IPO Firms Based on Investment Banker's Reputation Characteristics 
(Based on Carter-Manaster Investment Bankers’ Reputation Ranking)
Operating performance changes of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. The IPOs in the sample are separated into two groups based on Carter-Manaster (1998) measure 
for investment banker’s reputation. The Carter-Manaster measure is a discrete investment bankers’ reputation variable 0-9 where a 9 is the most prestigious investment banker and 0 is the 
least prestigious investment banker. The low group consists of IPOs underwritten by investment bankers with a CM ranks lower than 8, The high group consists of CM ranks 8 and above. 
Table values are for the median change after three years offering relative to year -1. Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of 
common stock. Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes. Operating Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data 
item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128). Operating margin is operating income before 
depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets 
plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet 
deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 
x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12], The Z statistics reported in the table are based on Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test which assumes that the observations are independent. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Changes in operating performance of Initial Public Offering Firms
HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat
IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year-1 to+1 Year-1 to+2 Year -1 to +3
Operating Return on Assets (EBITD / Assets)
IPO Finns
Median -0.04 -0.15 -1.31 -0.13 -0.12 0.45 -0.16 -0.25 -0.65 -0.17 -0.25 -0.34
Observations 313 126 (0.19) 311 126 (0.65) 295 116 (0.51) 231 88 (0.73)
Size-B/M-IndusUy Adjusted
Median -0.09 -0.19 -0.28 -0.07 -0.06 0.94 -0.07 -0.04 0.89 -0,18 -0.04 0.94
Observations 223 78 (0.78) 222 77 (0.34) 209 67 (0.37) 157 53 (0.35)
Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.13 -0.24 -1.52 -0.29 -0.36 0.01 -0.42 -0.37 0.52 -0.42 -0.38 0.58
Observations 310 122 (0.13) 306 122 (0.99) 290 112 (0.60) 226 86 (0.56)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0,07 -0.12 -0.32 -0.11 -0.07 -0.21 -0.19 0.10 1,93** -0.27 0.18 -1.61
Observations 216 75 (0.75) 213 74 (0.83) 199 64 (0.05) 148 51 (0 .11)
Operating Margin (EBITD / Sales)
IPO Finns
Median 0.08 0.13 0.59 0,06 0.14 1.24 0.05 0.16 0.99 0.05 0.14 0.74
Observations 293 116 (0.56) 284 114 (0.22) 266 105 (0,32) 203 78 (0.46)
Size-B/M-Industiy Adjusted
Median 0.07 0.17 1.96** 0.03 0.22 2.06** 0.07 0.22 1.32 0.06 0.01 0.10
Observations 213 70 (0.05) 207 67 (0.04) 194 60 (0.18) 143 47 (0.92)
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Table 4A-Continued
HR
IPOs
LR
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
HR
IPOs
LR
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
HR
IPOs
LR
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
HR
IPOs
LR
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to+2 Year -1 to+3
Sales
IPO Finns
Median 0.22 0.30 1.76* 0.52 0.69 2.15** 0,85 1.01 1.79* 1.24 1.65 1.51
Observations 314 120 (0.08) 312 120 (0.03) 296 111 (0,07) 230 85 (0.13)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.07 0.10 -0.28 0.18 0.29 0.10 0.38 0.38 -0.37 0.41 0.25 -1.10
Observations 225 73 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets
(0.78) 224 72 (0.91) 211 64 (0,72) 157 52 (0.29)
IPO Finns
Median 0.02 -0.10 -1.05 0.29 0.23 0,58 0.22 0.06 -0.98 0.10 0.10 0.14
Observations 309 121 (0.29) 305 121 (0.56) 290 111 (0.33) 226 85 (0 .88)
Size-B/M-Industry A djusted
Median 0.05 0.10 1.00 0.16 0.44 1.83* 0.22 0.09 -0.32 0.19 -0.07 -0.67
Observations 216 75 (0.33) 213 74 (0.07) 200 64 (0.75) 148 51 (0.50)
R&D/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.32 -0.37 -0.23 0,08 0.21 1.62* -0.15 -0.09 0.15 -0,21 -0,26 -0.44
Observations 133 49 (0.82) 139 52 (0.10) 127 44 (0.87) 99 35 (0 .66)
Size-B/M-lndusiry Adjusted
Median -0.26 -0.35 0.32 -0,28 -0.18 0,55 -0.28 -0.03 1.06 -0,36 -0.65 -0.96
Observations 76 24 (0.74) 75 24 (0.58) 73 19 (0.29) 54 14 (0.34)
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Table 4A-Continued
HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat
IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 to 0 YearO to+1 Year 0 to +2 Year 0 to +3
Tobin’s Q
IPO Finns
Median -0.14 -0.04 1.76* -0.20 -0.13 1.51 -0.28 -0.22 1.45
Observations 315 129 (0.08) 301 120 (0.13) 230 90 (0.15)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.00 0.08 0.92 -0.01 0.03 0.57 -0.01 0.03 1.21
Observations 225 79 (0.36) 214 70 (0.57) 158 55 (0 .22)
Book to Market Ratio
IPO Finns
Median 0.23 0.06 -1.38 0.31 0.15 -1.49 0.42 0.18 -1.84*
Observations 324 129 (0.17) 308 120 (0.14) 236 90 (0.07)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0,01 -0.06 -0.15 0.11 -0,06 -0.71 0.16 -0.10 -1.79*
Observations 236 79 (0 .88) 223 70 (0.48) 165 55 (0.07)
Excess Market value
IPO Finns
Median -0.23 -0.20 0.05 -0.41 -0,41 0.64 -0,55 -0.37 0.82
Observations 322 122 (0.96) 305 115 (0.52) 235 84 (0.41)
Size-B/M-Industiy Adjusted
Median -0,07 -0.10 0.17 -0.13 -0.12 -0.41 -0.19 0.07 0.98
Observations 236 73 (0 .86) 222 65 (0 .68) 165 52 (0.33)
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Panel B:Measures of Operating Performance of 456 IPO Firms Based on Investment Banker’s Reputation Characteristics 
(Based on Securities Data Corporation’s Investment Bankers’ Reputation Ranking)
Operating performance changes of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. The IPOs in the sample are separated into two groups based on the Securities Data Corporation’s 
(SDC) investment bankers ranking for the year 1996. SDC ranks underwriter according to their market share, If underwriter of an IPO firm is ranked in top ten, this IPO film is included in 
the high reputation group. Otherwise it is included in the low reputation group. Table values are for the median change after three years offering relative to year -1, Year -1 is the fiscal year 
preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common stock.Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes, Operating Return 
on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data item 6), Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures 
(data item 13 - data Item 128), Operating margin is operating income before depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding 
shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 /  data 
item 6]. Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding 
shares and bode value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12]. The Z statistics reported in the table are based on Wilcoxon two-sample non-perametric 
rank test which assumes that the observations are independent. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
Chan( es in operating performaiice of Intial Public Offering Firms
HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat
IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to+2 Year -1 to+3
Operating Return on Assets (EB1TD /, assets)
IPO Finns
Median -0.02 -0.16 -3.00+** -0.08 -0.15 -1.47 -0.11 -0.29 -2.81*** -0.15 -0.32 -1.85*
Observations 239 198 (0 .00) 237 198 (0.14) 222 187 (0,00) ' 177 140 (0.06)
Size-B/AI-Industry Adjusted
Median -0,05 -0.17 -0.55 -0.04 -0,11 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.46 -0.10 -0.14 0.12
Observations 171 129 (0.58) 169 129 (0.98) 157 118 (0.64) 122 87 (0,90)
Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0,08 -0.26 -1.84* -0.28 -0.37 0.03 -0.32 -0.49 -1.80* -0.33 -0.49 - 1.66*
Observations 238 192 (0.07) 235 191 (0.97) 219 181 (0.07) 175 135 (0 .10)
Size-BM-lndustry Adjusted
Median 0.02 -0.14 -1.13 -0.11 -0,13 0.69 -0.11 -0,03 0.62 -0.25 -0.01 0,65
Observations 166 124 (0.26) 163 123 (0.49) 148 114 (0.54) 115 83 (0.51)
Operating Margin (EBITD / Sales)
IPO Firms
Median 0.07 0.12 1.30 0,06 0.11 1.53 0.10 0.00 -0.36 0.13 -0.02 1.48
Observations 229 179 (0.19) 220 176 (0.12) 205 165 (0.71) 161 119 (0.14)
Size-BM-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.03 0.17 0.71 0.02 0.16 0.81 0.13 0.08 -0.72 0.07 -0.08 -0.83
Observations 166 116 (0.48) 159 114 (0.42) 146 107 (0.47) 114 75 (0.41)
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Tabic 4B-Continued
HR
IPOs
LR
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
HR
IPOs
LR
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
HR
IPOs
LR
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
HR
IPOs
LR
IPOs
Z-stat 
(P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to+2 Year -1 to +3
Sales
IPO Firms
Median 0.22 0.29 1.47 0.52 0.64 1.51 0.87 0.94 1.22 1.25 1.34 0.72
Observations 239 193 (0.14) 237 193 (0.13) 223 182 (0 .22) 177 136 (0.47)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.09 0.07 -0.89 0.20 0.23 -0.53 0.41 0.35 -0.06 0.40 0.37 -0.26
Observations 171 
Capital Expenditures/Total
126
Assets
(0.37) 169 126 (0.60) 158 116 (0.95) 123 85 (0.79)
IPO Finns
Median 0,09 -0.15 -2.72*** 0.33 0.15 -1.06 0.29 0.07 -2.01** 0.09 0.13 0.89
Observations 235 193 (0 .01) 232 192 (0.29) 218 181 (0.04) 175 134 (0.37)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.10 0,03 -0.18 0.24 0.17 0,08 0.27 0.15 -0,98 0.20 0.04 -0.83
Observations 165 125 (0.85) 162 124 (0.94) 149 114 (0.33) 115 83 (0.41)
R& D/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.23 -0.41 -2.62*** 0.08 0.09 -0.88 -0.07 -0.24 2.39** -0.22 -0.25 -0.36
Observations 90 90 (0 .01) 93 96 (0.38) 84 85 (0 .02) 70 62 (0.72)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.13 -0.50 -2.41** -0.25 -0,32 -0.34 -0.26 -0.29 -0.20 -0.39 -0.57 -0.84
Observations 56 43 (0 .02) 54 44 (0.73) 52 39 (0.84) 40 27 (0.40)
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Table 4B-Continued
HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat HR LR Z-stat
IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value) IPOs IPOs (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 to 0 Year 0 to +1 Year 0 to+2 Year 0 to+3
Tobin’s Q
IPO Finns
Median -0.12 -0.11 0.16 -0.19 -0.19 ' 0,28 -0.27 -0.34 -0.70
Observations 238 204 (0.88) 226 193 (0.78) 178 140 (0.48)
Size-B/M-lndustry Adjusted
Median -0.00 0.02 -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.16 -0.01 0.03 0.14
Observations 168 135 (0.73) 159 124 (0.87) 123 89 (0.89)
Book to Market Ratio
IPO Firms
Median 0.17 0.24 0.60 0.21 0,39 0.59 0.37 0.41 0,25
Observations 243 208 (0.55) 229 197 (0.55) 181 143 (0,80)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.01 0.00 0.71 0.05 0,12 0.54 0.08 0.06 - 1.01
Observations 174 140 (0.48) 163 129 (0.59) 127 92 (0.31)
Excess Market value
IPO Finns
Median -0.15 -0.25 - 1.00 -0.36 -0.44 -0,60 -0.46 -0.63 -0,88
Observations 243 199 (0.31) 228 190 (0.55) 181 136 (0.38)
Size-B/M-Industty Adjusted
Median -0.01 -0.11 -0.69 -0.10 -0.22 -1,05 -0.07 -0.26 -1.01
Observations 174 134 (0.49) 162 124 (0.29) 127 89 (0.31)
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Table 5: Institutional Ownership and Operating Performance of 456 IPO Firms
Operating performance changes of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. If institutional investors have stakes in an IPO firm greater than the median value of institutional 
ownership of the sample at the end of the offering year (year 0), the IPO firm is classified as the firm with high institutional ownership (HIGH-INST). An IPO with low institutional ownership 
(LOW-INST) is the one that institutional investors’ participation in this IPO firm is less than the median value of the sample. Table values are for the median change after three years offering 
relative to year -1. Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common stock.Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT 
annual and research tapes. Operating Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income 
before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128). Operating margin is operating income before depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). Tobin’s 
q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 
10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 /data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35), Excess market value is the difference 
between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12], The Z statistics reported in the table are based 
on Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test which assumes that the observations are independent. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.___________________
Changr s in operating perform! nee of Initi al Public Offering Firms|
HIGH LOW Z-stat HIGH LOW Z-stat HIGH LOW Z-stat HIGH LOW Z-stal
INST INST (P value) INST INST (P value) INST INST (P value) INST INST (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year -1 to+l Year -1 to+2 Year -1 to +3
Operating Return on Assets (EBITD/A ssets)
IPO Finns
Median -0.02 -0.13 2.81*** -0.09 -0.16 1.31 -0.13 -0.25 2.32** -0.14 -0.24 1.90*
Observations 202 239 (0 .01) 202 237 (0.19) 188 224 (0 .02) 144 176 (0.06)
Size-B/M-Industiy Adjusted
Median 0,02 -0.17 1.92** -0.04 -0.11 0.62 0.01 -0.20 2.98*** -0.03 -0,20 1.42
Observations 143 160 (0.05) 142 159 (0.53) 130 147 (0 .00) 100 111 (0.15)
Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.09 -0.23 1.65* -0.31 -0,30 -0.29 -0.35 -0.46 0.20 -0.38 -0.44 0.25
Observations 200 234 (0. 10) 200 230 (0.77) 185 218 (0.84) 140 173 (0.80)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.08 -0.17 0.01 -0.16 -0.11 -0.34 -0.13 -0.20 -0.40 -0.15 -0.20 -0.36
Observations 139 160 (0.99) 138 159 (0.73) 124 147 (0.69) 93 111 (0.72)
Operating Margin (EBITD / Sales)
IPO Firms
Median 0.12 0.08 1.08 0.11 0,06 1,06 0,14 -0,02 1.79* 0.14 -0.00 2.14**
Observations 189 222 (0.28) 187 213 (0,29) 172 200 (0.07) 128 154 (0.03)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.01 1.65* 0.25 -0.04 2.85*** 0.22 -0.08 2.25**
Observations 138 147 (0.87) 135 141 (0.10) 124 131 (0 .00) 95 96 (0 .02)
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Table 5-Continued
HIGH
INST
LOW
INST
Z-stat 
(P value)
HIGH
INST
LOW
INST
Z-stat 
(P value)
HIGH
INST
LOW
INST
Z-stat 
(P value)
HIGH
INST
LOW
INST
Z-stat 
(P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to +2 Year -1 to+3
Sales
IPO Finns
Median 0,21 0.26 -1.25 0.52 0.64 -0.80 0.86 0.95 -0.67 1.25 1.34 -0.34
Observations 203 233 (0 .21) 203 231 (0.42) 190 218 (0.51) 144 172 (0.74)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0,07 0.09 0.26 0.20 0.23 0.05 0.27 0.49 -0.77 0.31 0.41 -0.47
Observations 144 156 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets
(0.80) 143 155 (0.96) 132 144 (0.44) 101 109 (0.64)
IPO Finns
Median 0.04 -0.03 1.67* 0.39 0.14 1.66* 0.26 0.09 1,57 0.17 0.07 1.00
Observations 199 233 (0.10) 199 229 (0.10) 185 217 (0.12) 139 173 (0.34)
Size-B/M-Industry A djusted
Median 0,08 0.08 0.84 0.36 0.11 1.19 0.46 0.08 1.78* 0,29 -0.07 1.54
Observations 138 155 (0.40) 137 152 (0.24) 125 140 (0.08) 93 107 (0 .12)
R&D/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.24 -0.41 7.80* 0.02 0,16 -1.63* -0.04 -0.21 1.92** -0.07 -0.27 1.76*
Observations 81 102 (0.07) 83 109 (0.10) 76 96 (0.05) 55 80 (0.08)
Size-B/M-Industry A djusted
Median -0.10 -0.38 1.76* -0.19 -0.28 0.71 -0.11 -0.29 1.64* -0.42 -0.36 -0.57
Observations 42 58 (0.08) 42 57 (0.48) 39 53 (0.10) 28 40 (0.57)
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Table S-Continued
HIGH LOW Z-stat HIGH LOW Z-stat HIGH LOW Z-stat
INST INST (P value) INST INST (P value) INST INST (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 to 0 Year 0 to+1 Year 0 to+2 Year 0 to +3
Tobin’s Q
IPO Firms
Median -0.12 -0.11 -0.55 -0,20 -0.19 -0.86 -0.26 -0.29 -0.39
Observations 206 240 (0.58) 194 228 (0.39) 146 175 (0.70)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.00 0,00 -0.78 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.01 -0,00 -1.17
Observations 142 164 (0.44) 133 152 (0.69) 102 112 (0.24)
Book to Market Ratio
IPO Firms
Median 0,19 0.19 -0.39 0.26 0.27 0.87 0.38 0.37 0.79
Observations 210 245 (0.70) 197 232 (0.38) 147 180 (0.43)
Size-B/M-Industty A djusted
Median -0.01 0.01 -0.22 0.11 0.02 0,38 0.24 0.00 2 .21**
Observations 150 167 (0.83) 139 155 (0.71) 105 116 (0.03)
Excess Market value
IPO Finns
Median -0.17 -0.23 0.08 -0.40 -0.42 -0.35 -0.44 -0.58 0.62
Observations 209 237 (0.43) 195 226 (0.73) 146 174 (0.53)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.02 -0.10 0.61 -0.18 -0.10 -0.19 -0.09 -0.07 -0.11
Observations 150 161 (0.54) 138 150 (0.85) 105 113 (0.92)
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Table 6: Corporate Diversification and Operating Performance of 456 IPO Firms 
Panel A: Measures of Operating Performance of 456 IPO Firms Based on Corporate Diversification Characteristics Based on 2-Digit SIC Codes)
Operating performance changes of U.S. fums announced public offering between 1989-1994. For corporate diversification, IPOs are classified as Multi and Single segment IPO firms by using 
COMPUSTAT Business Segment Descriptions. The classification is made by comparing two-digit primary SIC codes with the secondary two digit SIC codes given by Standard & Poor’s. 
A firm with two or more different two-digit SIC codes are labeled as Multi-Segment IPO firm. A firm is defined a single segment IPO firm if it has only one 2-digit SIC code. Table values 
are for the median change alter three years offering relative to year -1. Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common stock. 
Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes, Operating Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data 
item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128), Operating margin is operating income before depreciation 
divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets plus long term 
debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 /  data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes (data 
item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 x 25) - data item 
60)/data item 12]. The Z statistics reported in the table are based on Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test which assumes that the observations are independent. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Changes in operating performance of Initial Public offering Firms
Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat
Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to+2 Year -1 to+3
Operating Return on Assets (EBITD / A; sets)
IPO Finns
Median -0,10 -0.06 -1.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.32 -0.17 -0.21 0.21 -0.18 -0,20 0.45
Observations 196 245 (0.26) 196 243 (0.75) 192 220 (0.83) 162 158 (0.65)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0,14 -0.09 -0.19 -0.04 -0,08 0.83 -0.04 -0.13 0.51 -0.14 -0,08 -0.38
Observations 133 170 (0.85) 132 169 (0.40) 128 149 (0.61) 103 108 (0.71)
Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0,19 -0.13 0.08 -0.29 -0.35 0.62 -0.32 -0.46 2.04 -0.37 -0.42 -1.18
Observations 191 243 (0.93) 190 240 (0.54) 186 217 (0.04) 157 156 (0.24)
Size-B/M-Industty Adjusted
Median -0.14 -0.03 -0.16 0.05 -0.16 0.68 -0.05 -0.12 0.61 -0.16 -0.09 -0.06
Observations 127 166 (0.87) 125 164 (0.50) 120 144 (0.54) 97 103 (0.96)
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Tabic 6A-Continued
Multi-
Segment
Single-
Segment
Z stat 
(P value)
Multi-
Segment
Single-
Segment
Zstat 
(P value)
Multi-
Segment
Single-
Segment
Zstat 
(P value)
Multi-
Segment
Single-
Segment
Z stat 
(P value)
Performance Measure Year 1 toO Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to +2 Year -1 to+3
Operating Margin (EBITD / Sales)
IPO Finns
Median 0.07 0.12 -0.39 0,09 0.09 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.73 0.08 0.07 -0.15
Observations 182 229 (0.70) 177 223 (0.84) 176 196 (0.46) 149 133 (0.80)
Size-B/M-lndustty Adjusted
Median 0,05 0.13 -0,66 0,05 0.11 -0.28 0.15 0.09 0.75 0.01 0.05 -0.01
Observations 121 164 (0.51) 117 159 (0.78) 116 139 (0.45) 93 98 (0.99)
Sales
IPO Finns
Median 0.22 0.27 -1,73* 0.55 0,58 -0.44 0.89 0.92 -0.83 1.19 1.54 1.23
Observations 193 243 (0.08) 193 241 (0.66) 189 219 (0.41) 160 156 (0.26)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.09 0.07 -0.48 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.45 0.27 0.74 0.30 0.41 -0.61
Observations 132 168 (0.63) 131 167 (0.82) 128 148 (0,46) 104 106 (0.54)
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.01 -0.03 0.22 0.29 0,26 -0.29 0.19 0.17 -0.10 0.15 0.07 -0.33
Observations 191 241 (0.82) 190 238 (0.77) 186 216 (0.92) 157 155 (0.74)
Size-B/M-Industry A djusted
Median 0.09 0.03 0.36 0.25 0.17 0.87 0.29 0.10 1.37 0.22 -0.01 0.53
Observations 129 164 (0.72) 127 162 (0.39) 121 144 (0.17) 97 103 (0.60)
R&D/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.38 -0.32 -0.33 0.05 0.17 -2.04** -0.16 -0.14 -0.51 -0.29 -0.19 1.48
Observations 84 99 (0.74) 90 102 (0.04) 82 90 (0.61) 69 66 (0.14)
Size-B/M-Industry A djusted
Median -0.29 -0.27 -0.10 -0.30 -0,14 -1.61 -0.36 -0.24 -1.80* -0.53 -0.16 -1.07
Observations 45 55 (0.92) 43 56 (0 .11) 40 52 (0.07) 33 35 (0.29)
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Table 6A-Continued
Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat
Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment P value) Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 to 0 Year 0 to+1 Year 0 to+2 Year 0 to+3
Tobin’s Q
IPO Firms
Median -0.07 -0.16 2.17** -0.19 -0.20 0.85 -0.26 -0.33 0.90
Observations 197 249 (0.03) 193 229 (0.40) 159 162 (0.31)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.03 -0.01 2,00** -0.00 0.01 0.16 -0.00 0.01 -0.25
Observations 134 172 (0.05) 129 156 (0.87) 102 112 (0.80)
Book to Market Ratio
IPO Firms
Median 0.11 0.24 -0.95 0.18 0.39 -1.35 0,23 0.48 1.87*
Observations 203 252 (0.34) 198 231 (0.17) 164 163 (0.06)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.07 0.07 -1.41 0.02 0.12 -0.12 0.09 0.08 -0.11
Observations 140 177 (0.16) 135 159 (0.91) 108 113 (0.91)
Excess Market value
IPO Finns
Median -0.15 -0.25 0.05 -0.39 -0.42 0.00 -0.48 -0.51 -0.28
Observations 198 248 (0.96) 195 226 (0.99) 162 158 (0.78)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.04 -0,09 0.52 -0,15 -0.11 -0.36 -0.07 -0.17 -0.40
Observations 136 175 (0.59) 132 156 (0.72) 107 111 (0.69)
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Panel B: Measures of Operating Performance of 456 IPO Firms Based on Corporate Diversification Characteristics 
(Based on Segment Information)
Operating performance changes of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. The diversity classification is used by using segment information from the COMPUSTAT 
Business Segment Descriptions. Firms with only one segment information are classified Single -Segment, firms with two or more segments are classified as Multi-Segment IPO firms. Table 
values are for the median change after three years offering relative to year -1. Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common 
stock. Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes. Operating Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 
13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128), Operating margin is operating income before 
depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets 
plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet 
deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 
x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12]. The Z statistics reported in the table are based on Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test which assumes that the observations are independent. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level,________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________
Changes in operating performance of Initial Public Offering Firms
Multi- Single- Z stat Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat
Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment (P value)
Performance Measure Year -1 toO Year-1 to +1 Year -1 to+2 Year o
Operating Return on Assets (E B IT D  /  A sets)
IPO Firms
Median 0,04 -0,10 2.36** 0.04 -0.13 2.21 -0.04 -0.20 1.70 -0.22 -0,19 -0.04
Observations 39 402 (0 .02) 39 400 (0.03) 38 374 (0.09) 33 287 (0.97)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.07 -0.11 0.98 0.12 -0.08 1.31 -0.03 -0.07 0.61 -0.21 -0.11 -0.66
Observations 25 278 (0.33) 25 276 (0.19) 25 252 (0.54) 21 190 (0.51)
Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median 0.04 -0.18 2.48*** -0.03 -0.37 2.53*** -0.08 -0.43 2.08** -0.45 -0.41 -0.52
Observations 38 396 (0 .01) 37 393 (0.01) 36 367 (0.04) 32 281 (0.60)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.16 -0.08 1.74* 0.58 -0.16 1.86* -0.02 -0.07 0.85 -0.44 -0.09 -0.65
Observations 25 268 (0.08) 24 265 (0.06) 24 240 (0.39) 21 179 (0,52)
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Table 6B-ContInued
Multi-
Segment
Single-
Segment
Zstat 
(P value)
Multi-
Segment
Single-
Segment
Zstat 
(P value)
Multi-
Segment
Single-
Segment
Zstat 
(P value)
Multi-
Segment
Single-
Segment
Zstat 
(P value)
Performance Measure Year 1 toO Year-1 to+1 Year -1 to +2 Year -1 to+3
Operating Margin (EBITD / Sales)
IPO Finns
Median 0.16 0.09 1.04 0.18 0.07 1.47 0.17 0.05 1.43 0.09 0.07 -0.33
Observations 38 373 (0.30) 38 362 (0.14) 36 336 (0.15) 32 250 (0.97)
Size-B/M-lndustiy Adjusted
Median 0.27 0.09 0.15 0.29 0.06 0.83 0.29 0.11 0.99 -0.07 0.05 -0.95
Observations 25 260 (0.88) 25 251 (0.41) 23 232 (0.32) 21 170 (0.34)
Sales
IPO Finns
Median 0.11 0.26 -2.65*** 0.39 0.59 -1.72* 0.51 1.00 -2,44*** 0.72 1.33 -1.44
Observations 39 397 (0.01) 39 395 (0.09) 38 370 (0.01) 33 283 (0.14)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.07 0,08 -0.70 0.05 0,22 -0.59 0.15 0.40 -0.49 0.17 0.40 -0.22
Observations 25 275 (0.48) 25 273 (0.55) 25 251 (0.63) 21 189 (0,82)
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median 0.06 -0.02 0.80 0.35 0.26 -0.12 0.34 0.16 0.58 0.14 0,08 0.38
Observations 38 394 (0.42) 37 391 (0.91) 36 366 (0.56) 32 280 (0.71)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.01 0.08 -0.15 0.34 0,22 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.26 -0.24 0.14 -0.61
Observations 25 268 (0.88) 24 265 (0.77) 24 241 (0.80) 21 179 (0.54)
R&D/Total Assets
IPO Finns
Median -0.19 -0.35* 1.39 -0.03 0 .11* -1.53 -0,02 -0.16* 0.63 -0.01 -0.25 1.15
Observations 15 168 (0.17) 16 176 (0.12) 15 157 (0.53) 13 122 (0.25)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median -0.06 -0.29 0.53 -0.08 -0.28 0,49 0.01 -0.28 0.63 0.04 -0.46 1.11
Observations 8 92 (0.60) 8 91 (0,62) 8 84 (0.53) 6 62 (0.27)
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Table 6B-Continued
Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat Multi- Single- Zstat
Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment P value) Segment Segment (P value) Segment Segment (P value)
Performance Measure Year-1 to 0 Year 0 to+1 Year 0 to +2 Year 0 to+3
Tobin’s Q
IPO Finns
Median -0,11 -0.12 0.31 -0.17 -0.20 0.62 -0.24 -0.28 0.66
Observations 39 407 (0.76) 38 384 (0.54) 32 289 (0.51)
Size-B/M-Industry Adjusted
Median 0.02 0.00 0.27 0.16 -0.00 0.55 0.07 -0.00 0.27
Observations 25 276 (0.79) 25 260 (0.58) 20 194 (0.79)
Book to Market Ratio
IPO Finns
Median 0.06 0.20 -0.58 -0.02 0.29 -0.66 0.21 0.37 -0.38
Observations 40 252 (0.56) 39 390 (0.51) 33 294 (0.70)
Size-B/M-Industty Adjusted
Median -0.07 0.01 -0.39 -0.11 0.10 -0.26 0.14 0.08 -0.28
Observations 25 274 (0.70) 25 268 (0.79) 20 200 (0.78)
Excess Market value
IPO Finns
Median -0.15 -0.23 -0.30 -0.28 -0.42 -0.02 -0.56 -0.49 -0.60
Observations 40 406 (0.77) 39 382 (0.99) 33 287 (0.55)
Size-B/M-Industry A djusted
Median 0,09 -0.09 0.46 0.21 -0.13 1.37 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02
Observations 25 275 (0.65) 25 263 (0.17) 20 197 (0.98)
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Table 7: Venture Capitalists, Investment bankers’ Reputation and Operating Performance of IPO Firms
Panel A: Operating Performance Change Differences of IPO Firms: Venture Capitalists Versus Investment Bankers’ Reputation 
(Based on Carter-Manaster Investment Bankers’ Reputation Ranking)
Operating performance change differences of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. The IPOs in the sample are separated into four groups based on Carter-Manaster (1998) 
measure for investment bankers’ reputation and whether they are venture backed or not. Venture Capitalist (VC) IPOs are backed by a venture capitalist, the others are classified as Non-Venture 
Capitalist (Non-VC) IPOs. One classification for investment bankers’ reputation is Carter-Manaster measure, The Carter-Manaster measure is a discrete underwriter reputation variable 0-9 where 
a 9 is the most prestigious underwriter and 0 is the least prestigious underwriter. The low group (LR) consists of IPOs underwritten by investment bankers with a CM ranks lower than 8. The high 
group (HR) consists of CM ranks 8 and above. Table values are for the median percentage change after three years offering relative to year -1, Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which 
is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common stock. Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes. Operating Return on Assets is operating income 
before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128). Operating 
margin is operating income before depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred 
stocks plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity 
plus balance sheet deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sa!es[(data 
item (24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12]. The first entry difference denotes the median percentage performance change between HR/VC and LR/VC (HR/NonVC and LR/VC) and the second 
entry difference denotes the median percentage performance change between HR/VC and LR/Non VC (HR/Non VC and LR/NonVC). The tests for differences between the groups are performed 
using Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test [the Z statistic-Normal approximation] and Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi Square approximation}in square brackets and queerly brackets, respectively, 
which assume that observations are independent. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level for both statistics.
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING RETURN ON ASSETS (EB1TD/ASSETS)
A I. IPO Firms A2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to l(%) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to 3(%) From Year-1 to 1/%! From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to 3/%)
L R /V C  LR/NonVC 
(N=S1)* (N=69)
LR/VC LR/Non VC 
(N=47) (N=49) *
L R/V C LR/Non VC 
(N=39) (N=49)
L R/VC LR/Non VC 
(N=43) * (N=43)
LR/VC LR/Non VC 
(N=31) (N=36)
LR/VC LR/Non VC 
(N=25) (N=28)
HR/VC
(N=141)
(-16-(-6)) (-16-(-22)) 
[2.4] {5.9}** [0.3] {0.1}
(-18-(-13)) (-18-(-31)) 
[1.8] {3.4}* [ 1.5] {2.4} 
(N=136)
(-16-(-14)) (-16-(-23)) 
[0,6] {0,3} [ 1.5] {2.4} 
(N=114)
(-7 -1 ) (-7 -(-22)) 
[2.2] {4.8}** [0,2]{0,1} 
(N=102)
(-4-21) (-4-(-18)) 
[1.7]{3.0}» [0.6]{0,4} 
(N=98)
(-20-4) (-20-(-6)) 
[1.5]{2.2} [0.1]{0.0} 
(N=81)
H R /
NonVC
(N=169)
(-7 - (-6)) (-7-(-22)) 
[1.0]{0.9] [2.1]{4.4}»*
(-14-(-13)) (-14-(-31)) 
[1 -2]{ 1.4} [2.3]{5.2}*» 
(N=158)
(-23 -(-14)) (-23-(-36)) 
[1.0]{1.1} [1.3]{ 1.8} 
(N=116)
(-0 - 1) (-0 -(-22)) 
[1.9]{3.6}* [0.7]{0.5} 
(N=120)
(-7-21) (-7-(-18)) 
[2.0]{4.2}** [0.4]{0.2} 
(N=lll)
(-12-4) (-12-(-6)) 
[1.7]{2.8}* [0.2]{0.0} 
(N=76)
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING CASH FLOWS / TOTAL ASSETS
BI. IPO Firms B2, Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to lf%l From Year-1 to 2/%) From Year -1 to 3(%) From Year-1 to lf%) From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to 3(%)
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC L R/V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (-31-(-18)) (-31-(-51)) 
[2.11(4.6}*- [2.2]{5.0}**
(-35-(-27)) (-35 -(-27)) 
[2.0]{4.0}‘* [2.6]{7.0}«**
(-29-(-31)) (-29-(-57)) 
[0.1] {0,0} [1.81(3.2}*
(-10-36) (-10-(-38)) 
[1.3]{ 1.6} [1,4]{ 1.8}
(-9-33) (-9-1) 
[1.7]{3.1}* [0,6]{0.4}
(-42-13) (-42- 18) 
[1.1K1.3} [1.7]{3.0>-
H R /
NonVC
(-27-(-18)) (-27-(-51)) 
[2.0]{4.0}** [2.1]{4.6}*«
(-46-(-27)) (-46-(-61)) 
[2.8] {7.9}*** [1.8] {3.4}*
(-43 -(-31)) (-43 -(-57)) 
[1 -4]{ 1.8} [0.7]{0.5}
(-13-36) (-13 -(-38)) 
[1.1]{1.2} [1 -2]{ 1.4}
(-21-33) (-21-1) 
[2.1]{4.6}«* [1.0]{1.0}
(-9-13) (-9-18) 
[0,4]{0,2} [1,2]{ 1.4}
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Table 7 A - Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING MARGIN (EBITD / SALES)
C l. IPO Firms C2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year -1 to \(% \ From Year -I to 2(%1 From Year -1 to 3(%1 From Year-1 to lf%^ From Year -1 to 2f%) From Year-1 to3(%)
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR /VC  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (9 - 27) (9 -3)
[1.9}{3.6}* [0.1] {0.0}
(8 -29) (8 - (-1)) 
[1.71(2.9}* [0.3] {0.1}
(7-14) (7 -6 )  
[0 .0] {0 .0} [0.0] {0.0 }
(7 - 34) (7 -16) 
[1.8] {3.3}* [0.9] {0.8}
(8 - 25) (8 -16)
[1-1]{ 1*3} [0 ,6] {0.4}
(-6 - 1) (-6 - 10) 
[0.2] {0,1} [0.3]{0.1}
H R /
NonVC
(6 -2 7 ) (6 -3 )  
12.01(4.1}*- [0.2]{0.1}
(5-29) (5 -(-!))  
[I.9]{3.7}«* [0.1]{0.0}
(5-14) (5-6)) 
[0.5] {0.2} [0.4] {0.2}
(3 - 34) (3 - 16) 
(2.1}{4.6}-* [2.0]{ 1.4}
(6 - 25) (6 - 16) 
f 1.3]{ 1.7} [0.8]{0 .6 }
(7 -1 ) (7 -10) 
[0.3]{0.1} [0.3]{0.1}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN SALES
D l. IPO Firms D2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to H%3 From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3(%) From Year-1 to From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3f%3
LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (7 8 -9 3 ) (78-61) 
[0.0]{0.0} |2.1]{4.4} **
(138- 162) (138-82) 
[0.5] {0.3} [2.71(7.3} ***
(205 - 252) (205 - 97) 
[1.1]{ 1.3} [2.5] {6.0}***
(39 - 28) (39 - 29) 
[1.0]{ 1.1} [1 -0] {0,9}
(62 - 34) (62 - 38) 
[0,7]{0.5} [1.8]{3.1}*
(73 -38) (73 - 15) 
[0.5]{0.3} [2.0]{4.0}**
H R /
NonVC
(43-93) (43-61) 
|3.2]{10}—* [2.1]{4.5}«*
(74-162) (74-82) 
(3.8]{14}*** [1,3]{ 1.6 }
(100-252) (100-97) 
[2.71(7.1}-** [0.5]{0.2}
(13 -28) (13 -29) 
[0.5] {1.6 } [I,4]{2.0}
(23 - 34) (23 - 38) 
[0.9] {0.8} [0.4] {0.2}
(22-38) (22- 15) 
[0.5] {0,3} [0.8] {0.7}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES I TOTAL ASSETS
El. IPO Firms E2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to 1/%! From Ycar-1 to 2(%) From Ycar-1 to 3/%1 From Year-1 to lf%1 From Year -1 to 2(%\ From Year -1 to 3(%3
L R /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (28 - 25) 
[0.6] {0.3}
(28 - 25) 
[0.7]{0.5}
(34 - 24) 
[0.5]{0,2}
(34-3) 
[0,8] {0 .6 }
(19 - 17) 
[0 ,2]{0 ,0 }
(19-3)
[0.6]{0.3}
(8 - 44) 
[0,9] {0.8}
(8-42)
[1.6]{2.4}
(35 - 9) (35 - 10) 
[0.5] {0,6} [0.0]{0.0}
(41-(-1)) 
[0 .8] {0.6}
(41-(-14)) 
[1.41(1.9}
H R /
NonVC
(29 - 25) 
[0.4] {0.2}
(29 - 25) 
[0.4]{0.2}
(13-24) 
[0 ,0] {0 .0 }
(13-3)
[0.3]{0.1}
(6-17) 
[1.3]{ 1.8}
(6-3)
[0.6]{0.3}
(23 - 44) 
[1.01( 1.0 }
(23 - 42) 
[1.6]{2.7}*
(20-9) (20- 10) 
[0.6]{0.3} [0.1] {0,0}
(-15-(-1)) 
[0.4]{0.2}
(-15-(-14))
[0.01(0 .0 }
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Table 7 A- Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN TOBIN’S Q
FI. IPO Firms F2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to lf%l From Year 0 to 2f%! From Year 0 to 3/%f From Year 0 to lf%! From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3f%3
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (-18-3) (-18-(-14)) 
[2.01(3.9}** [0.1] {0.0}
(-21-(-3)) (-21-(-23)) 
[1.5] {2.3} [0.5]{0.3}
(-27-(-7)) (-27-(-40)) 
[1.3]{1.7} [0.6]{0.4}
(0 -18) (O -(-ll)) 
[1.3]{1.6} [0.2]{0.0}
(-3-32) (-3-(-9)) 
11.61(2.7}* [0.71(0.5}
(-O -(-l)) (-0 -5 )  
[0.9 {0.8} [0.61(0.4}
H R /
NonVC
(-10-3) (-10-(-14)) 
[1.7J{3.1}- [0.4]{0.1}
(-19-(-3)) (-19-(-23)) 
[2.01(4.2}** [0.2]{0.0}
(-28-(-7)) (-28-(-40)) 
[2.21(5.0}** [0.1]{0.0}
(-1-18) (-1 -(-11)) 
[1.71(3.0}* [0.0]{0.0}
(-0-32) (-0 - (-9)) 
[1.81(3.2}* [0.8]{0.7}
( - l- ( - l ) )  (-1 -5 )  
[1.1]{1.3} [0.8]{0.6}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN BOOK TO MARKET RATIO
GI. IPO Finns G2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to lf%l From Year 0 to 2f%) From Year 0 to 3/%> From Year 0 to l(%) From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%)
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (22 - 2) (22 - 27) 
[1.3]{1.6} [1.3]{1.7}
(18-6) (18-47) 
[1.3]{1.6} [1.51(2.4}
(29 -2) (29-41) 
[1.3]{1.6} [0.61(0,4}
(-3-(-16)) (-3 -7 ) 
[0.7]{0.5} [1.1](1.1}
(10-(-31)) (10-16) 
[2.41(5.6}** [1.3]{1,6}
(21-(-7)) (21-(-11)) 
[1.71(2.9}* [0.8]{0.6}
H R /
NonVC
(19-2) (19-27) 
[2.11(4.3}** [0.3]{0.1}
(37 -6 ) (37 -47) 
[2.7]{7.1}*** [0.3]{0.1}
(56 -2 ) (56-41) 
[2.51(6.0}** [0.6]{0.4}
(2-(-16)) (2 -7 )  
[1.5]{2.2} [0.5]{0.3}
(12-(-31)) (12-16) 
[2.5]{6.4}*** [1.2]{1.5}
(14-(-7)) (14-(-11)) 
[1.5]{2.3} [0.8]{0.7}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN EXCESS MARKET VALUE
H I. IPO Finns H2. Size-Book to Market-Industiy Adjusted
From Year 0 to l(% ) From Year 0 to 2(%f From Year 0 to 3f%f From Year 0 to l(% ) From Year 0 to 2<%\ From Year 0 to 3fVol
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR /VC  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (-24-(-12)) (-24-(-26)) 
[0.8]{0.7} [0.5]{0.2}
(-39-(-25)) (-39-(-49)) 
[1.4](1.8} [0.6]{0.4}
(-46-(-23)) (-46-(-50)) 
[1.4]{2.1} [0.2]{0.1}
(2 -1 ) (2-(-10)) 
[0.2]{0.3} [0.1](0.0}
(-21-20) (-21 -(-59)) 
[1.9]{3.5}* [1.71(2.9}*
(-20-7) (-20- 14) 
[0.7]{0.4} [0.9]{0.8}
H R /
NonVC
(-19-(-12)) (-19-(-26)) 
[0.71(0.5} [0.6](0.3}
(-43-(-25)) (-43-(-49)) 
[2.01(4.0}** [0.0]{0.0}
(-63 -(-23)) (-63 -(-50)) 
[2.31(5.4}** [0.7]{0.5}
(-9 -1 ) (-9-(-10)) 
[0.11(0.0} [0.1]{0.0}
(-8 -20) (-8-(-59)) 
[1.2]{1.5} [2.1]{4.3}-
(-9 -7 ) (-9-14) 
[0.5]{0.2} [0.7]{0.5}
* The observation numbers are very close to presented numbers for the groups for other operating performance measures.
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Panel B: Operating Performance Change Differences of IPO Firms: Venture Capitalists Versus Investment Bankers’ Reputation 
(Based on Securities Data Corporations’ Investment Bankers’ Reputation Ranking)
Operating performance change differences of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. The IPOs in the sample are separated into four groups based on Carter-Manaster (1998) 
measure for investment bankers’ reputation and whether they are venture backed or not. Venture Capitalist (VC) IPOs are backed by a venture capitalist, the others are classified as Non-Venture 
Capitalist (Non-VC) IPOs, The Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) underwriters ranking for the year 1996 is used, SDC ranks underwriter according to their market share. If underwriter of an 
IPO firm is ranked in top ten, this IPO firm is included in the high reputation group. Otherwise it is included in the low reputation group, Table values are for the median percentage change after 
three years offering relative to year -1. Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common stock. Data for IPO firms is obtained from 
COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes. Operating Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating 
income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128), Operating margin is operating income before depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). 
Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data 
item 10 +  data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35), Excess market value is the difference 
between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12], The first entry difference denotes the median percentage 
performance change between HR/VC and LR/VC (HR/NonVC and LR/VC) and the second entry difference denotes the median percentage performance change between HR/VC and LR/Non VC 
(HR/Non VC and LR/NonVC). The tests for differences between the groups are performed using Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test [the Z Statistic-Normal approximation] and Kruskal- 
Wallis test {Chi Square approximation}in square brackets and queerly brackets, respectively, which assume that observations are independent. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1 % 
level for both statistics.
VIEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING RETURN ON ASSETS (EBITD/ASSETS)
A I. IPO Firms A 2, Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-! to l(% ) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3(%) From Year-1 to 1(%1 From Ycar-1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3C%>
L R /V C  LR/Non VC 
(N=79)" (I'M 18)
LR/VC LR/Non VC 
(N=75) (I'M 11)
L R/V C LR/Non VC 
(N=59) (N=80)
LR/VC LR/Non VC 
(N=54) * (I'M5)
LR/VC LR/Non VC 
(N=51) (N=67)
LR/VC LR/Non VC 
(N=42) (N=45)
HR/VC
(N=1I1)
(-10-(-13)) (-10-(-15)) 
[0,2] {0.0} [0.6] {0.3}
(-11 -(-25)) (-11 -(-33)) 
[1.0]{1.0} [2.4]{5.8}*» 
(N=106)
(-12-(-19)) (-12-(-34)) 
[l-2]{1.4} [2.1]{4.5}** 
(N=92)
(-4 -2) (-4-(-15)) 
[0.5]{0.2} [0,4] {0.2} 
(N=8lj
(-1 -3) (-1 - (-13)) 
[0,0] {0.0} [1,2]{ 1.3} 
(N=77)
(-16-11) (-16-(-18)) 
[0.5]{0.3} [0.5]{0.2} 
(N=63)
H R /
NonVC
(N=126)
(-6-(-13)) (-6-(-15)) 
[1.2]{1.5> [1.7] {3.0}*
(-1 1 -(-25)) (-1 1 -(-33)) 
[1.2]{1.4} [2.7]{7.4}*** 
(I'M 16)
(-21-(-19)) (-21-(-34)) 
[0,2] {0.1} |2.1]{4.4}** 
(N=85)
(-3 -2) (-3-(-15)) 
[0,5]{0.3} [0.4] {0.1} 
(N=88)
( -5 -3 )  (-5-(-13)) 
[0.7]{0.4} [0,6] {0.3} 
(N=80)
(-6 - 11) (-6-(-18)) 
[0.7] {0.4} [0.3] {0.1} 
(N=59)
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING CASH FLOWS / TOTAL ASSETS
B l. IPO Firms B2. Size-Book to Market-Industty Adjusted
From Year-1 to 1(%1 From Year -1 to 2(%1 From Year -1 to 3f%1 From Year -1 to l(% ) From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3/%l
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (-23 -(-30)) (-23-(-41)) 
[0.6]{0.4} [1.3]{ 1.7}
(-29-(-33)) (-29-(-61)) 
[0.4] {0.1} [3.1]{9.7}***
(-20-(-48)) (-20-(-51)) 
[1.2]{1.3} [2.4]{6.0}***
(-8 -(-2)) (-8-(-19)) 
[0.7]{0.5} [0.2]{0.1}
(-4 -5) (-4-(-13)) 
[0.3]{0.1} [0.3]{0.1}
(-54-0) (-54-(-5)) 
[1.4]{2.1} [1.1H1.0}
H R /
NonVC
(-31-(-30)) (-31-(-41)) 
[ 1.5] {2 ,2} [0 .1]{0 .0 }
(-37-(-33)) (-37 -(-61)) 
[ 1.3]{1.6} [2.4]{5.9}**
(-41-(-48)) (-41-(-51)) 
[0.4] {0.1} [0.9] {0.8}
(-22-(-2)) (-22-(-19)) 
[l-2]{ 1.5} [0.4]{0,2}
(-17-5) (-17-(-13)) 
[1.1 ]{1,0} [0.6]{0.4}
(17-0) (17-(-5)) 
[0.3] {0.1} [0.3]{0.1}
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Table 7B - Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING MARGIN (EB1TP / SALES)
C l. IPO Firms C2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to l(% ) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to3/%l From Year-1 to 1/%1 From Year-1 to 2(%\ From Year -1 to 3(%'\
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR /V C  LR/Non VC LR /V C  LR/Non VC LR /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (10-25) (10-7) 
[2.21(5.0}** [0.7]{0.4}
(9 -1 7 ) (9-(-3)) 
[0.9]{0.8} [0.8]{0.7}
(12-(-4)) (12-0) 
[0.7]{0.5} [1.11(1.1}
(6 -15 ) (6-16) 
[1.71(2.8}* [1.1J{1.2}
(15-17) (15-(-1)) 
[0.6]{0.4} [0.11(0.0}
(1 - (-17)) (1 * (-5)) 
[0.21(0.0} [0.2]{0.0}
H R /
NonVC
(5 -2 5 ) (5 -7 )  
[2.11(4.5}** [0.3]{0.1}
(10-17) (10-(-3)) 
[0.8]{0.6} [1.3]{1.8}
(14-(-4)) (14-0) 
[0.71(0.5} [1.91(3.7}*
(-3-15) (-3-16) 
[2.11(4.5}** [1.6}(2.5}
(13-17) (13-(-1)) 
[0.51(0.3} [0.11(0.0}
(9-(-17)) (9-(-5)) 
[0.6](0.4} [0.8)(0.6}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN SALES
D l. IPO Firms D2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to I/%1 From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3(%) From Year-1 to lf%f From Year -1 to 2/Vof From Year -1 to 3C%1
L R /V C  LR/Non VC L R /V C  LR/Non VC L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (73 - 90) (73 - 55) 
[0.61(0.3} [2.31(5.3}**
(132 - 175) (132 -72) 
[1.6](2.4} [2.81(6.6}***
(167 -260) (167-98) 
[1.91(3.6}* [2.61(6.8}***
(37 -34) (37- 18) 
[0.5]{0.2} [1.91(3.6}*
(57-71) (57-24) 
[0.41(0.2} [2.01(4.1}**
(64- 127) (64- 15) 
[1.11(1.3} [2.01(4.0}**
H R /
NonVC
(42 - 90) (42 - 55) 
[4.21(18}*** [2.11(4.5}**
(79 - 175) (79 - 72) 
[4.91(24}*** [0.8](0.7}
(101-260) (101-98) 
[3.9]{15}*«* [0.1]{0.0}
(15-34) (15-18) 
[1.01(1.0} [0.1]{0.0}
(23 -71) (23 -24) 
[2.11(4.3}** [0.1](0.0}
(22- 127) (22- 15) 
[1.71(2.9}* [1.2]{1.4}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES / TOTAL ASSETS
E l. IPO Firms E2. Size-Book to Market-Industty Adjusted
From Year-1 to I(%! From Year -1 to 2/%f From Year-1 to 3(%\ From Year-1 to I/%1 From Year -I to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3(%)
L R /V C  LR/Non VC L R /V C  LR/Non VC L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (30-14) (30-14) 
[0.71(0.5} [0.41(0.2}
(40 - 8) (40 - 6) 
[1.6]{2.5} [1.81(3.3}*
(18 -23) (18-6) 
[1.11(1.2} [0.5]{0.3}
(24 - 9) (24 - 30) 
[0.11(0.0} [0.31(0.1}
(36- 17) (36- 13) 
[0.71(0.5} [0.5]{0.3}
(24-29) (24-(-32)) 
[0.0](0.0} [2.11(4.4}**
H R /
NonVC
(38-14) (38-14) 
[1.0]{1.0} [0.8](0.7}
(15 -8 ) (15-6) 
[0.91(0.9} [1.2]{1.4}
(6 - 23) (6 - 6) 
[2.0[{3.9}** [0.5](0.3)
(25 - 9) (25 - 30) 
[0.3]{0.1} [0.31(0.1}
(22- 17) (22- 13) 
[0,7](0.5} [0.8](0.7}
(.3 -29) (-3 - (-32)) 
[1.01(0.9} [1.11(1.3}
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Table 7B- Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN TOBIN'S Q
FI. IPO Firms F2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to \(°/o\ From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%) From Year 0 to lf%1 From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(*A\
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC L R/V C LR/Non VC L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (-17-19) (-17-(-13)) 
(1.1){1.3} [0.01(0.0}
(-19-(-19)) (-19-(-19)) 
[0.7]{0.4} [0.6]{0.3}
(-21 -(-32)) (-21 -(-36)) 
[0.6]{0.4} [1.5]{2.2}
(2 -8 ) (2-(-4)) 
[0.91(0.7} [1.11(1.1}
( 1 - 11) (1 - (-5)) 
[0.9](0.7} [0.71(0.5}
( 2 -(-D ) (2 -3 )
[0.1 {0.0} [0.31(0.1}
H R /
NonVC
(-8 -1 9 ) (-8-(-13)) 
[0.81(0.6} [0.8](0 .6}
(-20-(-19)) (-20-(-19)) 
[1.21(1.4} [0.11(0.0}
(-29 -(-32)) (-29 -(-36)) 
[0.61(0,4} [0.0](0.0}
(-0 -8 ) (-0 -(-4)) 
[0.81(0.6} [1.1](1.3}
(-0-11) (-0 - (-5)) 
[1.01(1.1} [0.51(0.2}
( - l - ( - l ) )  (-1-3)  
[0.2]{0 .0 } [0 .21(0.0 }
MEDIAN CHANCE (%) DIFFERENCES IN BOOK TO MARKET RATIO
G l. IPO Firms G2. Size-Book to Market-lndustiy Adjusted
From Year 0 to l(% \ From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%) From Year 0 to 1C%1 From Year 0 to 2(*/») From Year 0 to 3(9A \
L R /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (22 - 7) 
[1.1] { 1.2}
(22 - 29) 
[1.81(3.3}*
(14-16)
[0.6]{0.3}
(14-49)
[2.01(4.1}**
(18 -37) 
[0.6]{0.4}
(18-40)
[1.41(2.1}
(-8 -( -6)) 
[0 .2}{0 .0}
(-8 -7 )
[1.6]{2.6}
(1 - (-4)) (1-15) 
[0.5]{0.3} [1.5]{2.2}
(16-7) (16-4)) 
[1,0]{0.9} [0.6]{0.4}
H R /
NonVC
(11-7)
[1.4]{1.9}
(11 -29) 
[1.4]{2.0}
(29 -16) 
[1.81(3.2}*
(29 - 49) 
[1.11( 1.2}
(59 - 37) 
[1.3]{1.7}
(59-40)
[0.6]{0.3}
(2 -(-6)) 
[0.8]{0.7}
(2 -7 )
[1.01( 1.0}
(5-(-4)) (5-15)  
[0.9]{0.9} [1.1]{1.3}
(3 -7 ) (3 -4 )  
[0.9]{0.8} [0.4]{0.2}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN EXCESS MARKET VALUE
H I. IPO Finns H2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to l(%) From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3f%1 From Year 0 to \ <%) From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year I) to 3f%1
L R /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC L R /VC  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC (-15-(-22)) (-15-(-25)) 
[0.9]{0.9} [0.9]{0.8}
(-22-(-46)) (-22-(-43)) 
[1.01(0.9} [1.3]{1.8}
(-22-(-67)) (-22-(-55)) 
[1.91(3.6}* [1.51(2.2}
(5-(-23)) (5-(-10)) 
[1.1]{1.2} [0.71(0.5}
(-7-(-24)) (-7-(-18)) 
[0.7]{0.5} [1.1]{1.2}
(-2-(-62)) (-2 - 1) 
[2.0]{4.0}»* [0.2]{0.0}
H R /
NonVC
(-15-(-22)) (-15-(-25)) 
[0.5]{0.3} [0.4]{0.1}
(-47-(-46)) (-47-(-43)) 
[0.5]{0.3} [0.21(0.1}
(-59-(-67)) (-59-(-55)) 
[0.21(0.1} [0.8](0.7}
(-8-(-23)) (-8 -(-10)) 
[1.01(1.0} [0.5]{0.3}
(-13-(-24)) (-13 - (-18)) 
[0.4]{0.2} [0.7]{0.5}
(-9-(-62)) (-9-1)  
[1.4]{1.9} [0.5]{0.2}
* The observation numbers are very close to presented numbers for the groups for other operating performance measures.
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Table 8: Investment bankers’ Reputation, Institutional Ownership and Operating Performance of IPO Firms 
Panel A: Operating Performance Change Differences of IPO Firms: Investment Bankers’ Reputation Versus Institutional Investors 
(Based on Carter-Manaster Investment Bankers’ Reputation Ranking)
Operating performance change differences of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994, The IPOs in the sample are separated into four groups based on Carter-Manaster (1998) 
measure for investment bankers’ reputation and whether they have high institutional investors participation or low. The classification for investment bankers’ reputation is Carter-Manaster measure, 
The Carter-Manaster measure is a discrete underwriter reputation variable 0-9 where a 9 is the most prestigious underwriter and 0 is the least prestigious underwriter. The low group (LR) consists 
of IPOs underwritten by investment bankers with a CM ranks lower than 8. The high group (HR) consists of CM ranks 8 and above. If institutional investors have stakes in an IPO firm greater than 
the median value of institutional ownership of the sample at the end of the offering year (year 0), the IPO firm is classified as the firm with high institutional ownership (HIGH-INST). An IPO with 
low institutional ownership (LOW-INST) is the one that institutional investors’ participation in this IPO firm is less than the median value of the sample. Table values are for the median percentage 
change after three years offering relative to year -1, Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common stock. Data for IPO firms is 
obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes. Operating Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows 
are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128). Operating margin is operating income before depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data 
item 12). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 
25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is 
the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12], The first entry difference denotes the 
median percentage performance change between HR/HINST and LR/HINST (HR/LINST and LR/HINST) and the second entry difference denotes the median percentage performance change between 
HR/HINST and LR/LINST (HR/LINST and LR/LINST). The tests for differences between the groups are performed using Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test [the Z statistic-Normal 
approximation] and Kruskal-Wallis test {Chi Square approximation)in square brackets and queerly brackets, respectively, which assume that observations are independent. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level for both statistics,
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING RETURN ON ASSETS (EBITD/ASSETS)
A l. IPO Firms A 2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to H%1 From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to3/% l From Year-1 to 1 ( % ) From Year -1 to 2/%f From Year -1 to 3/%l
LR/HINST LR/LINST 
(N=45)« (N=83)
LR/HINST LR/LINST
(N=43) (N=75)
LR/HINST LR/LINST
(N=30) (N=56)
LR/HINST LR/LINST 
(N=25) * (N=52)
LR/HINSTLR/LINST
(N=24) (N=43)
LR/HINSTLR/LINST
(N=U) (N=36)
H R /
HINST
(N=157)
(-5-(-13)) (-5-(-12)) 
[0.6] {0.4} [0.6] {0.4}
(-13-(-14)) (-13-(-26)) 
[0.2] {0.0} [1.9]{3.6}* 
(N=145)
(-14-(-12)) (-14-(-33)) 
[0.4]{0.2} [1,5]{2,2} 
(N=114)
(-4 - (-0)) (-4-(-15)) 
[I2]{ 1.4} [0.1 ]{0.0} 
(N=117)
(-1 -24) (-1 - (-20)) 
[1.4]{1.9} [1.3]{ 1.7} 
(N=106)
(-9 -6 ) (-9-(-13)) 
[0,8]{0.6} [0 .2]{0 .0 } 
(N=83)
H R /
LEMST
(N=152)
(-17-(-13)) (-17-(-12)) 
[0.6] {0.3} [0.8] {0.7}
(-14-(-14)) (-14-(-26)) 
[1.1]{ 1.2 } [0 .2]{0 .0 } 
(N=148)
(-21 -(-12)) (-21 -(-33)) 
[0.8] {0.7} [0.0] {0.0} 
(N=I 17)
(-11-(-0)) (-11-(-15)) 
[1.5]{2.2} [0.4]{0.2} 
(N=105)
(-16-24) (-16-(-20)) 
[2.8]{8.0}*** [0,5]{0.3} 
(N=103)
(-21-6) (-21-(-13)) 
[2.0K4.1}** [0.7]{0.5} 
(N=74)
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING CASH FLOWS I TOTAL ASSETS
Bl. IPO Firms B2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year -1 to 1/%1 From Year -I to 2/%l From Year -1 to 3/%l From Year-1 to 1/%1 From Year -1 to 2/%l From Ycar-1 to3{%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(-26 - (-40)) (-26 - (-34)) 
[1.1]{ 1.3} [0 .2] {0 ,0 }
(-36-(-34)) (-36-(-47)) 
[0.2] {0.0} [0.3]{0.1}
(-37 -(-45)) (-37 -(-46)) 
[0.5]{0.3} [0,3]{0.1}
(-18-(-13)) (-18-5) 
[0 .0]{0 .0} [0 .0]{0 .0}
(-35- 18) (-35-3) 
[2.0]{3.9}** [1.4]{ 1.9}
(-42-18) (-42- 18) 
[1.7]{3.0}* [1.0]{0,9}
H R /
LINST
(-29-(-40)) (-29-(-34)) 
[1.1] { 1.1} [0 .2] {0 ,\}
(-46 - (-34)) (-46 - (-47)) 
[0 ,1]{0 ,0 } [0 ,2] {0 .0 }
(-42-(-45)) (-42-(-46)) 
[0.3]{0.1} [0,1] (0,0}
(-3-(-13)) (-3-5) 
[0,4] {0,2} [0.2] {0.1}
(-3-18) (-0-3) 
[1.3] {1.8} [0.9] {0.9}
(-23 - 18) (-23 - 18) 
[1,4](2.0} [0.8] (0.6}
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Table 8A- Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING MARGIN (EBITDI SALES)
C l. IPO Finns C2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to lf/o f From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3f%l From Year-1 to 1/%1 From Year -1 to 2f%l From Year-1 to 3(%1
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(9 - 22) (9 -8) 
[1.6]{2.4> [0,1] {0.0}
(9 - 22) (9 - 5) 
[10]{I.1> [0.5] {0,3}
(11-23) (11-(-4)) 
[1.0]{ 1,0 } [l.l]{  1.3}
(13-58) (13-4) 
[3.0[{8.9}«** [0.1]{0.0}
(13-51) (13-5) 
[2.3j{5.4}** [1,2]{ 1.3}
(10-51) (10-(-34)) 
[ 1,6]{2.6 } [ 1.6] {2.6 }
H R /
LINST
(3 - 22) (3 - 8) 
|1.7J{2.8}* [0.5]{0.2}
(-3 - 22) (-3 - 5) 
[1.8]{3.2}“ [0.5]{0.3}
(2 -23) (2-(-4))
[ 1.9]{3.7}» [0.2]{0,0}
(-5-58) (-5-4) 
[3.3]{I0}**» [0,8] {0.6}
(-4-51) (-4 -5 ) 
[3.5]{12}**» [0,2]{0.0}
(-1-51) (-1- (-34)) 
[2.8] {7.8}*** [0.9]{0.9}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN SALES
D I. IPO Finns D2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year -1 to i /%1 From Year-1 to 2f%! From Year-I to3f%l From Year- 1 to lf/o l From Year-1 to2f%l From Year -1 to 3(%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(53 - 40) 
[1.0] { 1.0 }
(53 - 70) 
[1.8]{3.2}*
(90-81)
[0.7]{0.5}
(90-113) 
[1 -4]{ 1.9}
(131-82) 
[0.8] {0.7}
(131 - 100) 
[ U ] { 1.2}
(18-23) 
[0.6] {0.4}
(18-33) 
[0.4] {0.1}
(27-30) (27-51) 
[0,2] {0 .1} [0,2]{0.0 }
(38 - 9) 
[0,9]{0.8}
(38 - 35) 
[0.4]{0,1}
H R /
LINST
(52 - 40) 
[0.7]{0.5}
(52 - 70) 
[2.2] {4.9}**
(86-81) 
[0.5] {0.2}
(86-113)
[1,6]{2.4}
(125-82) 
[0.3] {0,1}
(125-100) 
[ 1.4] {2.0}
(18-23) 
[0,3]{0,1}
(18-33)
[0.5]{0,3}
(46-30) (46-51) 
[0,7] {0.5} [0.4]{0,2}
(42-9)
[1.2]{ 1.5}
(42 - 35) 
[0,7]{0.6}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES / TOTAL ASSETS
E l. IPO Finns E2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to It'%1 From Year -1 to 2/%l From Ycar-1 to3f%! From Year-1 to i(% ) From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to 3(%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(38-41 ) (38-23) 
[0.5] {0.3} [0.4] {0.1}
(24-31) (24-(-2)) 
[0,9]{0.8} [1.6]{2.7}*
(1 8 -1 5 ) (18-7)  
[1.3]{ 1.6 } [0.4] {0 .2}
(27 - 72) (27 - 22) 
[2.1[{4.3}‘* [0.4]{0,2}
(46 - 58) (46 - (-27)) 
[1.5] {2.2} [1.6]{2.7}*
(29 - 53) (29 - (-7)) 
[0.7R0.6} [1,5]{2.3}
H R /
LINST
(4 -4 1 ) (4-23) 
[1.4]{ 1.9} [1,0]{0.9}
(17-31) (17-(-2)) 
[ 1 -2]{ 1.4} [ 1,2]{ 1.5}
(6-15) (6 -7 )
[1.6] {2.4} [0.1] {0.0}
(6 - 72) (6 - 22) 
[2.5]{6.3}—  [0,9] {0.9}
(13 -58) (13 -(-27)) 
[1.8[{3.1}* [1.4]{2.0}
(-7-53) (-7-(-7)) 
[0.8] {0.6} [0.9] {0.9}
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Table 8 A- Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN TOBIN’S Q
FI. IPO Firms F2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to 1/%1 From Year 0 to 2/%1 From Year 0 to 3/%1 From Year 0 to 1/%1 From Year 0 to 2/%I From Year 0 to 3(%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(-12-(-5)) (-12-(-7)) 
[0.6] {0.3} [1.1]{1.2}
(-23 -(-11)) (-23 -(-19)) 
[1-1]{ 1-3} [0.8] {0.7}
(-25-(-31)) (-25-(-20)) 
[0,1] {0.0} [1.1]{ 1.3}
(-3 - 15) (-3 - 1) 
[1.8] {3.2}* [0.6]{0.4}
(-3-21) (-3-0)  
[l-4]{ 1.9} [0.2]{0.0}
( -2 -1 )  (-2 -5 )  
[0.9 {0.8} [1.4]{2.1}
H R /
LINST
(-12-(-5)) (-12-(-7)) 
[0.4]{0,1} [0.8] {0.7}
(-19-(-11)) (-19-(-19)) 
[0.5]{0,2} [0.1]{0.0}
(-31-(-31)) (-31-(-20)) 
[0.1 ]{0.0 } [ 1,2]{ 1.4}
(-0-15) (-0 -1 )  
[0 .8]{0 ,6 } [0 .2]{0 .0}
(-0 - 21) (-0 - 0) 
[0.8] {0,7} [0.3] {0.1}
(-1 -1 ) (-1 -5 )  
[0.3] {0.1} [0.6] {0.3}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN BOOK TO MARKET RATIO
G l. IPO Firms G2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to M%) From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3/%1 From Year 0 to 1/%1 From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3/VoI
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(19-23 )
[0.6]{0.3}
(19-8) 
[0.3] {0.1}
(29-12)
[0. 1K0.0 }
(29 - 20) 
[1.0]{ 1.0 }
(38 - 32) 
[0 .2] {0.0 }
(38-21)
[1.4]{2.0}
(2 - ( - 10)) 
[0.4] {0.1}
(2 - 2)
[0.0]{0.0 }
(15-(-18)) (15-2) 
[0.9] {0.9} [0.5] {0.3}
(37 -(-5)) (37 -(-14)) 
[1.2]{ 1.5} [2.4]{5.6}**
H R /
LINST
(23 - 23) 
[0 .1]{0 .0 }
(23 - 8) 
[ U ] { 1.2>
(30-12)
[0.2]{0 .0 }
(30 - 20) 
[0.4]{0.2}
(44 - 32) 
[0 .0] {0 .0 }
(44-21) 
[l-4]{ 1.9}
(0 - ( -10))
[0.2]{0 .1}
(0 - 2) 
[0 ,0] {0 .0 }
(6-(-18)) (6 - 2) 
[0.7]{0.4} [0.1] {0,0}
(5-(-5)) (5-(-14)) 
[0.1]{0.0} [0.8]{0.7}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN EXCESS MARKET VALUE
HI. IPO Finns H2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to lf%I From Year 0 to 2/%! From Year 0 to 3/%I From Year 0 to 1 /%! From Year 0 to 2/%I From Year 0 to 3/%1
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(-15-(-23)) (-15-(-18)) 
[0.9]{0.8} [0.1]{0.0}
(-41-(-34)) (-41-(-44)) 
[0.1]{0.0} [0.9] {0.9}
(-46-(-35)) (-46-(-38)) 
[0.0]{0.0} [0.9]{0,8}
(-4-33) (-4-(-24)) 
[1.4]{2.1} [0.7]{0,5}
(-20-2) (-19-(-27)) 
[0.2]{0.1} [0.4]{0.2}
(-2 0 - 10) (-2 0 - 2) 
[1.3]{ 1.7} [0.5]{0.2}
H R /
LINST
(-33 -(-23)) (-33 -(-18)) 
[0 .2] {0 .0 } [1.0]{ 1.0}
(-41-(-34)) (-41 -(-44)) 
[0. 1K0.0 } [1.1H 1.1}
(-64-(-35)) (-64-(-38)) 
[0.9] {0,8} [1.8]{3.3}*
(-8-33) (-8-(-24)) 
[1>1]{ 1-2} [0.6] {0,4}
(-9 -2 ) (-9-(-27)) 
[0.0]{0.0} [0,8]{0.7}
(-10-10) (-10 - 2)
[ 1.0] { 1.1} [0.2] {0,1}
* The observation numbers are very close to presented numbers for the groups for other operating performance measures.
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Panel B: Operating Performance Change Differences of IPO Firms: Investment Bankers’ Reputation Versus Institutional Investors 
(Based on Securities Data Corporations’ Investment Bankers’ Reputation Ranking)
Operating performance change differences of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994, The IPOs in the sample are separated into four groups based on investment bankers’ reputation 
and whether they have high institutional investors participation or low, The Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) underwriters ranking for the year 1996 is used, SDC ranks underwriter according 
to their market share. If underwriter of an IPO firm is ranked in top ten, this IPO firm is included in the high reputation group, Otherwise it is included in the low reputation group, If institutional 
investors have stakes in an IPO firm greater than the median value of institutional ownership of the sample at the end of the offering year (year 0), the IPO firm is classified as the firm with high 
institutional ownership (HIGH-INST). An IPO with low institutional ownership (LOW-INST) is the one that institutional investors’ participation in this IPO firm is less than the median value of 
the sample. Table values are for the median percentage change after three years offering relative to year -1. Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year which is the fiscal year of the initial public 
offering (IPO) of common stock. Data for IPO fums is obtained from COMPUSTAT annual and research tapes, Operating Return on Assets is operating income before deprecation divided by total 
assets (data item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128), Operating margin is operating income 
before depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets 
plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred 
taxes (data item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data item (24 x 25) - data item 
60)/data item 12], The first entry difference denotes the median percentage performance change between HR/HINST and LR/HINST (HR/LINST and LR/HINST) and the second entry difference 
denotes the median percentage performance change between HR/HINST and LR/LINST (HR/LINST and LR/LINST), The tests for differences between the groups are performed using Wilcoxon 
two-sample non-parametric rank test [the Z statistic-Normal approximation] and Kruskal-Wallis test {Chi Square approximation Jin square brackets and queerly brackets, respectively, which assume 
that observations are independent. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level for both statistics,
VIEPIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING RETURN ON ASSETS (EBITD/ASSETS)
A I. IPO Finns A 2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to 1(%) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3(%) From Year-1 to l(% ) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to3/% l
LR/HINST LR/LINST 
(N=78)* (N=120)
LR/HINST LR/LINST 
(N=74) (N=l 13)
LR/HINST LR/LINST
(N=50) (N=90)
LR/HINST LR/LINST
(N=52)* (N=77)
LR/HINSTLR/LINST
(N=49) (N=69)
LR/HINSTLR/LINST
(N=32) (N=55)
H R /
HINST
(N=123)
(-2-(-14)) (-2-(-15)) 
[2.21(4.6}** 11.91(3.5}*
(-10 -(-23)) (-10-(-35)) 
11.61(2.7}* [3.41(11}*** 
(N=l 13)
(-14-(-12)) (-14-(-39)) 
[0,7]{0.4J [2.61(6.7}*** 
(N=93)
(-3-(-4)) (-3-(-15)) 
[0.4]{0,1} [0.5]{0.3} 
(N=90)
(-2 -6 ) (-2-(-30)) 
[1.01(1.0} [2.31(5.4}- 
(N=81)
(-9 -9 ) (-9 -(-24)) 
[1.5]{2.2} [0.9]{0.9} 
(N=68)
H R /
LINST
(N=114)
(-16-(-14)) (-16-(-15)) 
[0.2] {0.0} [0.1]{0.0}
(-14-(-23)) (-14-(-35)) 
[1.1]{1.3} [2.01(4.0}** 
(N=109)
(-16-(-12)) (-16-(-39)) 
[0.2] {0.1} [1.4]{2.0} 
(N=84)
(-10-(-4)) (-10-(-15)) 
[0.6]{0.3} [0.5]{0.3} 
(N=79)
(-5 -6 ) (-5 -(-30)) 
[2.0){4.1}- [1.2]{1.4} 
(N=76)
(-12-9) (-12-(-24)) 
[1.71(2.8}* [0.9]{0.8 
(N=S4)
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING CASH FLOWS I TOTAL ASSETS
BI. IPO Finns j32. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to l(% \ From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year-I to3f%I From Year -1 to U%1 From Year -1 to 2(%\ From Year -1 to 3(%1
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(-31 -(-37)) (-31 -(-36)) 
[0.3]{0.1} [0.3]{0.1}
(-31-(-39)) (-31-(-51)) 
[1.1]{1.2} [1.4]{2.1}
(-25-(-49)) (-25-(-49)) 
[1.81(3.3}* [1.1]{1.3}
(-18-(-16)) (-18-(-2)) 
[0.3]{0.1} [0.7]{0.5}
(-27 -3 ) (-27 -(-5)) 
[0.9]{0.9} [0.6]{0.3}
(-42-3) (-42-(-9)) 
[1.01(1.0} [0.7]{0.4}
H R /
LINST
(-27- (-37)) (-27- (-36)) 
[0 .2]{0 .1} [0.2]{0 .0}
(-32-(-39)) (-32-(-51)) 
[1.1]{1.2} [1.4]{1.9}
(-37 -(-49)) (-37 -(-49)) 
[1.3]{1.6} [1.3]{1.7}
(-10-(-16)) (-10-(-2)) 
[0.2]{0.0} [0.6]{0.4}
(-0 -3 ) (-0 - (-5)) 
[0.2]{0.1} [0 .0]{0,0}
(-0 -3 ) (-0 - (-9)) 
[0.2]{0 .1} [0 .0]{0 .0}
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Table 8B- Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING MARGIN (EBITPI SALES)
C l. IPO Finns C2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to l(% ) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3C%1 From Year-1 to l(% ) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3/%l
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(9 -1 4 ) (9-10) 
[1-2] { 1.4} [0 .2] {0 .1}
(14-12) (14-(-4)) 
[0.5] {0.3} [2.0] {4.2}**
(12-23) (12-(-23)) 
[0,8] {0.7} [2.5]{6.1}***
(13-27) (13-6) 
[2.1]{4.4}*« [0.2]{0,0}
(17-50) (17-(-29)) 
[2.1]{4.6}*« [1,9]{3.6}*
(6-52) (6 -(-34)) 
[1.9]{3.7}* |2.3]{5.2}**
H R /
LINST
(0 -1 4 ) (0 -10) 
[2.0]{4.2}** [1.1]{ 1.3}
(8-12) (8 -(-4)) 
[ 1 -2]{ 1.5} [0 .8]{0 .6 }
(15 -23) (15-(-23)) 
[ 1 -0]{ 1.1} [2.4]{5.9}**
(-9 - 27) (-9 - 6) 
[3.0]{9.I}«*» [1,4]{2.0}
(12-50) (12-(-29)) 
(2.7]{7.5}***[1.4]{2.0}
(9-52) (9-(-34)) 
[2.1]{4.6}**[2.4]{5.7}»*
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN SALES
D l. IPO Finns D2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to From Year-1 to 2/%) From Year-1 to3/%'> From Year-1 to 1/%! From Year-1 to 2/%l From Year-1 to3f%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(52-45) (52-70) 
[0.1]{0.0} [1.7]{2.8}»
(93 -81) (93 - 121) 
[0.2]{0.1} [ 1,4]{2.0}
(129- 102) (129- 159) 
[0.4]{0.2} [0.8]{0.6}
(23 - 13) (23 -31) 
[i.3]{1.7} [0.1] {0.0}
(36-24) (36-54) 
[0.4] {0.2} [0,6] {0,3}
(40- 15) (40-41) 
[0.4] {0,2} [0,2]{0,0}
H R /
LINST
(51-45) (51-70) 
[0.2]{0.1} |2.0]{4.1}**
(85-81) (85 -121) 
[0.1 ]{0.0} 11.8J{3.1} *
(125-102) (125-159) 
[0,1]{0.0} [l.2]{ 1.4}
(19-13) (19-31) 
[0.5]{0.2} [0.3]{0.1}
(45-24) (45-54) 
[0.7]{0,5} [0.1]{0.0}
(41-15) (41-41) 
[0 .8] {0.6 } [0 .0]{0 .0 }
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES / TOTAL ASSETS
El. IPO Finns E2. Size-Book to Market-Industiy Adjusted
From Year-1 to lf%! From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to3f%1 From Year -1 to l(% \ From Year -1 to 2(%\ From Year -1 to 3f%1
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(4 8 -7 ) (48- 19) 
[2.6]{6.8}*** [1.7]{3.0}*
(43 .7 )  (43 - 5) 
[2.1]{4.5}** [2.3] {5.4}**
(1 1 -1 8 ) (11-7) 
[1.1]{1.3} [0.1] {0.0}
(37 -30) (37 - 16) 
[0.5]{0.3} [0.6]{0.3}
(52 - 32) (52 - 8) 
[0,9] {0.7} [1.7]{3.0}*
(26 - 33) (26 - (-7)) 
[0.1] {0.0} [1,5]{2,3}
H R /
LINST
(3 -7 )  (3 -19) 
[0.1] {0.0} [1.3] {1.8 }
(16-7) (16-5) 
[0.5] {0,2} [0.6]{0.4}
(5 -18) (5 -7 )
[ 1*7] {2.9}* [0,4]{0.1}
(2-30) (2-16) 
[0.8] {0.6} [0.7] {0.4}
(9 - 32) (9 - 8) 
[0.7]{0.5} [0,6] {0,4}
(-8-33) (-8 -(-7)) 
[0.5] {0.3} [0.6] {0.3}
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Table 8B- Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN TOBIN’S Q
FI. IPO Firms F2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to lt%t From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3/%') From Year 0 to i ( % ) From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(-11-(-13)) (-11-(-9)) 
[0.3] {0.1} [0.5] {0.3}
(-23 -(-16)) (-23-(-20)) 
[0,8]{0.6} [0.7]{0,4}
(-27-(-26)) (-27-(-40)) 
[0.5] {0.3} [0.1]{0.0}
(-0 - 1) (0 - 2) 
[0.5]{0.3} [0.3] {0.1}
(1 - 0) (1 - 1) 
[0.5] {0.3} [0,3] {0.1}
( -1 -3 )  (-1 -1)
[0.3 {0.1} [0.9]{0.7}
H R /
LINST
(-12-(-13)) (-12-(-9)) 
[0.3] {0,1} [0.3] {0.1}
(-17-(-16)) (-17-(-20)) 
[0.3] {0.1} [0.3] {0.1}
(-27-(-26)) (-27-(-40)) 
[0,8] {0.7} [0.6]{0.4}
(-0 - 1) (-0 - 2) 
[0.9]{0.9} [0.0]{0.0}
(-0 - 0) (-0 - 1) 
[0.1] {0.0} [0.3] {0.1}
(-0 -3 ) (-0 -1 )  
[0.9]{0.8} [0.1]{0.0}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN BOOK TO MARKET RATIO
GI. IPO Firms G2. Size-Book to Market-Industty Adjusted
From Year 0 to H%1 From Year 0 to 2(%1 From Year 0 to 3(%) From Year 0 to 1(%1 From Year 0 to 2(%\ From Year 0 to 3(%\
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(18-2 3 )
[0.3]{0.1}
(18-27)
[0.7]{0.5}
(26 - 36) 
[0.2] {0 .0 }
(26-40) 
[0.2] {0.0 }
(37 -39) 
[0.3] {0.1}
(37-41)
[0.4]{0.2}
(-2 - 2)
[1.0H 1.1}
(-2 - (-1)) 
[0.5]{0.2}
(9-15) (9 -8 )  
[0.1] {0.0 } [0.1 ]{0.0 }
(39 -14) 
[0.7] {0.4}
(39-(-10)) 
[0.8] {0.7}
H R /
LINST
(16-2 3 )  
[0 .1] {0 .0 }
(16-27)
[0.5]{0.2}
(18-36)
[1.0]{0.9}
(18-40) 
[!•!]{ 1-2}
(27 - 39) 
[0,9]{0,8}
(27-41)
[0 .2]{0 ,0 }
( 1 - 2) 
[0.6] {0,3}
( l - ( - l ) )  
[0.0] {0 ,0 }
(-5-15) (-5-8) 
[0.5]{0.3} [1.0]{ 1.0}
(0-14)
[1.0K 1.1}
(O-(-lO)) 
[0.4] {0.2}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN EXCESS MARKET VALUE
H I. IPO Firms 112. Size-Book to Market-Industiy Adjusted
From Year 0 to l(% ) From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%) From Year 0 to H%1 From Year 0 to 2(%\ From Year 0 to 3f%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R /
HINST
(-12 - (-23)) (-12 - (-31)) 
[0.7]{0.5} [1,2]{ 1.5}
(-39-(-40)) (-39-(-50)) 
[0.2] {0 .0 } [0 .2]{0 .0 }
(-42-(-49)) (-42-(-68)) 
[0.6 ]{0,4} [1.0]{0.9}
(2 - (-1)) (2-(-24)) 
[0.5]{0,2} [1.2]{ 1.4}
(-19-(-17)) (-19-(-32)) 
[0.4]{0,1} [0.8] {0.7}
(-14-(-8)) (-14-(-34)) 
[0,2] {0.0} [0.6]{0,3}
H R /
LINST
(-20 - (-23)) (-20 - (-26)) 
[0.2] {0.0} [0.6]{0.3)
(-35-(-40)) (-35-(-50)) 
[0.6]{0.4} [0.7]{0.5>
(-48 -(-49)) (-48 -(-68)) 
[0.2] {0.0} [0.6] {0.4}
( - l- ( - l ) )  (-1 - (-24)) 
[0,5]{0.2> [0.9] {0.9}
(2-(-17)) (2-(-32)) 
[0.6]{0.4) ]1.8]{3.1}*
(1 * (*8)) (1 - (-34)) 
[0.9] {0.8} [1,2]{1.5}
*The observation numbers are very close to presented numbers for the groups for other operating performance measures,
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Table 9: Operating Performance Change Differences of IPO Firms: Venture Capitalists Versus Institutional Investors
Operating performance change differences of U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. Venture Capitalist IPOs are backed by a venture capitalist (VC), the others are classified 
as Non-Venture IPOs (Non-VC). If institutional investors have stakes in an IPO firm greater than the median value of institutional ownership of the sample at the end of the offering year (year 0), 
the IPO firm is classified as the firm with high institutional ownership (HIGH-INST). An IPO with low institutional ownership (LOW-INST) is the one that institutional investors’ participation in 
this IPO firm is less than the median value of the sample. Table values are for the median percentage change after three years offering relative to year -1, Year -1 is the fiscal year preceding the year 
which is the fiscal year of the initial public offering (IPO) of common stock, Data for IPO firms is obtained from COMPU STAT annual and research tapes. Operating Return on Assets is operating 
income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128), 
Operating margin is operating income before depreciation divided by total sales (data item 13/data item 12), Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of 
preferred stocks plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6], Book value is defined as common 
equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes (data item 60 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total 
sales[(data item (24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12]. The first entry difference denotes the median percentage performance change between VC/HINST and NonVC/HINST (VC/LINST and 
NonVC/HINST) and the second entry difference denotes the median percentage performance change between VC/HINST and NonVC/LINST (VC/LINST and NonVC/LINST), The tests for 
differences between the groups are performed using Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test [the Z statistic-Normal approximation] and Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi Square approximation)in 
square brackets and queerly brackets, respectively, which assume that observations are independent. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level for both statistics.
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING RETURN ON ASSETS (EBITP/ASSETS)
AI. IPO Finns .42. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to \(% ) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to3(%) From Year-I to U%) From Year -1 to !(*/•) From Year-1 to 3f%)
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST 
(N=99)* (N=147)
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST 
(N=92) (N=136)
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST 
(N=66) (N=100)
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
(N=67)* (N=98)
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
(N=60) (N=88)
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
(N=42) (N=63)
V C  I
HINST
(N=103)
(-11-(-7)) (-11 -(-15)) 
[0.41(0.2} [0.51(0.2)
(-12-(-15)) (-12-(-24)) 
[0.81(0.6} [2.1j{4.2}** 
(N=96)
(-9 -(-25)) (-9 -(-26)) 
[1.9]{3.8]** (2.2|(5.0}**
(N=78)
(-0 - (-7)) (-0-(-10))
[0.6]{0.3} [0.7]{0.5J 
(N=75)
( 8 -(-3)) (8-(-22))  
(1.0]{ 1.0} (2.91(8.6}*** 
(N=70)
(-4-(-5)) (-9-(-17)) 
[1.0]{1.0} [1.5]{2.1} 
(N=S8)
V C /
LINST
(N=89)
(-17- (-7)) (-17-(-15)) 
[1.4]{2.0} [0.8]{0,6J
(-27 -(-15)) (-27 -(-24)) 
[!•!]{ 1-2} [0 ,2]{0 .0 ] 
(N=87)
(-20-(-25)) (-20-(-26)) 
[0.4] {0,1} [0.1] {0,0} 
(N=75)
(-14-(-7)) (-14-(-10)) 
[0 .1] {0 .0 } [0 .0] {0 .0} 
(N=61)
(-19-(-3)) (-19-(-22)) 
[1 *3]{ 1.7} [0.4]{0.2} 
(N=59)
(-23 -(-5)) (-23 -(-17)) 
[0,7]{0.4} [0.3]{0.1} 
(N=48)
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING CASH FLOWS I TOTAL ASSETS
B l. IPO Finns B2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to 1/%1 From Year - I to 2(%1 From Year-1 to 3(%) From Year-1 to l(%) From Year -1 to 2(%) From Year-1 to 3(%)
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
V C /
HINST
(-25-(-38)) (-25-(-39)) 
[1.7] {2.8}* [1.1]{1-3}
(-30-(-47)) (-30-(-51)) 
[2.5]{6.3}**< [2.1]{4.5}**
(-21-(-44)) (-21 -(-47)) 
[2.1]{4.2}*‘ [1.5]{2.4}
(1- (-24)) (1 -0 )  
[1.9] {3.5}* [0.7]{0.4}
(4-(-45)) (4-(-2)) 
[2.4]{5.9}*** [0.6]{0.4}
(-3-(-46)) (-3-18) 
[0.8] {0.7} [1.0]{ 1.0}
V C /
LINST
(-26-(-38)) (-26-(-39)) 
[1.3]{ 1.6 } [1.2]{1.5}
(-33 -(-47)) (-33 -(-51)) 
[1.8]{3.3}* [1.81(3.1}-
(-39-(-44)) (-39-(-47)) 
[2.11(4.4}- [1.4]{1.9}
(-4-(-24)) (-4-0) 
[1.0] {0,9} [0,1] {0.0}
(-9-(-45)) (-9-(-2)) 
[1,0]{ 1.1} [0.8] {0.7}
(-59-(-46)) (-59-18) 
[0,5] {0.3} [2.2] {5.0}**
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Table 9- Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN OPERATING MARGIN (EB1TP / SALES)
CL IPO Finns C2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to l(% ) From Year-1 to 2(%1 From Year-1 to 3(%) From Ycar-1 to H%1 From Year -1 to 2(%1 From Year-1 to 3(%)
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
V C I
HINST
(1 3 -9 ) (13-2) 
[0.3]{0.1} [1.0]{1.0}
(16-10) (16-(-4)) 
[0.0]{0.0} [1.9] {3.5}*
(18-10) (18-2) 
[0.7]{0.5} |1.7](3.0}*
(18-14) (18-3) 
[0.1]{0.0} [1.4] {2.0}
(24-29) (24-(-1)) 
[0.4]{0.2} [2.2|{4.7}**
(18-22) (18-4) 
[0.2]{0.0} [1.4]{2.0}
V C /
L1NST
(1 4 -9 ) (14 -2 )  
[0 .0] {0 ,0 } [1.1] { 1.2}
(9 -10) (9-(-4)) 
[0.5]{0.2} [1.1]{ 1.3}
(-4-10) (-4 -2 ) 
[1.3]{1.6} [0.4]{0,2}
(0-14) (0 -3 )  
[0.8]{0.6} [0.3]{0.1}
(-6-29) (-6 -(-1)) 
[1.71(2.8}* [0.21(0.0}
(-27-22) (-27-4) 
[1.91(3.7}** [1.41(1.8}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES PS SALES
D l. IPO Finns D2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to l f %) From Year -1 to 2/%t From Year-1 to 3/%l From Year-1 to 1 (%) From Year-1 to 2(%) From Year -1 to 3/%f
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
V C /
HINST
(77 - 37) (77 - 52) 
[3.61(12}*** [2.71(7.4}***
(119-60) (119-80) 
[3.3]{10}*** [3.01(9.1}***
(168-82) (168-105) 
[2.81(7.8}*** [2.71(7.4}**'
(33 - 14) (33 - 18) 
[1.81(3.1}* [1.5]{2.2}
(46-15) (46-25) 
[2.01(4.1}** [1.4]{2.1}
(74-0) (74-34) 
[2.01(4.1}** [1.2]{1.6}
V C /
LINST
(95 - 37) (95 - 52) 
[4.21(17}*** [3.41(11}***
(168-60) (168-80) 
[4.41(19}*** [4.51(20}***
(245-82) (245-105) 
[3.41(11}*** [3.61(13}***
(40-14) (40-18) 
[1.4]{2.1} [1.1]{1.3}
(68-15) (68-25) 
[2.61(6.7}*—2.21(4.7}**
(69-0) (69-34) 
[1.9]{3.6}* [1.3]{1.6}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES / TOTAL ASSETS
E l. IPO Firms E2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year-1 to l(% ) From Ycar-1 to 2(%) From Ycar-1 to3f%l From Ycar- 1 to 1/%1 From Year -1 to 21%) From Year-1 to 3/%t
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
V C /
HINST
(29-41)
[0.3]{0.1}
(29- 11) 
[0.9]{0.9}
(39-13)
[1.01( 1.1}
(39 - 8) 
[1.71(2.8}*
(18 -7) 
[0.7]{0.5}
(18-5)
[1.7]{2.8}*
(30 - 36) 
[0.7]{0.5}
(30 - 16) 
[0.6]{0.3}
(49 - 37) 
[0.11(0 .0 }
(49-6)
[1.11(1.3}
(47- 17) (47-(-15)) 
11.8] {3.3} * [2.9] {8.4} * * •
VC
LINST
(21-41)
[1.4]{2.0}
(2 1 - 11)
[0.5]{0.3}
(20-13)
[0.6]{0.4}
(20 - 8) 
[0.2]{0 .0 }
(21-7)
[0.6]{0.3}
(21-5)
[1.51(2,3}
(8-36)
[1.01( 1.0 }
(8-16)
[0 .01(0 .0 }
(8 - 37) 
[1.51(2.2}
(8 - 6)
[0.5]{0.2}
(-2-17) (-2-(-15)) 
[0.6]{0.4} [0.6]{0.4}
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Tabic 9- Continued
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES PS TOBIN’S Q
FI. IPO Firms F2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to 1(%) From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%) From Year 0 to l(%) From Year 0 to 2f%) From Year 0 to 3(%)
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
V C /
HINST
(-16-(-10)) 
[1 -2]{ 1.4}
(-16-(-11)) 
[0.3]{0.1}
(-23-(-17)) 
[0 .2]{0 .1}
(-23 -(-36)) 
[0 .1] {0 .0 }
(-27 -(-25)) 
[0 .8] {0,6 }
(-27 - (-36)) 
[0 .8] {0 .6 }
(0 - 0)
[0.0]{0.0 }
(0-(-4)) 
[0,3]{0.1}
(1 - (-5)) 
[0.6] {0.4}
(1 -(-!))  
[0.4] {0.2}
(8 -(-18)) 
[1.5K2.3}
(8 -4 )
[0.5]{0.3}
V C /
LINST
(-7 - ( - 10)) 
[0.9]{0.8}
(-7-(-11)) 
[1.71(2.8}*
(-0 -(-17)) 
ll.9|{3.4}*
(-0 - (-36)) 
[2.01(3.9}**
(-8-(-25)) 
[1.71(3.0}*
(-8-(-36)) 
[1.81(3.1}*
(22 - 0)
[1.6] {2.6 }
(22-(-4)) 
[1.3]{1.7>
(13-(-5)) 
[1.0]{ 1.0 }
(13-(-1)) 
[0.8] {0.7}
(-8-(-18)) 
[1.1]{1.3}
(-8 -4 )
[0.7]{0.5}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN BOOK TO MARKET RATIO
GI. IPO Firms G2. Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to lf%l From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%1 From Year 0 to lf%3 From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3/%)
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
Non-VC
HINST
Non-VC
LINST
V C /
HINST
(21 - 17) 
[0 ,2]{0.0 }
(21-25)
[1.4]{2.0>
(18-42) 
(1.3]{ 1.7}
(18-39)
[1.1]{1.1>
(31 -40) 
[1.4]{2.0}
(31-59)
[0.8]{0.6 }
(3 - (-1)) 
[0 ,2] {0.1}
(3 -9 )
[1.1]{1.3}
(8 -17)
[1.4]{1.9}
(8 -5 )  
[0.8] {0.7}
(9-35)
[0.7]{0.5}
(9-(-9)) 
[1.41(1.9}
V C /
LINST
(7 -17)
[1 *5] {2.1 >
(7-25)
[2.7]{7.0}***
(8 - 42) (8 - 39) 
[2.81(7.7}*** [2.6]{7.0}**«
(18-40) 
[2.3] {5.4}**
(18-59)
[1.71(2.9}*
(-14-(-1)) 
[1.3]{ 1.6 }
(-14-9)
[1.91(3.5}*
(-8-17)
[1.5]{2,3}
(-8-5)
[I.0]{0.9}
(14-35)
[1.81(3.1}*
(14-(-9)) 
[0.4] {0.1}
MEDIAN CHANGE (%) DIFFERENCES IN EXCESS MARKET VALUE
H I. IPO Finns H2, Size-Book to Market-Industry Adjusted
From Year 0 to W%3 From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%) From Year 0 to l(% ) From Year 0 to 2(%) From Year 0 to 3(%3
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
Non-VC Non-VC 
HINST LINST
V C /
HINST
(-14-(-17)) (-14-(-26)) 
[0 .0]{0.0 } [0 .8] {0 .6}
(-31 -(-49)) (-31 -(-43)) 
[1 -4]{ 1.9} [0.8]{0.6}
(-27-(-50)) (-27-(-63)) 
[1.5 ]{2.2} [1.6]{2,6}
(-7 -6 ) (-7-(-14)) 
[0.2] {0.0} [0.6] {0.4}
(-10 -(-22)) (-10-(-2)) 
[1.0]{ 1.1} [0,2] {0.0 }
(-0 - (-32)) (-0 -5 )  
[1.2]{1.5} [0.3]{0.1}
V C /
LINST
(-20-(-17)) (-20-(-26)) 
[0.2] {0.1} [0.3] {0.1}
(-39-(-49)) (-39-(-43)) 
[ 1 -4] {2.0} [0.9]{0.8}
(-48-(-50)) (-48-(-63)) 
[I -0]{ 1.0} [0.9] {0.7}
(12-6) (12-(-14)) 
[0.3] {0.1} [0.2]{0.0}
(-11-(-22)) (-11-(-2)) 
[0.5K0.2} [0.4] {0.2}
(-44-(-32)) (-44-5) 
[0.3] {0.1} fl.6J{2.6}*
*The observation numbers are very close to presented numbers for the groups for other operating performance measures.
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Table 10: Initial Returns for Different Classifications of IPO Firms
The initial return is the difference between the first CRSP-listed after-market price and the offering price as a proportion of the offering price. Venture Capitalist (VC) IPOs 
are backed by a venture capitalist, the others are classified as Non-Venture Capitalist (Non-VC) IPOs. One classification for investment bankers’ reputation is Carter- 
Manaster measure. The Carter-Manaster measure is a discrete underwriter reputation variable 0-9 where a 9 is the most prestigious underwriter and 0 is the least prestigious 
underwriter. The low group (LR) consists of IPOs underwritten by investment bankers with a CM ranks lower than 8. The high group (HR) consists of CM ranks 8 and 
above. As a second investment bankers’ reputation measure, the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) underwriters ranking for the year 1996 is used. SDC ranks underwriter 
according to their market share. If underwriter of an IPO firm is ranked in top ten, this IPO firm is included in the high reputation group, Otherwise it is included in the low 
reputation group. For industry diversification, IPOs are classified as Multi and Single segment IPO firms by using COMPUSTAT Business Segment Descriptions. One 
classification is made by comparing two-digit primary SIC codes with the secondary two digit SIC codes given by Standard & Poor’s. A firm with two or more different 
two-digit SIC codes are labeled as Multi-Segment IPO firm, The other diversity classification is used by using segment information from the COMPUSTAT Business 
Segment Descriptions, Firms with only one segment information are classified Single -Segment, firms with two or more segments are classified as Multi-Segment IPO firms. 
If institutional investors have stakes in an IPO firm more than median value of institutional ownership of the sample at the end of the offering year (year 0), this IPO is 
classified as an IPO with high institutional ownership (HINST). An IPO with low institutional ownership (LINST) is the one that institutional investors’ participation in 
this IPO firm is less than median value of the sample. The tests for differences between the groups are performed using the F test (for mean differences), and Kruskal-Wallis 
test (Chi Square statistic for median differences), which assumes that observations are independent. *, **, **+ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level._______
Initial Returns
N Mean Median N Mean Median
All IPOs 456 11.1 5.2 Investment bankers’ reputation Based on CM Ranking
HR - VC IPOs 145 15.2 10.0
Venture Capilatist IPOs 198 14.1 8.9 HR - Non VC IPOs 171 9.3 4.2
Non-Venture Cap. IPOs 256 8.96 4.4 LR - VC IPOs 52 10.9 3.5
Difference Test Statistics (11)*** (5.7)** LR - Non VC IPOs 80 8.2 4.7
Difference Test Statistics (5.0)***(9.5)**
Investment bankers’ reputation Based on CM Ranking
High Reputation Group 316 12.0 5.9 Investment bankers’ reputation Based on SDC Ranking
Low Reputation Group 132 9.3 4.4 HR - VC IPOs 112 14.8 8.8
Difference Test Statistics (2.7)* (2.1) HR-Non VC IPOs 
LR - VC IPOs
127
84
9.5
13.3
3.8
7.6
Investment bankers’ reputation Based on SDC Ranking LR - Non VC IPOs 124 8.4 5.0
High Reputation Group 239 12,0 5.2 Difference Test Statistics (4.2)***(6.0)*
Low Reputation Group 208 10.4 5.6
DifferenceTest Statists (1.1) (0.0) Investment bankers’ reputation Based on CM Ranking
HR - HINST 162 11.5 6.6
Corporate Diversification: Based on two-digit SIC Codes HR - LINST 154 12.6 4.7
Multi-Segment IPOs 201 10.9 4.0 LR - HINST 44 7.9 2.6
Single-Segment IPOs 254 11.5 6.4 LR-LINST 88 10.0 5.6
DifferenceTest Statistics (0.6) (0.8) Difference Test Statistics (1.2) (4.7)
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N Mean Median
Table 10 - Continued
N Mean Median
Corporate Diversification: Based on Segments Investment bankers' reputation Based on SDC Ranking
Multi-Segment IPOs 39 6.3 0.9 HR - HINST 124 10.7 5.4
Single-Segment IPOs 416 11.7 5.9 HR-LINST 115 13.3 4.8
Difference Test Statistics (3.5)*«(4.8 )*** LR - HINST 82 11.0 6.1
LR - LINST 126 10.2 5.1
IPOs with high Inst. Ownership 206 10.7 5.7 Difference Test Statistics (0.9) (1.5)
IPOs with low Inst. Ownership 244 11.6 4.9
Difference Test Statistics (0.4) (0 .2) VC - HINST 104 14.5 9.0
VC - LINST 93 13.7 7.1
Non VC-HINST 102 9.4 3.5
Non VC-HINST 151 10.3 4.7
Difference Test Statistics y—
y o ♦ • © • *
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Table 11: Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns for Different Classifications of IPO Firms
Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns are presented for several periods (starting from third day of trading). Returns are adjusted by substracting the contemporaneous CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted, equaly-weghted market returns, S&P 500 index returns and returns of firms matched by size and book to market ratio along with two-digit 
industry classification. Venture Capitalist (VC) IPOs are backed by a venture capitalist, the others are classified as Non-Venture Capitalist (Non-VC) IPOs. One classification for 
investment bankers’ reputation is Carter-Manaster measure. The Carter-Manaster measure is a discrete underwriter reputation variable 0-9 where a 9 is the most prestigious underwriter 
and 0 is the least prestigious underwriter. The low group (LR) consists of IPOs underwritten by investment bankers with a CM ranks lower than 8. The high group (HR) consists of 
CM ranks 8 and above, As a second investment bankers’ reputation measure, the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) underwriters ranking for the year 1996 is used. SDC ranks 
underwriter according to their market share. If underwriter of an IPO firm is ranked in top ten, this IPO firm is included in the high reputation group, Otherwise it is included in the 
low reputation group. For industry diversification, IPOs are classified as Multi and Single segment IPO firms by using COMPUSTAT Business Segment Descriptions. One classification 
is made by comparing two-digit primary SIC codes with the secondary two digit SIC codes given by Standard & Poor’s. A firm with two or more different two-digit SIC codes are 
labeled as Multi-Segment IPO firm. The other diversity classification is used by using segment information from the COMPUSTAT Business Segment Descriptions. Firms with only 
one segment information are classified Single -Segment, firms with two or more segments are classified as Multi-Segment IPO firms. If institutional investors have stakes in an IPO 
firm greater than the median value of institutional ownership of the sample at the end of the offering year (year 0), the IPO firm is classified as the firm with high institutional ownership 
(HIGH-INST), An IPO with low institutional ownership (LOW-INST) is the one that institutional investors’ participation in this IPO firm is less than the median value of the sample. 
The tests for differences between the groups are performed using the F statistic (for mean differences) and Kruskal-Wallis test (Chi Square statistic for median differences), which 
assumes that observations are independent. ♦, **, ♦** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level._____________________________________________________________
Panel A: Day 3 to 1 Month Returns (%)
Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns (%)
Raw Returns CRSP value-weighted CRSP equally-w'eighted S&P 500 Index Size-B/M-indus.Match Firms
N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median N Mean Median
All IPOs 456 4.03 2,4 3.2 2.4 1.4 -0.2 3.4 1.9 367 1.7 2.3
Venture Capilatist IPOs 198 5.67 3.83 4.9 2.7 3.0 1.2 5.1 3.2 171 2.4 3.6
Non-Venture Cap. IPOs 256 2.76 0.87 1.9 -0.4 0.2 -2.0 2.1 0,3 195 1.4 2.2
Difference Test Statistics (3.6)” (4.0)” (4.0)” (4.1)” (3.7)* (4.4)** (4.1)” (4.1)” (0.2) (0.5)
Investment Bankers’ Reputation,Based on CM Ranking
High Reputation Group 316 3.93 2.55 3.2 1.8 1.6 0.6 3.4 2.3 264 1.7 3.3
Low Reputation Group 132 4.39 1.51 3.3 1.4 1.2 -0.5 3.5 1.3 100 2.6 -0.2
Difference Test Statistics (0 .1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2)
Investment Bankers’ Reputation,Based on SDC Ranking
High Reputation Group 239 3,65 2.43 2.8 1.5 1.1 -0.1 3.0 1.7 196 1.3 2.8
Low Reputation Group 208 4.51 2.09 3.7 2.1 1.8 0.2 4.0 2.3 167 2.7 3.1
Difference Test Statists (0.3) (0 .0) (0.4) (0 .0) (0 .2) (0 .0) (0.5) (0 .0) (0.5) (0 .0)
Corporate Diversification: Based on two-digit SIC Codes
Multi-Segment IPOs 201 3.26 0.9 2.4 0.4 0.7 -0.7 2,6 0,6 162 1.4 2.1
Single-Segment IPOs 254 4.64 3.8 3.8 2.4 2.0 0.7 4.0 3.0 212 1.8 3.0
Difference Test Statistics (0.8) (L6) (0.9) (1.9) (0.9) (1.7) (0.9) (1.9) (0 .1) (0.4)
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 11- Continued
Raw Returns CRSP value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted S&P 500 Index Size-B/M-indus.Match Firms
N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median N Mean Median
Corporate Diversification: Based on Segments
Multi-Segment IPOs 39 1.63 0,62 1.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 1.2 -0.8 29 5.7 6.0
Single-Segment IPOs 416 4.26 3.13 3.4 1.8 1.6 0.4 3.6 2.3 345 1.3 2.3
Difference Test Statistics (0.9) ( 1.0) (0.8) (0 .6) (0.5) (0.3) (0.9) (0.6) (1.3) (1.4)
IPOs with high Inst. Ownership 209 4.1 2.3 3.4 1.8 1.8 0.2 3.6 2.0 173 2.5 3.6
IPOs with low Inst. Ownership 245 4.0 3.1 3.0 1,6 1.1 -0.2 3.3 1.7 194 1.1 0.7
Difference Test Statistics (0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.6) (0.2) (1.0) (0.0) (0.5) (0.5) (1.5)
Panel B: Day 3 to 1 Year Returns (%)
Raw Returns CRSP value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted S&P 500 Index Size-B/M-indus.Match Firms
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All IPOs 26,5 15.9 12,3 4.1 -15.5 -21.1 15.2 7.6 -5.8 1.2
Venture Capilatist IPOs 31.8 22.8 15.5 11.2 -14.4 -17.3 18.7 15.0 -5.9 0.7
Non-Venture Cap. IPOs 22.3 9.3 10,1 - 1.0 -16.3 -24.8 12.9 0.9 -5.4 2.3
Difference Test Statistics (2.4) (2.5) (1.0) (2.7)* (0. 1) (0 .8) ( 1.2) (3.0)* (0.0) (0 .1)
Investment Bankers’ Reputation Based on CM Ranking
High Reputation Group 27.0 15.9 12,2 5.2 -15.2 -20.4 15.1 8.2 -7,7 7.4
Low Reputation Group 26.1 15.7 13.7 4.1 -15,0 -18,9 16.6 7.0 -0.2 -7.0
Difference Test Statistics (0 .0) (0.1) (0.1) (0 .1) (0.0) (0 .0) (0.1) (0 .1) (0.4) (0.5)
Investment Bankers’ Reputation Based on SDC Ranking
High Reputation Group 29.1 15.9 13.4 5.8 -14.3 -21.0 16.4 8.8 -7.6 7.4
Low Reputation Group 24.0 15.4 11.6 3.5 -16.2 -19.5 14.6 6.6 -3.8 -7.7
Difference Test Statistics (0.7) (0.4) (0 .1) (0.5) (0 .1) (0.5) (0.1) (0.4) (0.1) (0.4)
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Table 11 - Continued
Raw Returns CRSP value-W'eighted CRSP equally-w'eighted S&P 500 Index Size-B/M-indus.Match Firms
Mean Median Mean ’ Median Mean Median Mean Median N Mean Median
Corporate Diversification: Based on two-digit SIC Codes
Multi-Segment IPOs 20.3 7.3 5.9 - 1.8 -21.2 -26.4 8.8 0.1 -13.5 -3.2
Single-Segment IPOs 31.3 23.4 17.6 8.7 -11.0 -18.3 20.6 14.9 2.5 4.6
Difference Test Statistics (3.2)* (4.7)** (4.8)** (4.3)* (3.7)* (3.1)* (4.9)** (4.5)** (2.3) (0.7)
Corporate Diversification: Based on Segments
Multi-Segment IPOs 17.7 6.8 6.7 -5.2 -19.5 -26.3 9.3 -0.7 12.8 13.3
Single-Segment IPOs 27.3 17.1 13.0 4.8 -15.1 -20,3 15.9 8.1 -5.9 -2.0
Difference Test Statistics (0 .8) (0.4) (0.5) (0.3) (0.2) (0.1) (0.5) (0.3) (0.9) (1.4)
IPOs with high Inst. Ownership 32.8 22.7 16.3 9.0 -13,5 -17.5 19.5 14.0 0.2 7.8
IPOs with low Inst. Ownership 21.1 9.6 9.2 -1.4 -17.1 -24.5 12.0 1.5 -11.2 -4.5
Difference Test Statistics (3.6)* (4.5)** ( 1.8) (3.4)* (0.4) (0.6) (2.0) (3.7)** (1.2) (12 )
Panel C: Day 3 to 2 Year Returns (%)
Raw Returns CRSP value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted S&P 500 Index Size-B/M-indus.Match Firms
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All IPOs 60.4 18.9 16.1 -11.5 -56.4 -81.5 22.3 -4.2 -8.4 0.7
Venture Capilatist IPOs 82.3 29.0 27.3 -0,5 -48.5 -78.8 34.3 5.4 -7.1 1.2
Non-Venture Cap. IPOs 43.4 12.0 6.3 -16.7 -62.9 -85.0 12.7 - 10.0 -9.7 -1.4
Difference Test Statistics (3.7)* (7.1)*** (3.9)** (8.1)*** (1.7) (2.1) (4.2)** (8.6)*** (0.0) (0.7)
Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on CM Ranking
High Reputation Group 56.6 20.1 9.7 -12.4 -62,5 -84.5 16.5 -5.8 -11.1 -1.7
Low Reputation Group 72.4 21.8 30.8 -1.5 -40.3 -75.2 37.3 3.7 -2.5 -8.3
Difference Test Statistics (0.5) (1.4) (3.3)* (1.6) (3.4)* (2.3) (3.2)* ( 1.6) (0.2) (0.4)
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Table 11 - Continued
Raw Returns CRSP value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted S&P 500 Index Size-B/M-indus.Match Firms
Mean Median Mean Median Mean vledian Mean Median N Mean Median
Investment Bankers’ Reputation Based on SDC Ranking
High Reputation Group 65.0 23.7 13.3 -9.9 -58.6 -78.1 20.1 -1.5 -1.8 10.9
Low Reputation Group 57.0 16.8 18.8 -12.0 -52.7 -83.8 25.4 -5.0 -16.3 -8.4
Difference Test Statists (0 .2) (0.2) (0.3) (0 .2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.1) (0 .8) (3.9)**
Corporate Diversification: Based on ttvo-digit SIC Codes
Multi-Segment IPOs 73.8 26.9 18.6 -2.2 -54.8 -78.4 25.5 4.6 4.0 8.1
Single-Segment IPOs 49.9 14.6 12.8 -15.8 -58.2 -85.5 19.3 -8.4 -6.4 -2.6
Difference Test Statistics (1.4) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0 .1) (0 .0) (0,3) (0.4) (0.3) ( 1.1)
Corporate Diversification: Based on Segments
Multi-Segment IPOs 54.3 18.6 26.5 0.0 -48.4 -71.5 33,7 5.1 35.9 28.1
Single-Segment IPOs 61.0 19.0 14.3 -12.3 -57.5 -83.5 20.9 -5.6 -5.1 -1.9
Difference Test Statistics (0. 1) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) ( 1.6) (4.2)**
IPOs with high Inst. Ownership 70.0 83.8 12.3 -1.3 -62.9 -78.6 19.3 4.3 -11.0 2.6
IPOs with low Inst. Ownership 52.5 79.7 17.9 -16.2 -51.6 -84.2 24.3 -9.0 -6.2 -1.4
Difference Test Statistics (0.8) (1.1) (0.3) (1.8) d .l ) (0 .2) (0.2) (1.9) (0.1) (0.9)
Panel D: Day 3 to 3 Year Returns (%)
Raw Returns CRSP value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted S&P 500 Index Size-B/M-indus.Match Firms
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All IPOs 83.7 19.4 12.4 -28.6 -111 -145 22.3 -18.3 -17.1 -4.7
Venture Capilatist IPOs 119.5 35.1 28,0 -16.0 -104 -137 38,5 - 2.5 - 12.1 -10.4
Non-Venture Cap. IPOs 56.0 9.8 1.0 -37.4 -116 -147 10.5 -27.8 -20.8 -3.2
Difference Test Statistics (8.0)” * (6.9)*** (4.4)** (5.2)** (0.7) (0 .2) (4.7)** (5.8)** (0 .2) (0.0)
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Raw Returns 
Mean Median
Table 11 - Continued
CRSP value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted 
Mean Median Mean Median
S&P 500 Index 
Mean Median
Size-B/M-indus.Match Firms 
N Mean Median
Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on CM Ranking
High Reputation Group 81.9 19.4 9.7 -29.5 -115 -144 19.8 -18.9 -12.7 -2.7
Low Reputation Group 93.4 30.9 23.6 -19.3 -96.6 -140 33,2 -8.7 -27.7 -14.4
Difference Test Statistics (0.2) (0.5) ( 1.0 ) (0 .1) (1.4) (1.4) (0.9) (0 .1) (0.4) (0.9)
Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on SDC Ranking
High Reputation Group 87.9 23.9 11.7 -22.5 -112 -134 21.7 -13.5 -5.4 1.5
Low Reputation Group 82.3 17.2 15.9 -31.0 -107 -150 25.7 -20.0 -5.4 1.5
Difference T est Statists (0.1) (0 .6) (0 .1) (0.7) (0 .1) (0.4) (0 .1) (0.7) (0.4) (0.9)
Corporate Diversification: Based on two-digit SIC Codes
Multi-Segment IPOs 92.6 20.1 12.6 -31.8 -115 -149 22,8 -22.0 4.9 -7.0
Single-Segment IPOs 76.7 19.1 12.7 -24.4 -108 -136 22.3 -13.5 -10.8 -3.2
Difference Test Statistics (0.5) (0.2) (0.0) (0.4) (0 .2) (0.7) (0 .0) (0.4) (0.4) (0.0)
Corporate Diversification: Based on Segments
Multi-Segment IPOs 59.8 19.5 14.2 -27.0 -114 -143 24.5 -18.8 35.6 19.2
Single-Segment IPOs 86.0 19.3 12.5 -28.4 -110 -145 22,3 -18.2 -7.2 -4.8
Difference Test Statistics (0.4) (0 .0) (0.0) (0.2) (0 .0) (0 .0) (0.0) (0.2) (0 .8) (2.2)
IPOs with high Inst. Ownership 91.8 30.2 14.6 -15,6 -113 -132 24.9 -3.1 -7.5 -0.3
IPOs with low Inst, Ownership 76.9 12.0 11.0 -39.7 -109 -148 20.6 -30.9 -25.5 -14.3
Difference Test Statistics (0.4) ( 1.6) (0 .1) (3.3)’ (0 .1) (0.3) (0 .1) (3.5)’ (0.7) (1.5)
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Table 12: Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Return Differences of IPO Firms: Venture Capitalists Versus Investment Bankers’ Reputation
Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Return differences are presented for several periods (starting from third day of trading). Returns are adjusted by substracting the contemporaneous CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted, equaly-weghted market returns, S&P 500 index returns and returns of firms matched by size and book to market ratio along with two-digit industry 
classification. Venture Capitalist (VC) IPOs are backed by a venture capitalist, the others are classified as Non-Venture Capitalist (Non-VC) IPOs. One classification for investment bankers’ 
reputation is Carter-Manaster measure. The Carter-Manaster measure is a discrete underwriter reputation variable 0-9 where a 9 is the most prestigious underwriter and 0 is the least prestigious 
underwriter. The low group (LR) consists of IPOs underwritten by investment bankers with a CM ranks lower than 8. The high group (HR) consists of CM ranks 8 and above. As a second 
investment bankers’ reputation measure, the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) underwriters ranking for the year 1996 is used. SDC ranks underwriter according to their market share. If 
underwriter of an IPO firm is ranked in top ten, this IPO firm is included in the high reputation group. Otherwise it is included in the low reputation group. The first entry difference denotes 
the median percentage return difference between HR/VC and LR/VC (HR/Non VC and LR/VC) and the second entry difference denotes the median percentage return difference between HR/VC 
and LR/Non VC (HR/Non VC and LR/NonVC). The tests for differences between the groups are performed using Wilcoxon two-sample non-parametric rank test [the Z statistic-Normal 
approximation] and Kruskal-Wallis test {Chi Square approximation Jin square brackets and queerly brackets, respectively, which assume that observations are independent. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: MEDIAN RAW RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
AI. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month Dav 3 to 1 Year Dav 3 to 2 Year (% ) Dav 3 to 3Year (% )
LR/VC
(N=52)
LR/Non VC 
(N=80)
LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/V C LR/Non VC LR/V C LR/Non VC
HR/VC*
(N=145)*
(3.8 - 4.2) 
[0.1]{0 .0 J
(3.8-(-0,0)) 
[1.2]{ 1.6 )
(23.9-15.7)
[0 .2]{0.0J
(23,9-16.6)
[0.5]{0,3J
(26.2 - 52.9) 
[-0.7]{0.6J
(26.2-16,3)
[0.9]{0.8J
(28.1 -58.8) 
[-0,6] {0.3}
(28.1-7.4)
[1.0]{1.0}
HR/NonVC*
(N=171)
(1.3-4.2) 
[! .! ]{1.2}
(1.3-(-0,0))
[0.5]{0.2J
(7.9-15.7)
[1.0]{ 1.0 J
(7.9-16.6) 
[0.6] {0.4}
(12.2-52.9)
[2.3]**{5.5J**
(12.2-16.3) (16.8 - 58.8) 
[2.1]**{4.6}**
(16.8-7.4) 
[0 .8] {0,6 }
‘These two groups are statistically different each other for each period.
A 2. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation’s Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%) Dav 3 to 1 Year (% ) Dav 3 to 2 Year (% ) Dav 3 to 3Year M l
LR/VC
(N=84)
LR/Non VC 
(N=124)
LR/VC LR/NonVC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC*
(N=112)*
(3.8 - 3.9) 
[*0.5]{0.3}
(3.8- 0.0) 
[l-3]{ 1.6 }
(20.6 - 25.9) 
[-0.3]{0.1}
(20,6 - 7.3) 
[1.4]{2.0}
(34.1 - 18.3) 
[0.5]{0.3}
(34.1 -11.4) 
[2.1]**{4.4}**
(46.5 - 28.0) 
[0.7]{0.4>
(46.5 - 6.4) 
J2.0]**{4.0}**
HR/NonVC*
(N=127)
(1.4-3.9) 
[1,5]{2.2}
(1 .4 -0.0) 
[-0.2K0 .1}
(13.3-25.9)
[0,8]{0.7}
(13,3-7.3)
[-0.9H0.9}
(18.6-18.3)
[1.5]{2.3}
(18.6-11.4) 
[-0.1] {0 .0}
(17.6-28.0)
[1.2]{1.4}
(17.6 - 6.4) 
[-0.2]{0 .0}
‘These two groups are statistically different each other in two-year and three-year buy-and-hold period.
*The observation numbers are the same for the groups for Raw, value, equaly, and S&P index adjusted returns in every period.
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Table 12- Continued
Panel B: MEDIAN CRSP VALUE-WEIGHTED ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
B l. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to I Month (%) Dav 3 to 1 Year (%) Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Ycar (%)
LR/VC LR/Non VC LR /VC LR/Non VC LR /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC* (2.9 - 2.8) 
[0.3]{0.1>
(2.9-(-1.5)) 
[1.5]{2.1}
(13.8-3.8) 
[0 .1] {0 ,0 }
(13.8-4.1) 
[0 .8] {0 .6 }
(-1.2-5.0) 
[-0,9] {0.9}
(-1.2 - ( - 12.0)) 
[0,8] {0,7}
(-18.2-4.5) 
[-0,3] {0.1}
(-18.2-(-31.3))
[ -U ]{U >
HR /NonVC* (0.5 - 2.8) 
[0.9] {0.7}
(0.5-(-1.5)) 
[0.5] {0,1}
(-1.6-3.8) 
[l-2]{ 1.4}
(-1.6-4.1) 
[0.4]{0.2}
(-21.4-5.0)
[2.5]***{6.3}**'"
(-21 ,4-(-12.0)) 
[1.2]{ 1.3}
(-37.1-4.5)
[1.6]*{2.6}*
(-37.1-(-31.3)) 
[0.4]{0.1}
‘These two groups are statistically different each other for each period.
B2. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%) Dav 3 to 1 Year f%l Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Year (%)
LR /V C 6 LR/Non VC6 LR/VC LR/Non VC LR /VC LR/NonVC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC* (2.1 -3.4) 
[-0.7K0.5}
(2.1 - ( -1.0)) 
[1.5]{2.1}
(9.9-13.1)
[-0 .2K0 .0 }
(9.9-(-4.3)) 
[1.6]{2.4}
(5.5-(-1.7)) 
[0.3]{0,3}
(5.5-(-15.1)) 
[2.0]**{4.1}**
(1.9-(-25.3)) 
[0.9] {0.9}
(1.9-(-39.4)) 
[1.7]*{2.9}*
HR/NonVC* (0.5 - 3.4) 
[1.8]*{3.3}*
(0 .5 -(-1.0)) 
[-0.3]{0.1}
(2.8-13.1) 
[1.0] {0.9}
(2.8-(-4.3)) 
[-1.0K U }
(-17.2-(-1.7)) 
[1.8]*{3.2}*
(-17.2-(-15.1)) 
[0.0K0 .0 }
(-34.4 - (-25.3)) 
[0 .8] {0 ,6 }
(-34.4 - (-39.4) 
[-0 .2]{0 .0 }
‘These two groups are statistically different each other in two-year and three-year buy-and-hold period. 
‘These two groups are statistically different each other in one-month and one-year buy-and-hold period.
Panel C: MEDIAN CRSP EQUALLY WEIGHTED ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
C l. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%) Dav 3 to 1 Year (%) Dav 3 to 2 Year /%) Dav 3 to 3Year /%!
L R /V C 6 LR/Non VC6 L R /V C LR/Non VC L R /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC* (1.5-0.4) 
[0.5]{0.4}
(1.5-(-2.3)) 
[1.6]{2.5}
(-17.3-(-17.6)) 
[-0.1]{0 .0 }
(-17.3-(-23.7)) 
[0.6] {0.4}
(-80.4 - (-58.3)) 
[-1 *2]{ 1.4}
(-80.4 - (-77.3)) 
[-0,2] {0 .0 }
(-142-(-130)) 
[-1.1 ] { 1.2}
(-142-(-147)) 
[-0.6] {0,4}
HR/NonVC* (-1.5-0.4) 
[0.7] {0.5}
(-1.5-(-2.3)) 
[0.3] {0.1}
(-26.3 -(-17.6)) 
[0.5] {0,3}
(-26.3 - (-23.7)) 
[0.0] {0 .0}
(-86.1 -(-58,3)) 
[1.9]** {3.7}**
(-86.1 -(-77.3)) 
[ U ] { 1.2>
(-146-(-130)) 
[1.3]{1.6}
(-146-(-147)) 
[0.5]{0.3)
‘These two groups are statistically different each other only in one-month buy-and-hold period. 
'These two groups are statistically different each other only in one-month buy-and-hold period.
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Table 12- Continued
C2. Investment Bankers ’ Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%) Dav 3 to 1 Year (%) Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Year (Vo)
LR /VC b LR/Non VCb LR/VC LR/Non VC LR /V C  LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR /VC* (1.0-2.1) (1.0-(-1.4)) 
[-0.6] {0.3} H.5]{2.3}
(-20.7-(-16.3)) (-20.7 - (-29.2)) 
[0 .6] {0 .0 } [-L1]{1.1>
(-61,2-(-85.8)) (-61,2-(-83,5)) 
[0.8]{0.7} [-1.2] {1.5}
(-127-(-150)) (-127-(-148)) 
[1.0]{0,9) [-0.4] {0.2}
HR /NonVC* (-2.1-2.1) (-2.1-(-1.4)) 
[1.9]*{3.5}* [-0.1K0.0}
(-21.2-(-16.3)) (-21.2-(-29.2)) 
[0.3]{0.1} [-0.8] {0.7}
(-84.5 - (-85.8)) (-84.5 - (-83.5)) 
[0.3] {0.1} [0.1]{0.0}
(-140-(-150)) (-140-(-148)) 
[-0.4] {0.2} [0.2]{0,0}
‘These two groups are statistically different each other in two-year and three-year buy-and-hold perioc
'These two groups are statistically different each other in one-month and one-year buy-and-hold period.
Panel D: MEDIAN SAP SOQ INDEX ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
D l. Investment bankers ’ reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%) Dav 3 to 1 Year (%) Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Year (Vo)
LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC* (3.0-3.2) 
[0.3]{0.1}
(3.2-(-1.0)) 
[1.5]{2.1}
(16.4-8.3)
[0 ,1]{0 .0 }
(16.4-7.0) 
[0.8] {0.7}
(4.4-13.2) 
[-0,9] {0.9}
(4.4-(-6.4)) 
[0.9]{0.8}
(-6.5-15.6)
[-0 .2}{0 .0 }
(-6.5-(-21.9)) 
[U H 1.3}
HR/NonVC* (0.7 - 3.2) 
[0,8] {0,7}
(0 .7 -(-1.0)) 
[0.3]{0.1]
(0.8 - 8.3) 
[1.3]{1.6]
(0.8 - 7.0) 
[0.41(0.2}
(-18.9-13.2)
[2.5]***{6.4}***
(-18.9-(-6.4)) 
[1.2]{1.4}
(-27.8-15.6)
[1.6|*{2.6}*
(-27.8-(-21.9)) 
[0,4]{0,1}
‘These two groups are statistically different each other for each period.
D2. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (Vo) Dav 3 to 1 Year (%) Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Year (Vo)
LR /V C b LR/Non VCb LR/VC LR/Non VC LR /V C LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC* (2.8 - 3.5) 
[-0.7]{0.5}
(2.8 -(-0.6)) 
[ 1.5] {2.1}
(14.2-16,6)
[-0.3]{0.1}
(14.2-(-3.1)) 
[1.6] {2.6}
(12.2-4.4)
[0,3]{0.3}
(12.2 - ( - 10.1)) 
[2.0]**{4.2}**
(12.9-(-15.6)) 
[0.9]{0.9}
(12.9-(-30.9)) 
[1.8]*{3.2}*
HR/NonVC* (0.8 - 3.5) 
[1.8]*{3.3}*
(0.8 -(-0.6)) 
[-0,3]{0.1}
(3.3 - 16,6) 
[1.0] { 1.1}
(3.3-(-3.1)) 
[-1.0] { 1.1}
(-10.4-4.4)
[1.9]*{3.7}*
(-10.4-(-10.1)) 
[0 .1]{0 .0 }
(-24.8-(-15.6)) 
[0.9]{0.9}
(-24.8 - (-30.9) 
[-0.11(0 .0}
‘These two groups are statistically different each other in two-year and three-year buy-and-hold period, 
bThese two groups are statistically different each other in one-month and one-year buy-and-hold period.
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Table 12 - Continued
Panel E: MEDIAN SIZE-BOOK TO MARKET-INDUSTRY ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
EL Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month ( % \ Dav 3 to 1 Year (% ) Dav 3 to 2 Year <% } Dav 3 to 3Year ( % \
LR/VC
(N=45)
LR/Non VC 
(N=55)
LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC
(N=126)
(4.6-(-0.9)) 
[0.8] {0.7}
(4.6-0.7) 
[0.4]{0.2}
(9.7-(-8.5)) 
[0.2] {0.1 >
(9.7-(-6.1)) 
[0,7]{0,5>
(9.2-(-11.2)) 
[0.2]{0.1 >
(9.2-(-1.7)) 
[1.0]{1.0>
(-4.3-(-26.7)) 
[0.5]{0.2}
(-4.3-(-4.7)) 
[0.7] {0,4}
HR/NonVC
(N=138)
(2.2-(-0.9)) 
[0.3]{0.1>
(2.2 - 0.7) 
[0.1]{0.0}
(3.2-(-8.5)) 
[-0.3]{0.1 >
(3.2-(-6.1)) 
[-0.8]{0.6]
(-2.5-(-11.2)) 
[0.0]{0.0}
(-2.5-(-1.7)) 
[-0.4]{0.2}
(-1.5-(-26.7)) 
[-0.6] {0.4}
(-1.5-(-4.7)) 
[-0.9] {0.8}
E2. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation 's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month f%l Dav 3 to 1 Year /%! Dav 3 to 2 Year (% ) Dav 3 to 3Ycar /%!
LR/VC(N:75) LR/Non VC(N:92) LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC LR/VC LR/Non VC
HR/VC
(N=95)
(3.6-3.6) (3.6-1.0) 
[-0.2]{0.0} [0.3]{0.1}
(4.6-(-1.7)) 
[-0.2] {0.0}
(4.6-(-11.1)) 
[1.0]{0.9}
(15.5-(-11,2)) 
[1.5] {2.2}
(-15.5-(-6.6)) 
[2.2]**{4.8}**
(1.4-(-36,9)) 
[1.7]*{2.8)*
(-1.4-(-5.4)) 
[1.2]{ 1.3}
HR/NonVC
(N=101)
(2.3-3.6) (2.3-1.0) 
[0.6] {0.4} [0.1]{0.0}
(8.7-(-1.7)) 
[-0.4] {0.1}
(8.7-(-11.1)) 
[-1.6] {2,5}
(-4.5-(-11.2)) 
[-0.8]{0.6}
(-4.5 - (-6,6)) 
[-1.3]{ 1.7}
(6.8-(-36.9)) 
[-1,0]{0.9}
(6.8-(-5.4)) 
[-0.3]{0.I}
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Table 13: Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Return DilTerences of IPO Firms: Investment Bankers’ Reputation Versus Institutional Investors
Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Return differences are presented for several periods (starting from third day of trading). Returns are adjusted by substracting the contemporaneous CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted, equaly-weghted market returns, S&P 500 index returns and returns of firms matched by size and book to market ratio along with two-digit industry 
classification. One classification for investment bankers’ reputation is Carter-Manaster measure. The Carter-Manaster measure is a discrete underwriter reputation variable 0-9 where a 9 is 
the most prestigious underwriter and 0 is the least prestigious underwriter. The low group (LR) consists of IPOs underwritten by investment bankers with a CM ranks lower than 8 . The high 
group (HR) consists of CM ranks 8 and above. As a second investment bankers’ reputation measure, the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) underwriters ranking for the year 1996 is used. 
SDC ranks underwriter according to their market share. If underwriter of an IPO firm is ranked in top ten, this IPO firm is included in the high reputation group. Otherwise it is included in the 
low reputation group. If institutional investors have stakes in an IPO firm greater than the median value of institutional ownership of the sample at the end of the offering year (year 0), the IPO 
firm is classified as the firm with high institutional ownership (HIGH-INST). An IPO with low institutional ownership (LOW-INST) is the one that institutional investors’ participation in this 
IPO firm is less than the median value of the sample. The first entry difference denotes the median percentage return difference between HR/HINST and LR/HINST (HR/LINST and LR/HINST) 
and the second entry difference denotes the median percentage return difference between HR/HINST and LR/LINST (HR/LINST and LR/LINST), The tests for differences between the groups 
are performed using Wilcoxon two-sample non-perametric rank test [the Z statistic-Normal approximation] and Kruskal-Wallis test {Chi Square approximation}in square brackets and queerly 
brackets, respectively, which assume that observations are independent, *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
Panel A: MEDIAN RAW RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
A l. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%1 Dav 3 to 1 Year (% ) Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Year (%)
LR/HINST
(N=44)
LR/LINST
(N=88)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST
(N=162)*
(3.1 -0.0) 
[0.6] {0.4}
(3.1- 3.3) 
[0.1]{0.0}
(25.0-19.5) 
[0.6] {0.3}
(25.0-13.1) 
[0.9] {0.7}
(25.1 -36.8) 
[-0.4]{0.1}
(25.1 - 18.7) 
[-0.2] {0.0}
(28.8 - 58.0) 
[-0.2]{0.8}
(28.8-16.8)
[0.1K0.0}
HR/LINST
(N=154)
(2.2 - 0.0) 
[0.0] {0.0}
(2.2 - 3.3) 
[0.7]{0.4}
(6.7-19,5)
[1.1]{1.1}
(6.7-13.1)
[1.4]{2.0}
(10.1-36.8)
[1.4]{2.0}
(10.1 - 18.7) 
[1.3]{ 1.6}
(12.1-58,0)
[L1K1.4}
(12.1 - 16.8) 
[0.9] {1,3}
A2. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month ( % ) Dav 3 to 1 Year f%l Dav 3 to 2 Year /%! Dav 3 to 3Year (%'S
LR/HINST LR/LINST 
(N=82) (N=126)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST
(N=124)*
(2.4-1.9) (2.4-2.5) 
[-0.6] {0.4} [0.3] {0.1}
(21.2-29.2) (21.2-6.5) 
[0.1]{0,4} [1.9]**{3.7}**
(25.3 -28.1) (25.3 -7.1) 
[-0.4]{0.2} [1.1]{1.3}
(40.4 - 28.2) (40.4 - 5.3) 
[-0.4] {0.2} [1.2]{ 1.5}
HR/LINST
(N=115)
(3.1-1.9) (3.1-2.5) 
[0.3]{0.1} [-0.7K0.5}
(11.1-29.2) (11.1-6.5) 
[1 -3]{ 1.7} [0,5]{0.2}
(22.5-28.1) (22.5-7.1) 
[0.6] {0.4} [0,3] {0.1}
(18.0-28.2) (18.0-5.3) 
[0.5] {0.2} [0.4]{0.2>
♦The Observations are the same for the groups for Raw, value, equaly, and S&P index adjusted returns.
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Table 13 - Continued
Panel B: MEDIAN CRSP VALUE-WEIGHTED ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
BI. Investment Bankers 'Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month f%l Dav 3 to 1 Year (%) Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Year (%\
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
H R/H IN ST (2.3 -(-0.8)) 
[-U K 1.3}
(2 .3 -2.1) 
[0.3] {0.1}
(11.7-4.2)
[-0.7K0.4}
(11.7-3.9) 
[0.6] {0,4}
(-1.2-(-1.4)) 
[0.4] {0.2}
(-1.2-(-6.4)) 
[0.3]{0.1}
(-18.5-(-1.6)) 
[0.0] {0,0 }
(-18.5-(-37.4)) 
[-0.6] { 1,1}
H R /LIN ST (1 .5 -(-0.8)) 
[-0 .1H0.0}
(1 5 -2 .1 )
[0.7]{0.5}
(-2.2-4.2) 
[0.7]{0,5}
(-2.2 - 3.9) 
[1.2]{1.4>
(-19.8-(-1.4)) 
[1 -4]{2.1}
(-19.8-(-6.4)) 
[1.5]{2.2}
(-39.6-(-1.6)) 
[1.1]{ 1.3}
(-39.6-(-37.4)) 
[0.7]{0,4}
‘These two groups are statistically different each other for each period, except one-month.
B2. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation 's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month f%! Dav 3 to 1 Year /%) Dav 3 to 2 Year f%l Dav 3 to 3Year (%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST (2.1 - 1.3) 
[-0 .8]{0.6 }
(2.1 -2.3) 
[-0,4]{0.2}
(8.6 - 12,8) 
[0.0]{0 .0 }
(8.6 -(-4.4)) 
J1.7]*{2.8}*
(-4.3-(-1.1)) 
[-0,4] {0,2}
(-4.3-(-16.8)) 
[-1.0K 1. 1}
(-15.5-(-18.5)) 
[-0.5]{0.3}
(-15.5-(-45.7)) 
[1.6] {2,5}
HR/LINST (1.4-1.3) 
[0.5] {0.3}
(1.4-2.3) 
[1.0] {0.9}
(2.8 - 12.8) 
[0.8] {0.7}
(2.8-(-4.4)) 
[-0.7] {0.5}
(-13.3-(-1.1)) 
[0.6] {0.4}
(-13.3-(-16.8)) 
[-0.1]{0 .0 }
(-37.1-(-18.5)) 
[0.7]{0 .6>
(-37.1 -(-45.7) 
[-0.1] {0.4}
Panel C; MEDIAN CRSP EQUALLY WEIGHTED ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
C l. Investment Bankers ’ Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month Dav 3 to 1 Year <%) Dav 3 to 2 Year /%! Dav 3 to 3Year (%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST (0.7-(-2.7)) 
[1.5]{2.2}
(0.7 - 0.7) 
[0,6] {0.3}
(-17,6-(-16.3)) 
[-0.9]{0.8}
(-17.6-(-19.4)) 
[0.2]{0,0 }
(-79.7 - (-76.8)) 
[0 .2]{ 1.1}
(-79.7 - (-74.4)) 
[-1.1] { l . l }
(-132-(-123)) 
[0.4] {0.1}
(-132-(-140)) 
[-0.6] {0.4}
HR/LINST (-0.4-(-2.7)) 
t-0 .1]{0 .0 }
(-0.4-0.7) 
[0,7] {0.5}
(-26.3-(-16.3)) 
[0 .1K0 .0 }
(-26,3 -(-19.4)) 
[0 .8]{0 .6 }
(-85.8-(-76.8)) 
[1.03(0.9}
(-85,8 - (-74.4)) 
[1.7]*{2.9}*
(-150-(-123)) 
[1.0K 1.0}
(-150-(-140)) 
[l-3]{ 1.6}
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Tabic 13 - Continued
C2. Investment Bankers ’ Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month Dav 3 to 1 Year (%’) Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Year (%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST (0.7-(-0.2)) 
[1.0] { 1.0 }
(0.7 - 0.9) 
[-0,6] {0.3}
(-19.9-(-13.7)) 
[0.3]{0.1}
(-19.9-(-29.3)) 
[-1.0] { 1.0 }
(-77.0 - (-79.7)) 
[-0.5] {0.3}
(-77.0 - (-84.9)) 
[-0,5]{0.3}
(-132-(-141)) 
[-0 .1]{0 .0)
(-132-(-151)) 
[-0.7K0.5}
HR/LINST (-1.4-(-0.2)) 
[1.7]{0.5>
(-1.4-0.9) 
[!.!]{1.3}
(-22.2-(-13.7)) 
[0 .0] {0.0}
(-22,2 - (-29.3)) 
[-1.0] { 1.0}
(-78.6 - (-79.7)) 
[-0.3] {0.1}
(-78.6 - (-84.9)) 
[-0,5] {0.2}
(-135-(-141)) 
[-0.1K0.0}
(-135-(-151)) 
[-0.7] {0.5}
Panel D: MEDIAN S&P 500 INDEX ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
D l. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month Dav 3 to 1 Year f%) Dav 3 to 2 Year /%! Dav 3 to 3Year (%)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST* (2.5-(-0.7)) 
[1.1]{ 1.2}
(2.5-3.1) 
[-0.3]{0,1}
(16.2-6.6)
[0.6]{0.4}
(16.2-7.3)
[0.7]{0.5}
(3.8-5.1) 
[0.5]{0,2}
(3.8 - 2.3) 
[0.3] {0,1}
(-7.3 -12.9) 
[0 .0]{0 .0 }
(-7.3-(-22.5)) 
[-0.7] {0.4}
HR/LINST* (1.7-(-0.7)) 
[0 .1]{0 .0 }
(1.7 - 3,1) 
[0.7]{0.4}
(-1 .3 -6 .6) 
[0.8] {0.6 }
(-1.3-7.3) 
[ 1 -2]{0.2}
(-12.9-5.1) 
[1,4]{2.0}
(-12.9-2.3)
[1.5]{2.2}
(-29.2 -12.9) 
[1.1K 1.2}
(-29.2 - (-22.5)) 
[0.7] {0.5}
•These two groups are statistically different each other for each period, except one-month.
D2. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%f Dav 3 to 1 Year f%t Dav 3 to 2 Year (%) Dav 3 to 3Year
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST (2.4-0.9) 
[-0.7K0.5}
(2.4-3.1) 
[0.4]{0.1}
(12,0-16.6)
[0,0]{0.0 }
(12.0-(-1.9)) 
(1.7]*{3.0}*
(2.7 - 5.0) 
[-0.4] {0.2}
(2.7-(-9.6)) 
[1.1]{ U }
(-1.8-(-3.1)) 
[-0.5K0.3}
(-1.8-(-32.9)) 
[-1.6]*{2.6}*
HR/LINST (1.4-0.9) 
[0.5]{0,3}
(14 -3 .1 )  
[-0,9] {0.8}
(3.2-16.6) 
[0.9] {0.9}
(3.2-(-1.9) 
[0.6]{0.3}
(6.3 - 5.0) 
[0.7]{0.5}
(6.3-(-9.6)) 
[0.0]{0,2}
(-25.8-(-3.1)) 
[0.8]{0.7}
(-25.8 - (-32.9) 
[-0.6] {0.3}
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Table 13 - Continued
Panel E: MEDIAN SIZE-BOOK TO MARKET-INDUSTRY ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
E l. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Carter-Manaster Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%) Dav 3 to I Year (%) Dav 3 to 2 Year f%) Dav 3 to 3Year (%\
LR/HINST
(N=34)
LR/LINST
(N=69)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST
(N=142)+
(4.7 - 0.2) 
[0.5]{0.2}
(4.7 - 0.3) 
[0.9] {0.9}
(10.8-(-4.7)) 
[0.2]{0.0 }
(10.8-(-7.7)) 
[1.3]{ 1.6}
(-2.5 - 29.6) 
[1.4]{ 1.9}
(-2.5-(-22.4)) 
[1.4]{2.1}
(1.2-5.1)) 
[0,2] {0 .0 }
(1.2-(-29.1)) 
[1.2] {1.5}
HR/LINST
(N=126)
(2.2 - 0.2) 
[0.1]{0.0>
(2.2 - 0.3) 
[0 .1] {0.0}
(0.6-(-4.7)) 
[0.2]{0 .1}
(0.6-(-7.7)) 
[-0.8]{0,6}
(9.2 - 29.6) 
[15]{ 1.3}
(9.2 - (-22.4)) 
[-1.4K2.0}
(-3.2-5.1) 
[-0.5]{0.3}
(-3.2-(-29.1)) 
[-0,9] {0.8}
■o
CD-5
3<f) C/)
E2. Investment Bankers' Reputation Based on Securities Data Corporation's Ranking
Dav 3 to 1 Month (%) Dav 3 to 1 Year (%\ Dav 3 to 2 Year (%\ Dav 3 to 3Year f%)
LR/HINST
(N=72)
LR/LINST
(N=99)
LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST LR/HINST LR/LINST
HR/HINST
(N=104)
(4.8 - 3.6) 
[-0.5] {0.3}
(4.8 - 0.5) 
[0.6]{0.4}
(7.4-11.1)
[0.0]{0 .0 }
(7.4-(-12.7)) 
[ 1 -4] {2.1}
(10.9-(-2.6)) 
[11]{ 1.2}
(10.9-(-15.4)) 
[2.0] **{4.0}**
(6.6 -(-4.1)) 
[0.9] {0.9)
(6.6 - (-34.4)) 
[1.6]{2.5}
HR/LINST
(N=95)
(2.1 -3.6) 
[0.9]{0.8}
(2.1 -0.5) 
[0,7]{0,5}
(9.5-11.1) 
[-0.4]{0.1}
(7.4-(-12.7)) 
[-1,1]{ 1,2}
(15.5-(-2.6)) 
[-0.8] {0,5}
(15.5-(-15.4)) 
[~1.5]{2.1}
(1.5-(-4.1)) 
[-0.3]{ 1.0}
(1.5-(-34.4)) 
[-0.9]{0.8}
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Table 14: Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Return Differences of IPO Firms: Venture Capitalists Versus Institutional Investors
Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Return differences are presented for several periods (starting from third day of trading). Returns are adjusted by substracting the contemporaneous CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted, equaly-weghted market returns, S&P 500 index returns and returns of firms matched by size and book to market ratio along with two-digit industry 
classification. Venture Capitalist (VC) IPOs are backed by a venture capitalist, the others are classified as Non-Venture Capitalist (Non-VC) IPOs. If institutional investors have stakes in an 
IPO firm greater than the median value of institutional ownership of the sample at the end of the offering year (year 0), the IPO firm is classified as the firm with high institutional ownership 
(HIGH-INST). An IPO with low institutional ownership (LOW-INST) is the one that institutional investors’ participation in this IPO firm is less than the median value of the sample. The first 
entry difference denotes the median percentage return difference between VC/HINST and NonVC/HINST (VC/LINST and NonVC/HINST) and the second entry difference denotes the median 
percentage return difference between VC/HINST and NonVC/LINST (VC/LINST and NonVC/LINST). The tests for differences between the groups are performed using Wilcoxon two-sample 
non-perametric rank test [the Z Statistic-Normal approximation] and Kruskal-Wallis test {Chi Square approximation}in square brackets and queerly brackets, respectively, which assume that 
observations are independent. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel A: MEDIAN RAW RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
Dav 3 to 1 Month (% ) Dav 3 to 1 Year (% ) Dav 3 to 2 Year (% ) Dav 3 to 3Year (*/•)
NonVC/ HINST 
(N=102)
NonVC/LINST
(N=151)
NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST
VC / HINST 
(N=104)*
(4.1 -0.0) 
[2.7]***{7.3}***
(4.1- 1.5) 
[1.9]*{3.6}*
(29.8-15.9)
[1.6]*2.6}*
(29.8 - 6.9) 
|2.7]***{7.4}***
(32.9-21.1)
[2.0]**{3.8}**
(32.9 - 6.2) 
[2.5]*** {6.5}***
(50.1 -17.4) 
[2.3]**{5.1}**
(50.1 -7.1) 
[2.6]*** {6.9}***
VC / LINST 
(N=93)
(3.5-0.0) 
[1.0K1.0]
(3.5-1.5) 
[0.3] {0,1}
(13.0-15.9) 
[0.6] {0,3}
(13.0-6.9)
[0.2]{0.0}
(28.4-21.1) 
[1>2]{ 1.4}
(28.4 - 6.2) 
[1.6]*{2.7}*
(18.4-17.4)
[0,9]{0.8}
(18.4-7.1)
[1.0K1.0}
Panel B: MEDIAN CRSP VALUE-WEIGHTED ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
Dav 3 to 1 Month ( % ) Dav 3 to 1 Year (%! Dav 3 to 2 Year /%! Dav 3 to 3Year
NonVC/ HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST
VC / HINST (3.7-(-1.2)) (3.7-1,3)
[3.0] * * * {8.7} ** * [2.0]**{4.1}**
(15,5-2.2) (15.5-(-1.7)) 
[1.9]*{3.6}* [2.5]*** {6.2}***
(1.4-(-10.5)) (1.4-(-24.2)) 
[2.0]**{4.1}** [2.7]***{7.1}***
(-0.6 - (-20.0)) (-0.6-(-41.2)) 
[1.9]*{3.5}* [2.7]***{7.2)***
V C /L IN ST (1.7-(-1.2)) (1.7-1.3) 
[0.8]{0.7} [0.2] {0.0}
(2,7-2.2) (2.7-(-1.7)) 
[0.1] {0.0} [0.3]{0.1}
(-3.1-(-10.5)) (-3.1-(-24,2)) 
[1 -2]{ 1.5} [1.7]*{3.0}*
(-27.8-(-20.0)) (-27.8-(-41.2)) 
[0.5]{0,2} [0.8] {0.7}
♦The observations are the same for the groups for raw, value, equaly, and S&P index adjusted returns in every period.
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Table 14 - Continued
Panel C: MEDIAN CRSP EQUALLY WEIGHTED A DJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
Dav 3 to 1 Month (% ) Dav 3 to 1 Year ( % ) Dav 3 to 2 Year ( % ) Dav 3 to 3Year ( % \
NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/ HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST
VC/H IN ST (2.1 -(-2.8)) 
[2.7]***{7.2}***
(2.1-(-0.4)) 
[2.7]**{5.1}**
(-14.5-(-20.0)) 
[1.1K0.0}
(-14.5-(-25.7)) 
[1.2K1.6}
(-75.7 - (-84.3)) (-75.7 - (-84.2)) 
[1.3]{1.8} [-1,2]{ 1.4}
(-125-(-140)) 
[0.6{0.4)
(-125-(-147)) 
[-0.6] {0.4}
V C/LIN ST (0.5 -(-2.8)) 
[0.7]{0.5}
(0.5-(-0.4)) 
[0.4] (0.2)
(-21.8-(-20,0)) 
[0,2]{0.0}
(-21.8 -(-25.7)) 
[0,2] {0.0}
(-79.9 - (-84.3)) (-79.9-(-84.2)) 
[0.8]{0.7> [0.6]{0.4}
(-146- (-140)) 
[0,1] {0.0}
(-146- (-147)) 
[-0.2]{0.0}
Panel D: MEDIAN S&P SOO INDEX ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIFFERENCES
Dav 3 to 1 Month f%1 Dav 3 to 1 Year /%! Dav 3 to 2 Year ( % ) Dav 3 to 3Year ( % )
NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/ HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST
V C /H IN ST (3.8-(-0.9))
[3.0] ***{9.0}***
(3.8-1.1) 
[2.0]**{4.I}**
(20.8 - (-3.6)) (20.8-(-1.8)) 
[1.9]**{3.8>** [2.6]***{6.7}***
(9.5-(-5.1)) 
[2.1]**{4.3}**
(9.5-(-19.0)) 
[2.7]***{7.5}***
(12.2-(-10,8)) 
[2.0] **{3.9}**
(12.2-(-31.7)) 
[2.8]***{7.9}***
VC / LINST (2.3-(-0.9)) 
[0,9] {0.7}
(2.3- 1.1) 
[0.1]{0.0}
(4.8-(-3.6)) (4.8-(-1.8)) 
[0.1] {0.0} [0.3] {0.1}
(4.6-(-5.1)) 
[1.2] {1.6}
(4.6-(-19.0)) 
|1.9]*{3.5}*
(-18.7-(-10.8)) 
[0.5] {0.3}
(-18.7-(-10.8)) 
[0.9]{0,8}
Panel E: MEDIAN SIZE-BOOK TO MARKET-INDUSTRY ADJUSTED RETURN (%) DIF1FERENCES
Dav 3 to 1 Month ( % ) Dav 3 to 1 Year ( % \ Dav 3 to 2 Year Dav 3 to 3Year ( % )
NonVC/HINST
(N=85)
NonVC/LINST 
(N=l 12)
NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST NonVC/HINST NonVC/LINST
VC /H IN ST
(N=91)
(5.2 - 2.3) 
[1,4]{1.9}
(5.2- 1.6) 
[1.4]{ 1.9}
(11.3-4.8)
[0.9]{0.8}
(11.3-(-0.9)) 
[!• 1]{ 1-2}
(8.0-(-0.2)) 
[0.9]{0.7}
(8.0 - 0.3) 
[1,4]{ 1.8}
(6.6-(-4.1)) 
[1.2]{ 1.5}
(6.6-(-1.3)) 
[1.0]{1.0}
V C/LIN ST
(N=85)
(0.2 - 2.3) 
[-0.5K0.2}
(0.2- 1.6) 
[0.7]{0.5}
(-5.3-4.8)) 
[0.6] {0.3}
(-5.3-(-0.9)) 
[0.4] {0.1}
(-2.0-(-0.2)) 
[0.1]{0.0}
(-2.0 - 0.3) 
[-0.5] {0.2}
(-30,1-(-4.1)) 
[-0.6]{0.5}
(-30.1-(-1.3)) 
[0.8]{0.7}
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Table 15: Cross-Sectional Regressions Explaining Raw and Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns
The dependent variables are the raw and adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns (starting from third day of trading) for 456 U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. Returns are adjusted 
by subtracting the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted, equally-weighted market returns, and returns of firms matched by size and book to market ratio along with two-digit 
industry classification. These returns are regressed on three dummy variables. First dummy variable represents whether an IPO firm is venture-backed or not (VBDUMMY), It takes 1 if the IPO firm 
is backed by a venture capitalist, and zero if it is not. Investment bankers’ reputation is presented by another dummy variable (REPDUM), It takes 1 if IPOs are underwritten by high reputable 
investment bank, otherwise zero. Another dummy variable (DIVDUM) is used for corporate diversification. It takes 1 for a firm defined a single segment IPO firm if it has only one 2-digit SIC code. 
For a firm with two or more different two-digit SIC codes labeled as Multi-Segment IPO firm, it takes 0, Independent variables include issue size (ISSUE) which is defined as total value of the offering 
divided by total assets at the year prior to the offering (year -1), the percentage of the total issue offered by current shareholders (SECOND), and ownership variables, which are percentage of shares
held by institutional (INST), blockholders (LARGE), and Insiders (INSD). The t statistics are given in parentheses. ♦, *♦, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level._________________
Panel A; Cross-Sectional Regression Results (Based on Carter-Manaster Investment Bankers’ Reputation Ranking)_______________________________________________________
Dependent Variables
Raw BHRs Value Weighted Adjusted BHRs Equally Weighted Adjusted BHRs Sizc-B/M-Industry Adj. BHRs
Day 3 to 
1 Month
Independent Variables
Day 3 to 
1 Year
Day 3 to 
2 Year
Day 3 to 
3 Year
Day 3 to 
1 Month
Day 3 to 
1 Year
Day 3 to 
2 Year
Day 3 to 
3 Year
Day 3 to 
I Month
Day 3 to 
1 Year
Day 3 to 
2 Year
Day 3 to 
3 Year
Day 3 to 
1 Month
Day 3 to 
1 Year
Day 3 to 
2 Year
Day 3 to 
3 Year
Intercept 0.02 0.12 0.53 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.19 0,05 -0.00 -0,22 -0.42 -0.97 0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.37
(0.8) (1.6)* (3.5)*** (3.2)*** (0.5) (0.2) (1.3) (0.3) (-0.5) (-3,0)"'>(-2.7)"*(-4.9)*" (0.3) (-0.9) (-0.1) (-1.1)
VBDUMMY 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.26 0.03 0,06 0.20 0,26 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.15
(2.2)" (0.8) (1.5) (1.9)** (2.1)" (1.1) (1.7)* (1.9)** (1.8)* (0.5) (1.1) (0.6) (0.8) (0.1) (0.2) (0.6)
REPDUM 1 0.00 -0.05 -0,29 -0.30 0.01 -0,05 -0.30 -0.30 0.01 -0.04 -0.31 -0.35 -0.01 -0.04 -0.19 0.23
(0.3) (-0.8) (-2.2)** (-1.9)** (0.5) (-0.9) (-2.3)" (-1.9)" (0.4) (-0.7) (-2.3)" (-2,0)** (-0.4) (-0.4) (-0.9) (0.8)
DIVDUM 0.02 0.10 -0.04 0.09 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.09 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.16 0,03 0.20 0.02 0.07
(0.9) (1.7)* (-0.4) (0.6) (1.0) (1.8)* (-0.3) (0.7) (0.9) (1.4) (-o.i) 0 .1) (1.3) (1.8)* (0.1) (0.3)
ISSUE 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0,00 -0,00 0.00
ooo
-0.00 -0.00 (0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(1.2) (-0.8) (-0.6) (-0.5) (1.0) (-0.9) (-0.6) (-0.5) (1.2) (-0.6) (-0.5) (-0.7) (1.3) (-1.0) (-0.7) (-1.0)
SECOND -0.00 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.15 0.02 -0.38 -0.15 -0.18
(-0.1) (-1.0) (-0.3) (-0.3) (-0.2) (-0.8) (-o.i) (-0.2) (-0.1) (-0.5) (0.1) (-0.5) (0.5) (-1.9)" (-0.4) (-0.4)
INST -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0,00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0,00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(-0.2) (2.6)*" (1.0) (0.60 (0.00) (2.4)" (1.2) (1.0) (0.1) (1.4) (0.3) (0.5) (-0.0) (2.2)** (1.8)* (1.0)
LARGE -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0,01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.1) (-3.9)"'> (-2.6)*" (-2.4)" (-0.3) (-3.7)"'► (-2.8)"''(-2,6)*« (-0.3) (-2,7)"* (-2,1)" (2,0)** (0.1) (-1.7)* (-1.8)* (-1.3)
INSD -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0,00 0,01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.8) (1.9)* (1.4) (1.6)* (-0.6) (1.6)* (1.5) (2.0)" (-0.2) (1.0) (0.7) (0.4) (-0.8) (-0.4) (0.5) (0.4)
Adj. R2 0.001 0,053 0.019 0.019 -0.001 0.049 0,026 0.024 -0.004 0.012 0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.022 0.000 -0.008
p for F-st. (0.41) (0.00)*** (0.05)*'' (0.05)" (0.49) (0.00)*"(0.02)" (0.03)" (0.60) (0.12) (0.19) (0.23) (0.72) (0.06)* (0.43) (0.72)
# of Obs 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 326 326 326 326
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Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regression Results (Based on Securities Data Corporations* Investment Bankers* Reputation Ranking)
Dependent Variable
Raw BHRs Value Weighted Adjusted BHRs Equally Weighted Adjusted BHRs Size-B/M-Industry Adj. BHRs
Day 3 to 
1 Month
Independent Variables
Day 3 to 
I Year
Day 3 to 
2 Year
Day 3 to 
3 Year
Day 3 to 
1 Month
Day 3 to 
1 Year
Day 3 to 
2 Year
Day 3 to 
3 Year
Day 3 to 
1 Month
Day 3 to 
1 Year
Day 3 to 
2 Year
Day 3 to 
3 Year
Day 3 to 
1 Month
Day 3 to 
1 Year
Day 3 to 
2 Year
Day 3 to 
3 Year
Intercept 0 .02 0.09 0.41 0.47 0 .02 -0.02 0.07 -0,06 -0 .00 -0.24 -0.56 -1.13 0 .00 -0.17 -0 .20 -0.42
( 1.1) • (1.4) (2.9)*** (2.7)*** (0 .8) (-0.3) (0.5) (-0.4) (-0.3) (-3.6)***(-3.9)***(-6.0)*** (0 .2) (-1.3) (-0.9) (-1.3)
VBDUMMY 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.25 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.25 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.13
(2.2)** (0 .8) (1.4) (1.8)* (2.1)** (1.0) (1.7)* (1.8)* (1.9)* (0.4) (0.9) (0.5) (0 .8) (-0.0) (0.1) (0.5)
REPDUM2 -0 .00 0 .00 -0.08 -0 .10 -0 .00 0.01 -0.09 -0 .12 -0 .00 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.21 0.45
(-0 .1 ) (0 .0) (-0.7) (-0.7) (-0,3) (0.1) (-0.7) (-0 .8) (-0 .2) (0.2) (-0.4) (-0.5) (-0 .2) (0.6) d . l ) (1.8)*
DIVDUM 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.10 0.02 0,10 -0.02 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.08
(0.9) (1.8)* (-0.3) (0.7) (1 .0) (1.8)* (-0.2) (0.7) (0 .8) (1.5) (0 .0) (1 .1) (1.3) (1.9)* (0 .2) (0.3)
ISSUE 0 .00 -0 .00 -0.00 -0.00 0 .00 -0.00 -0.00 -0 ,00 0.00 -0.00 -0 .00 -0.00 (0 .00 -0.00 -0,00 -0 .00
(1 .2 ) (-0 .8) (-0.7) (-0 .6) (1 .0) (-0.9) (-0.7) (-0 .6) (1 .2) (-0.6) (-0 .6) (-0.8) (1.3) (-1.0) (-0.7) (-0.9)
SECOND -0 .00 -0.11 -0 .10 -0.12 -0 .00 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0 .00 -0,06 -0.1 -0 .20 0.02 -0.38 -0 .22 -0.23
(-o.i) (-1 .1) (-0.5) (-0.5) (-0 .1) (-0.9) (-0.3) (-0.3) (-0 .1) (-0.6) (-o.i) (-0.7) (0.5) (-1-9)” (-0.7) (-0.5)
INST -0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 -0 .00 0.01 0.00 0,00 0 .00 0,00 0 .00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(-0 .1 ) (2.5)*** (0.7) (0.4) (0 .00) (2.3)** (0.9) (0 .8) (0 .2) (1.3) (0 .2) (0.3) (-0 .1) (2.1)** (1.5) (0.9)
LARGE -0 .00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0 .00 -0,01 -0.01 -0.01 0 .00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(-0 .0 ) (-3.9)**' (-2.6)*** (-2.4)** (-0.3) (-3.8)*** (-2.8)**-*(-2.6)*** (-0 .2) (-2.7)***'(-2 .1)** (2.0)** (0.1) (-1.8)* (-2.0)** (-1.4)
INSD -0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 -0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 -0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 -0 .00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0 .8 ) (1.9)* (1.2) (1.5) (-0 .6) (1.6) (1.4) (1.8)* (-0 .1) (0.9) (0 .6) (0.3) (-0 .8) (-0.5) (0.5) (0.4)
Adj. RJ 0.001 0.051 0.008 0.011 -0.001 0.047 0.014 0.016 -0.005 0.011 -0,005 -0.003 -0.009 0.023 0.001 -0.000
p for F-st. (0.41) (0.00)*** (0 .21) (0.10)* (0.49) (0.00)***(0.10)* (0.07)* (0.62) (0.14) (0.64) (0.57) (0.73) (0.05)** (0.39) (0.44)
# of Obs 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 326 326 326 326
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Table 16: Cross-Sectional Regressions Explaining Operating Performance Changes
The dependent variables are several operating performance changes of 456 U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994, Operating performance changes are adjusted by subtracting 
the performance changes of firms matched by size and book to market ratio along with two-digit industiy classification. Following variables are used as the dependent variables. Operating Return 
on Assets (EBITD/Assets) is operating income before deprecation divided by total assets (data item 13/data item 6). Operating Cash Flows are operating income before depreciation less capital 
expenditures (data item 13 - data Item 128). Tobin’s q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stocks plus net current assets plus long term debt divided 
by total assets [data item (24 x 25)+ data item 10 + data item (5 - 4) + data item 9 / data item 6].The dependent variables are regressed on three dummy variables. First dummy variable represents 
whether an IPO firm is venture-backed or not (VBDUMMY). It takes 1 if the IPO firm is backed by a venture capitalist, and zero if it is not. Investment bankers’ reputation based on Carter-Manaster 
Investment Bankers’ Reputation rankings is presented by another dummy variable (REPDUM), It takes 1 if IPOs are underwritten by high reputable investment bank, otherwise zero. Another dummy 
variable (DIVDUM) is used for corporate diversification. It takes 1 for a firm defined a single segment IPO firm if it has only one 2-digit SIC code. For a firm with two or more different two-digit 
SIC codes labeled as Multi-Segment IPO firm, it takes 0. Independent variables include issue size (ISSUE) which is defined as total value of the offering divided by total assets at the year prior to the 
offering (year -1), the percentage of the total issue offered by current shareholders (SECOND), and ownership variables, which are percentage of shares held by institutional (INST), blockholders 
(LARGE), and Insiders (INSD). The t statistics are given in parentheses. *, ♦*, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.___________________________________________________
Dependent Variables
Tobin’s Q Operating Return on Assets Operating Cash Flows/Assets
IPO Finns Size-B/M-lndustry Adjusted IPO Finns IPO Firms
Year 1 Otol  0 to2  0to3 Year 1 Otol  0 to2  0to3 Year 1 -1 to 1 - l t o 2  - l t o3  Year 1 -1 to 1 - 1 to 2 -1 to 3
Intercept 2.28 0.98 0.56 0.23 1.79 1.60 0.68 0.34 0.04 0.36 0.28 0.50 -0.06 0.50 2.22 1.90
(4.6)*** (2.8)*** (2.3)** (0.8) (5.7)*** (3.0)*** (1.8)* (0.7) (0.9) (0.5) (0.2) (0.3) (-1.3) (0.6) (1.2) (1.8)*
VBDUMMY 1.20 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.26 -0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.25 -0.52 -0.92 -0,01 0.63 2.1 1.14
(3.1)*** (0.3) (0.7) (0.2) (1.2) (-0.0) (0.3) (-0.2) (-1.3) (-0.4) (-0.6) (-0.8) (-0.4) (0.9) (1.6)* (1.5)
REPDUM -0.88 -0.55 -0.44 -0.40 -0.48 -0.76 -0.50 -0.53 0.08 -0.34 -0.45 -0,63 0.06 -0.73 -2.4 -1.78
(-2.0)** (-1.8)* (-2.1)** (-1.5) (-1.9)* (-1.7)* (-1.6)* (-1.4) (2.3)** (-0.5) (-0.4) (-0.5) (1.7)* (-0.9) (-1.6)* (-2.0)**
DIVDUM -0.06 -0.44 0.00 0.13 0.19 -0.54 0.15 0.36 0.04 -0.19 -0.55 -0,86 0.03 -0.52 -1.77 -1.43
(-0.2) (-1.6)* (0.0) (0.6) (0.8) (-1.4) (0.6) (LI) (1.3) (-0.3) (-0.6) (-0.7) (0.9) (-0.7) (-1.4) (-1.9)*
ISSUE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.2) (-o.i) (0.1) (-o.i) (-o .i) (-6.6)*»* (-o.i) (0.2) (0.2) (-6.7)*** (-0.8) (-0.8) (-1.0)
SECOND -0.27 -0.16 0.01 0.45 -0.05 -0.36 -0.12 0.43 0.09 -0.76 -1.08 -1.50 0.11 -1.0 -1.40 -0.68
(-0.4) (-0.3) (0.0) ( l .D (-o.i) (-0.5) (-0.3) (0.8) (1.7)* (-0;7) (-0.6) (-0.7) (1.8)* (-0.7) (-0.6) (-0.5)
INST -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
(-0.9) (-1.0) (-1.9)** (-1.5) (0.1) (-1.0) (-1.4) (-1.3) (2.2)** (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (2.4)** (1.1) (1.0) (0.9)
LARGE -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0,00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-2.0)** (0.6) (0.2) (-0.2) (-0.9) (0.9) (-0.0) (-0.3) (-1.7)* (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (-1.4) (0.3) (-0.1) (-0.2)
INSD 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0,01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(2.4)** (-0.1) (0.2) (0.9) (0.6) (-1.0) (-0.5) (0.6) (2.3)** (-0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (2.3)** (-0.5) (-0.9) (-1.0)
Adj. R2 0.037 0.003 0.007 -0.007 -0.004 0.009 -0.006 -0.010 0.183 -0.018 -0.019 -0.023 0.176 -0.011 0.002 0.014
p for F-sta, (0.00)***(0.33) (0.25) (0.63) (0.53) (0.24) (0.58) (0.63) (0.0)*** (0.99) (0.99) (0.98) (0.0)*** (0.86) (0.37) (0.17)
# of obs 380 380 358 270 269 269 250 189 381 381 356 272 371 372 347 265
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Table 17: Cross-Sectional Regressions Explaining Operating Performance at Year 1
The dependent variables are several operating performances o f456 U.S. firms announced public offering between 1989-1994. Operating performance are adjusted by 
subtracting the performance of firms matched by size and book to market ratio along with two-digit industry classification, Following variables are used as the dependent 
variables. One dependent variable is capital expenditures over total assets (data item 128/data item 6). Operating margin is operating income before depreciation divided 
by total sales (data item 13/data item 12). Book to Market ratio is book value divided by market value. Book value is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred 
taxes (data item 6 0 + data item 35). Excess market value is the difference between market value of outstanding shares and book value of equity divided by total sales[(data 
item (24 x 25) - data item 60)/data item 12], The dependent variables are regressed on three dummy variables. First dummy variable represents whether an IPO firm is 
venture-backed or not (VBDUMMY). It takes 1 if the IPO firm is backed by a venture capitalist, and zero if it is not. Investment bankers’ reputation based on Carter- 
Manaster Investment Bankers’ Reputation rankings is presented by another dummy variable (REPDUM). It takes 1 if IPOs are underwritten by high reputable investment 
bank, otherwise zero. Another dummy variable (DIVDUM) is used for corporate diversification. It takes 1 for a firm defined a single segment IPO firm if it has only one 
2-digit SIC code. For a firm with two or more different two-digit SIC codes labeled as Multi-Segment IPO firm, it takes 0, Independent variables include issue size (ISSUE) 
which is defined as total value of the offering divided by total assets at the year prior to the offering (year -1), the percentage of the total issue offered by current shareholders 
(SECOND), and ownership variables, which are percentage of shares held by institutional (INST), blockholders (LARGE), and Insiders (INSD). The t statistics are given 
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.___________________________________________________________________________
Dependent Variables
Operating margin Capital Expend./Assets Book to Market Excess market Value
IPO Finns Adjusted_______ IPO Finns______Adjusted_______ IPO Firms______Adjusted_______ IPO Finns______Adjusted
Intercept -0.50 -0.35 0.09 0.07 0.50 0.59 9.9 12.2
(-1.0) (-0.8) (6.6)*** (5.4)*** ( 10)*** (9.6)*** (1.8)* (2.3)**
VBDUMMY -0.67 -0.39 -0,02 0.01 -0.15 -0.13 10.8 5.14
(-1.8)* (-1.4) (-2.3)** ( 1.2) (-3.9)*** (-2.9)*** (2,5)*** (1.4)
REPDUM 0.24 0.61 0.01 0.02 0,02 -0.03 0.40 -8.9
(0.6) (1.8)* ( 1.2) (2.0)** (0.4) (-0.6) (0.1) (-2.0)**
DIVDUM 0.05 0.39 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.02 1.45 -3.11
(0 .1) (1.4) (1.5) (0.7) (1.5) (-0,3) (0.3) (-0 .8)
ISSUE -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-2.4)** (-2.6)*** ( 1.2) (-1.7)* (2.8)*** (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
SECOND 0.31 0.30 -0.01 -0.00 0,05 0,11 -9.43 -4.93
(0.5) (0 .6) (-0 .6) (-0 .0) (0.7) (1.4) (-1.2) (-0.7)
INST 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0,00 -0.00 0.00 -0.15 -0.07
(1.5) (0.3) (-1.D (-1.3) (-0.7) (0.6) (-1.3) (-0.7)
LARGE -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.05
oo1
(-0.8) (0 .0) (-0.5) (1.3) (3.3)*** (1.3) (-0.4) (-o.i)
INSD 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.04
(1.4) (-1.0) (0.7) M. l ) (-2.3)** (-2.5)*** (-1.4) (0.5)
Adj. RJ 0.028 0.037 0,006 0.019 0,080 0.035 0.015 0.004
p for F-sta. (0,02)** (0.03)** (0.25) (0 .12) (0 .00)*** (0 .02)** (0.09)* (0,34)
if of obs 344 247 369 257 386 278 378 272
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